# EMERGENCY PHASE BOOKLET

IRAN PROSPERITY PROJECT

NUFDI

FEBRUARY 2026

IRAN PROSPERITY PROJECT

EMERGENCY PHASE

FOREWORD

The Iran Prosperity Project presents this Booklet as a blueprint for the first 180 days following the fall of the Islamic Republic (the "Emergency Phase"), serving as a practical guide to Iran's transition to freedom and stability. Created by experts from within Iran and the diaspora, it draws on firsthand knowledge to address the urgent challenges of governance, security, the economy, and society in the immediate post-regime period.

For over forty years, the Islamic Republic has imposed authoritarian rule, suppressed Iran's rich cultural heritage and economic potential, and isolated the country internationally. The regime's policies have caused widespread suffering, including human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and financial crises, among other harms. Nevertheless, the resilience of the Iranian people—evident in ongoing protests and demands for change—demonstrates that a new chapter is within reach.

This Booklet proposes a structured path forward, centered on a Transitional System to govern Iran during the transitional period, consisting of the Transitional Mehestan (the legislative branch), the Transitional Government (the executive branch), and the Transitional Divan (the judiciary). Key priorities include securing borders, maintaining essential public services, stabilizing the economy through transparent budgeting and market-based reforms, reorienting foreign policy, and reforming education.

Central to this framework are democratic mechanisms: first, a referendum to determine the system of government—whether a parliamentary monarchy or a republic—followed by the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution; then a referendum on the proposed Constitution; and finally, an election for the Mehestan (the Parliament). These steps ensure that Iran's future is shaped by its citizens, fostering unity across ethnic, religious, and social groups.

All political parties and figures that adhere to the following four principles are welcome to join the coalition to bring this blueprint to life: first, Iran's territorial integrity; second, a secular democracy based on the separation of religion and state; third, individual freedoms and equality before and under the law; and fourth, the Iranian people's right to freely choose their system of government (whether a parliamentary monarchy or a republic).

To the people of Iran: your resolve has eroded the foundations of tyranny. This plan honors your sacrifices by providing the tools to rebuild our country—one where individual rights are protected, women and men in all religious and ethnic communities thrive equally, and opportunities in education, industry, and innovation abound. A free Iran will harness its natural resources, human capital, and strategic position to achieve rapid growth, environmental sustainability, and social well-being. United in purpose, we can transform challenges into progress, restoring Iran's position as a center of prosperity, true to the cradle of civilization she has always been.

To leaders and policymakers in the region and the world: a democratic Iran will emerge as a reliable partner, committed to regional peace and global cooperation. Freed from the regime's support for terrorism, nuclear weapons programs, and proxy conflicts, Iran will normalize its relations, respect international norms, and contribute to shared goals such as countering extremism and stabilizing the Middle East. By supporting this transition through diplomatic recognition, economic cooperation, and technical assistance, you invest in a stable ally that bolsters security, advances trade, and strengthens our shared interests.

This Booklet is a call to action, grounded in realism and hope. It lays the foundation of a path for an Iran that benefits both its people and the world.

Reza Pahlavi

A NOTE FROM NUFDI'S PRESIDENT

The National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization in Washington, DC. It works to elevate the voices of the Iranian-American community, which tirelessly strives to strengthen international support for the Iranian people's democratic aspirations and to help shape a serious policy framework for a peaceful transition and long-term stability. We seek to connect diaspora communities, policymakers, media, and civil society around a common goal: supporting the Iranian people, isolating the Islamic Republic regime's machinery of repression, and preparing for a future democratic Iran that can rejoin the international community as a responsible and prosperous nation.

NUFDI's vision is an Iran that is free and democratic, where the Iranian people can determine their future through peaceful political participation, free elections, and the rule of law. We believe Iran's future must be built on equal citizenship, accountability, and national dignity, with protections for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right of every Iranian to live without fear of repression. At its core, NUFDI envisions a post-Islamic Republic Iran with a secular governing system rooted in the will of the people, while preserving Iran's territorial integrity, cultural heritage, and national unity. At NUFDI, we have long believed that supporting the Iranian people means more than opposing the Islamic Republic; it also means helping build the foundation for what comes next.

This booklet, the Emergency Phase of the Iran Prosperity Project, is part of NUFDI's commitment to help prepare for that future responsibly and seriously. The purpose is not to dictate Iran's future; that future belongs to the Iranian people. Rather, this document is a practical planning tool for the transitional period. It reflects a simple belief: preparation matters. A successful transition requires not only courage in the streets, but also competence, coordination, and foresight. I am deeply grateful to all those who have contributed their time, expertise, and patriotism to this effort.

The Iranian people have already shown extraordinary bravery. Our responsibility, especially those of us outside Iran who have the freedom to plan and prepare, is to match that bravery with readiness. We must be prepared to support a peaceful transition, help prevent chaos, and ensure that the first steps of a post-Islamic Republic Iran move the country in the right direction.

We offer this booklet as a sign of confidence in Iran's future. The road ahead will not be easy. But Iran is not beginning from nothing. It is a great nation with a rich civilizational heritage, a talented population, and a strong capacity to rebuild. With the right preparation, principled leadership, and the support of a united people, Iran will emerge from this dark chapter stronger, freer, and more prosperous than before.

Dr. Saeed Ganji
NUFDI President/CEO

ABOUT
IRAN PROSPERITY PROJECT

By convening subject-matter experts to develop a comprehensive, practical, and peer-reviewed plan for Iran's post-Islamic Republic future, the Iran Prosperity Project ("Project") provides a clear roadmap for rebuilding the country during the Transitional Period[1] and beyond, meeting its socioeconomic needs, and preparing it to become an economic powerhouse. Our mission is to chart a path toward a free and prosperous Iran and to demonstrate that the dreams millions hold for a new Iran are attainable.

OUR VISION

Our vision is to see the revitalization of Iran—the birthplace of a glorious civilization—after nearly five decades of the Islamist regime's incompetence and brutality, which have brought the country to the brink of collapse. The regime has deprived tens of millions of Iranians of the opportunity to achieve prosperity and deprived the world of all that Iran and Iranians can offer. Since this regime took power, the Iranian people have fought for freedom and the chance to flourish like their regional neighbors and global peers.

When the regime falls—as it inevitably will—the Iranian nation will embark on rebuilding its country. This Project provides a guiding framework rooted in the aspirations and priorities of the Iranian people. Within a democratic political system, Iranians can restore lost prosperity and growth through hard work, foreign investment, and

international commerce while also contributing to the global rules-based order. For the world, a free and democratic Iran represents one of the last large, untapped markets. With its strategic location, abundant natural resources, a well-educated and skilled workforce, and significant existing infrastructure, the country is poised to finally unleash its economic potential.

A future Iran can establish long-term economic relationships with its neighbors based on mutual respect, fostering stability and cooperation across the region—rather than the extremism and terrorism exported by the current regime. Domestically, the resulting expansion of international trade will serve as a powerful engine for the Iranian economy, helping to revive what was once a regional powerhouse.

THE PROJECT'S STRUCTURE

This Project is structured into three phases, each with its own implementation timeline. The first phase is the Emergency Phase, which covers the first six months of the Transitional Period and focuses on addressing immediate challenges while preparing the country for a democratic and economically prosperous future. This phase is addressed in detail in this Booklet. A draft of the Booklet was published in July 2025 to solicit public feedback. The authors subsequently analyzed the feedback and revised the Booklet accordingly.

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[1]The term "Transitional Period" refers to the time between the fall of the Islamic Republic regime and the establishment of a democratically elected government.

The second phase is the Stabilization Phase (running from month seven through the end of the Transitional Period), and the third phase is the Post-Transition Long-Term Reforms Phase (beginning with the formation of the first elected government). The booklets covering these two phases focus on policy and strategic planning for the Transitional Period and recommendations for long-term reforms. Some parts of these booklets have already been completed, and they will be released to the public as they are finalized.

In addition to the phased booklets, the Project includes a subject-matter-specific track of policy papers organized into two categories: Foundational Stabilization and Industrial Revitalization. These papers establish national policy frameworks to support long-term economic stability, labor market resilience, and sustainable growth. They also outline sector-specific visions and investment requirements. A draft of the economic part of the Foundational Stabilization papers was released to the public for comment in May 2025, and the full booklet is expected to be published in the coming months. Work on the Industrial Revitalization papers has already commenced, and the initial draft will be released in the near future.

Iran is a great country, and Iranians are a great nation. They deserve freedom, prosperity, and respect. The Iran Prosperity Project has developed a comprehensive plan to restore Iran's greatness.

Saeed Ghasseminejad, Ph.D.
Project Director

INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE: A PRACTICAL ROADMAP TO REBUILDING IRAN

In January 2026, the world watched in horror as the Islamic Republic massacred, according to credible reports, tens of thousands of peaceful protesters across Iran in just a few days. This atrocity marks a turning point: the regime has completely lost the remaining domestic legitimacy it claimed to have. These acts of mass violence have further solidified the Islamic Republic's position as an international pariah. The Islamic Republic stands as a failed and deeply unpopular political system, clinging to power through sheer brutality and against the will of the people. After nearly five decades of gross incompetence, domestic repression, regional aggression, and systemic corruption, the downfall of the Islamic Republic appears increasingly plausible and is indeed perceived by many as inevitable.

To reclaim and rebuild Iran, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has outlined a five-pronged campaign strategy: 1) exerting maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic; 2) providing maximum support to the Iranian people; 3) encouraging maximum defections from the regime; 4) maximizing mobilization of Iranians inside and outside Iran; and 5) planning for the reconstruction of Iran following the regime's fall. It is the fifth prong—the reconstruction of Iran—that gave rise to the Iran Prosperity Project (the "Project"), which provides a comprehensive strategic roadmap to address the systemic challenges of a post-theocratic transition in Iran. The Project is structured into three phases, each with its own implementation timeline. The first phase, covering the first six months following the fall of the regime, is called the Emergency Phase and is the subject of this Booklet.

The primary objective of this Booklet is to mitigate the volatility of the Emergency Phase through coordinated efforts in economic, legal, and political reconstruction. By engaging with key international and domestic stakeholders, the Project seeks to establish a resilient framework for democratic governance and a renewed social contract, ensuring both immediate stabilization and long-term institutional viability. Even if the regime's fall is delayed, partial, or uneven, the Emergency Phase logic set out in this Booklet still applies.

The Project team released a draft of this Booklet in July 2025 for public comment to engage in a democratic process and collect feedback, views, and concerns from Iranians. The authors have subsequently analyzed the feedback received and revised the Booklet accordingly. While this Booklet primarily focuses on the Emergency Phase, it also contains elements that affect the medium- and long-term viability of a free and democratic Iran.

CONTEXT: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IS WEAK, VULNERABLE, AND HAS LOST LEGITIMACY

The brutal response to the January 2026 uprising—known as the "Lion and Sun Revolution"—has solidified a domestic and international consensus regarding the Islamic Republic's lack of viability and legitimacy. Defined by endemic economic stagnation and pervasive social and political repression, the regime's stability is further undermined by strategic failures, military defeats, and the concentration of power in the hands of Ali Khamenei, the aging and increasingly paranoid Supreme Leader. Attempts to reform the regime have been systematically blocked from within since the 1990s. As a result, the Iranian public—and even regime insiders—have largely abandoned any hope for meaningful reforms capable of producing tangible political, social, or economic change.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution caused a profound upheaval in Iran's social fabric, marked by severe restrictions on civil liberties and a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The regime's systematic interference in private life—ranging from clothing choices to social media use—has led to persistent conflict between the state and society. The September 2022 Mahsa Uprising, sparked by the tragic death of Mahsa Amini following her arrest for alleged noncompliance with hijab laws, serves as a stark example of the regime's brutal enforcement of its repressive public policies.

The Islamic Republic's regional and global policies have exacerbated domestic economic instability while solidifying its reputation as a hostile international actor. These policies include nuclear proliferation efforts, declared goals to eliminate the State of Israel, and attempts to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa, among others. Furthermore, the regime's strategic campaigns to expel the United States forces from the Persian Gulf, its support for militant groups beyond its borders, and its involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war have further isolated Iran. Consequently, many analysts now argue that regime change represents the most practical response to these systemic challenges.

The strategic landscape of the Middle East has shifted significantly following Israel's post-October 2023 campaign against the "Axis of Resistance," which substantially weakened Hamas and Hezbollah. The subsequent fall of the Assad regime further isolated the Islamic Republic, undermining decades of geopolitical investment in Syria and regional proxy networks. In addition, the 12-Day War of June 2025 inflicted significant damage on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program and military capabilities. The loss of numerous commanders from both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the "IRGC") and the regime's conventional armed forces exposed core institutional weaknesses when confronted with a determined and capable foreign adversary, prompting a reassessment of the regime's military capacity. These developments shattered the regime's narrative of invincibility and have fueled internal discord, as even senior officials increasingly question the effectiveness of the regime's regional strategy.

Iran's macroeconomic indicators reflect prolonged stagnation since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, with real per capita income remaining significantly below pre-1979 levels and consistently underperforming upper-middle-income peers and regional averages. This stagnation is compounded by an average annual inflation rate of 22 percent since 1979, a sharp increase from the approximately 6 percent observed between 1960 and 1978. Inflation exceeded 60 percent in 2025. In the same year, the collapse of Ayandeh Bank—once one of the country's largest private financial institutions—further exposed the systemic fragility of the regime's banking sector. As a result, a growing consensus has emerged among the Iranian public and private sectors that sustainable economic development is fundamentally incompatible with the current governance framework. This sentiment was exemplified by the widespread bazaar strike of December 2025, which served as a critical precursor to the January 2026 Lion and Sun Revolution and signaled a shift in the attitudes of the bazaar—an institution long viewed as a cornerstone of the Islamic Republic's support base.

Since 2017, Iran's political landscape has shifted from a discourse of reform to one of revolution, marked by major protest waves in 2017, 2019, 2022, and 2026. Each successive wave has grown in scale despite escalating repression. By January 2026, millions took to the streets across hundreds of municipalities and in every corner of the country. Across diverse cities, provinces, and social groups, demonstrators chanted a single name and called for the leadership of one man: Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. The scale, geographic breadth, and consistency of these calls were unprecedented. The January 2026 Lion and Sun Revolution reflected a visible consolidation around a unifying national figure. The Islamic Republic, however, met the protesters with unprecedented violence, reportedly killing tens of thousands in just a few days. The growing convergence of nationwide uprisings and localized labor strikes demonstrates that the regime is no longer confronting isolated dissent, but rather a

broad-based revolutionary movement. At this point, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has emerged as the widely recognized leader of the Iranian people's uprising.

Taken together, these developments point to the real possibility of regime change through a popular revolution.

IMPORTANCE OF THE EMERGENCY PHASE BOOKLET

A central question posed by Iranians and the international community alike is: what political and economic system will replace the Islamic Republic? Without careful planning and serious engagement with the real-life scenarios likely to arise during the Transitional Period, the risk of chaos and instability increases significantly. The transition strategy outlined in this Booklet aims to achieve tangible socioeconomic improvements— including expanded freedoms and the resumption of economic growth—to ensure the medium- and long-term viability of a democratic Iran. By treating planning as an iterative and flexible process, the Project seeks to mitigate the risks inherent in the Emergency Phase while offering a credible and hopeful path forward. Analytically, the success of these domestic policies is closely linked to broader geopolitical objectives, including regional security and reintegration into the global economy. This Booklet therefore provides a structured pathway for the international community to engage with a new Iranian political order based on mutually beneficial principles.

STRUCTURE OF THE EMERGENCY PHASE BOOKLET

The Booklet comprises fourteen white papers addressing fourteen topics essential to the Transitional Period. The first two focus on legal and political frameworks for transitional governance. The remaining papers cover key areas such as foreign policy, the military and security apparatus, cybersecurity, financial and macroeconomic reform, and education.
The legal and political white papers present a comprehensive plan for Iran's transition from an Islamic theocracy to a secular democracy and

detail the legal reforms necessary to achieve this goal. Under the proposed legal framework, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi will issue an official decree consisting of three parts: 1) abolishing the Constitution of the Islamic Republic to create a clear break from the regime; 2) retaining, as a default rule, all existing laws and institutions—except for those listed in the next part—throughout the Transitional Period to ensure legal stability; and 3) repealing any laws and dissolving any institutions that are in clear conflict with Iran's historical and national identity or with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To avoid any legal vacuum, replacement laws and institutions will be drawn from the Pahlavi Imperial era for use during the Transitional Period, and if a law or institution from that era does not meet the modern needs, it will be updated or replaced with a new one, whichever is more effective. Accordingly, the proposed legal framework does not call for a complete overhaul of existing institutions and laws during the Transitional Period, but rather for targeted, surgical changes. Responsibility for fully modernizing laws and institutions is left to a future parliament democratically elected by the Iranian people.

The political framework for the Transitional Period comprises three institutions: a transitional legislature, a transitional government, and a transitional judiciary. The latter includes a transitional justice program featuring a specialized court and a truth commission to address human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic. The political process culminates in: a national referendum to determine the future system of government; the election of the Constitutional Assembly to draft a new, modern Constitution; a subsequent referendum to approve the proposed Constitution; and finally, elections for the legislative body (parliament) and the formation of an elected government, following which the transitional bodies will be dissolved.

The white paper on military and security outlines a comprehensive 24-month plan to overhaul Iran's military and security sectors following the fall of the Islamic Republic. The plan's core objective is to ensure national stability and territorial

integrity while transitioning to a professional, non-ideological, and accountable defense structure. Key elements include: 1) Institutional consolidation: dissolving ideological and parallel structures such as the IRGC—including the Quds Force and Basij—and integrating their technical assets and vetted personnel into a unified National Army and a National Intelligence and Security Service (the "NISS"); 2) Pragmatic personnel vetting: avoiding the mistakes of past revolutions by retaining most rank-and-file personnel while referring those responsible for egregious crimes to a transparent judicial process; 3) Democratic oversight: enforcing a strict separation between the military and politics and establishing civilian oversight bodies to rebuild public trust and ensure accountability; and 4) Phased transition: implementing a three-stage timeline (0 to 24 months) moving from immediate crisis management and border security to long-term institutional modernization and international defense cooperation.

The white paper on foreign policy outlines a pragmatic, non-ideological roadmap for the transitional government's foreign policy. The framework prioritizes national interest, security, and economic recovery through reintegration into the international community. The paper recommends: 1) Nuclear transparency: ceasing all uranium enrichment and allowing unrestricted inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to facilitate the lifting of sanctions; 2) Global realignment: normalizing relations with the United States and the European Union, and officially recognizing Israel through the Cyrus Accord framework; and 3) Regional stability: establishing a "Framework for Regional Stability" with neighboring countries based on the principles of non-interference and border security. It also recommends institutional reforms to overhaul the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and establish an economic diplomacy task force to attract foreign investment.

The white paper on macroeconomics provides a strategic roadmap for stabilizing Iran's economy during the Transitional Period. The overarching goal is to prevent systemic collapse and lay the groundwork for long-term recovery under a future democratic government. The plan focuses on five critical areas: 1) Fiscal policy: establishing control over public finances and the Central Bank to ensure continued government payments and provision of essential public services; 2) Banking and currency: granting the Central Bank full and functional independence to conduct monetary policy to curb inflation; 3) Capital flows and oversight: implementing capital controls and seeking access to frozen international assets; 4) Financial markets: temporarily suspending the stock exchange to prevent panic-driven sell-offs while auditing state-owned enterprises; and 5) Social safety nets: ensuring uninterrupted payment of pensions and subsidies to maintain public trust.

The remaining white papers in this Booklet provide technical assessments and policy recommendations across key sectors, including asset control, energy, industry, cybersecurity, water, the environment, healthcare, and education. Taken together, these papers establish an operational framework aimed at restoring essential services, addressing immediate shortages, and positioning Iran on a stable, growth-oriented path forward.

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EMERGENCY PHASE

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LEGAL: Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic

February 2026

This white paper outlines potential legal frameworks for managing domestic legal affairs under a "Transitional System"[1] following the fall of the Islamic Republic regime. Under the proposed framework, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, as Leader of the National Uprising, will issue an official decree composed of three parts:

Part I: Abolishing the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. This part formally dissolves the Islamic Republic, establishes the Transitional System, and creates a clear break from the regime, laying the foundation for the Transitional System's formal recognition by other governments and for securing international support.

Part II: Retaining all existing laws and institutions throughout the transitional period, except for those expressly repealed in Part III. This approach ensures legal stability and prevents chaos during the transitional period. Replacement laws and institutions shall be drawn from the Pahlavi Imperial era. If a law or institution from that era does not meet the modern needs, it shall be updated or replaced with a new one, whichever is more effective.

Part III: Repealing laws and regulations, and dissolving institutions and bodies that are in clear conflict with any of the following three criteria: (a) Iran's historical and national identity; (b) the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; or (c) the progress of the Transitional System.

The proposed framework offers a pragmatic, stabilizing, and promising approach for the transitional period. By combining legal continuity with the targeted repeal of laws and dissolution of institutions, it ensures stability until new laws are enacted, lessens the legal workload of the Transitional System (allowing it to prioritize urgent needs), and defers comprehensive legal reform to the future, democratically elected Mehestan. This framework lays the foundation for the democratic modernization of the Iranian legal system.

I.   CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS

1.   Generally, under the *Principle of Continuity of Laws*, laws enacted under an overthrown regime are not automatically invalidated upon the abolition of its constitution, unless those laws are inherently tied to that regime's ideology. Therefore, civil, criminal, and administrative laws normally remain in force until a new legal authority formally repeals them. However, in the case of the Islamic Republic

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[1] The title "Transitional System" serves as an umbrella term encompassing three institutions that will govern Iran during the transitional period, under the leadership of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. These three institutions are as follows: the *Transitional Mehestan* (the transitional legislative branch), the *Transitional Government* (the transitional executive branch), and the *Transitional Divan* (the transitional judiciary). For more information, see the white paper "Political: Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic."

regime, many statutes (notably portions of the Civil Code and the entirety of the Islamic Penal Code) are inseparable from its religious and political ideologies. Thus, there is a credible basis to conclude that these statutes could automatically lose validity upon the abolition of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, potentially undermining the validity of certain documents and deeds issued under such statutes. This scenario would inevitably lead to legal and social instability, underscoring the need for a comprehensive transitional legal framework to prevent such an outcome.

2.   When formulating a legal framework for the transitional period in Iran, two competing imperatives must be reconciled: on the one hand, the legitimate desire to immediately eliminate all the Islamic Republic's retrograde laws, and on the other hand, the critical need to maintain stability during the transitional period, which may last up to three years. The objective is to establish an optimal framework that effectively balances these competing needs.

3.   To avoid misunderstanding, the term "optimal framework" in this white paper refers to a transitional legal framework that meets the following three criteria:

   3.1.   *Practical* – Given the extensive responsibilities of the Transitional System, the framework must be realistically implementable;

   3.2.   *Stabilizing* – It must ensure continuity and stability in the nation's daily legal affairs during the transitional period; and

   3.3.   *Promising* – It must inspire hope and confidence among the Iranian people. The absence of this psychological dimension, even if the other two criteria are met, could lead to collective frustration and ultimately hinder the success of the Transitional System.

4.   With these criteria in mind, the following Sections will explore the available legal frameworks and identify the one that best meets these criteria.

II.   POSSIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

5.   There are three possible legal frameworks for the transitional period:

   5.1.   The *Restorative Option*, which—

   - repeals all laws enacted by legislative bodies of the Islamic Republic, on the premise that these laws are rooted in illegitimate power, corruption, incompetence, and discrimination; and

   - immediately reinstates the body of laws in force during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

   5.2.   The *Retaining Option*, which—

   - retains the laws of the Islamic Republic; and

   - leaves the task of modernizing these laws to a future elected Mehestan (parliament).

   5.3.   The *Hybrid Option*, which—

   - retains the laws of the Islamic Republic, as the default rule, during the transitional period; but

- immediately repeals any laws and regulations that clearly conflict with one of the following three criteria: Iran's historical and national identity, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the progress of the Transitional System.

6. The Hybrid Option is the only framework that meets all three optimal criteria outlined earlier: being practical, stabilizing, and promising. The following Sections explain why.

A. RESTORATIVE OPTION

7. Repealing all laws of the Islamic Republic and reinstating all Imperial laws is not suitable for the transitional period and, therefore, this white paper does not recommend it. This is because, while this option is appealing, it would lead to legal and social chaos, as it fails to satisfy the first two wings of the optimal criteria: practicality and stabilizing effect.

8. The Islamic Republic has ruled Iran for approximately fifty years, during which significant changes have transformed people's lives worldwide, including in Iran. Examples include the rise of new technologies, novel forms of transactions, and scientific breakthroughs—none of which existed half a century ago, and thus no relevant laws even existed at the time. Throughout this period, the Islamic Republic has enacted numerous laws to keep pace with these changing needs. These laws, albeit ineffective and unscientific, play an important role simply by filling legal gaps.

9. One of the key objectives of the transitional period is to ensure stability in the daily lives of the Iranian people (the stabilizing criterion). Repealing all laws of the Islamic Republic would undermine this goal by creating a legal vacuum that Imperial-era laws cannot adequately fill. The only way to fill such a vacuum would be for the Transitional System to enact a wide range of new laws—an undertaking that is impractical given the scope of its responsibilities (the practicality criterion).

10. It is crucial to emphasize that the above analysis does not imply that the current laws of the Islamic Republic should remain unchanged indefinitely. These laws—being retrograde, unscientific, and discriminatory—must indeed be replaced. The question is one of timing. The transitional period is not the appropriate time for such a sweeping and fundamental overhaul. Instead, once the elected Mehestan (parliament) is formed, the Imperial laws can serve as a starting point for debates on modernizing Iranian laws, in line with the nation's needs and aspirations.

B. RETAINING OPTION

11. This framework involves retaining all laws of the Islamic Republic during the transitional period and deferring their modernization to a future elected Mehestan. This white paper does not recommend this option either. Despite meeting the first criterion (being practical and easy to implement), it fails to meet the third criterion (raising public hope and confidence).

12. A significant portion of the frustration and even animosity that Iranians feel toward the Islamic Republic stems from the fact that existing laws have made their daily lives an unbearable challenge. Given that the transitional period could last up to three years, adopting the Retaining Option would deny Iranians the improvement they seek in their daily lives, potentially leading to widespread dissatisfaction.

13. Furthermore, several laws (such as those discriminating against women, mandating corporal punishments, and restricting internet access) fundamentally contradict the notion of a new era for the nation.

C. HYBRID OPTION

14. This framework consists of two key parts: retaining existing laws during the transitional period, as the default rule, while repealing those laws and regulations that are clearly incompatible with any of the following three criteria:

    14.1. Iran's historical and national identity;

    14.2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); or

    14.3. The progress of the Transitional System.

15. This white paper recommends the Hybrid Option because it satisfies all three criteria for an optimal framework:

    15.1. *Practical* – The Hybrid Option lessens the workload of the Transitional System because it is implementable without overburdening the Transitional System's resources;

    15.2. *Stabilizing* – By maintaining continuity in the Iranian people's daily affairs, the Hybrid Option helps ensure stability until new modern laws can be enacted; and

    15.3. *Promising* – Repealing repressive laws associated with the Islamic Republic provides visible evidence of progress, boosting the nation's hope and confidence that the Transitional System is steering the country in the right direction.

16. The next consideration is whether the Hybrid Option is informed by examples from notable regime changes over the past five decades.

III. EXAMPLES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS

A. SOVIET UNION, IRAQ, TUNISIA, AND EGYPT

17. An examination of notable regime changes in other countries over the past fifty years reveals that their experiences offer only limited guidance for Iran. This is because the challenges Iran faces are distinct from those encountered elsewhere. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran not only changed the country's political system but also fundamentally and substantively altered its legal system.[2] No comparable ideological shift occurred in the legal systems of these other countries.

18. Consider the 2011 Egyptian revolution, which emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. While it changed Egypt's political landscape, its legal system did not undergo a major ideological transformation. The same holds true for the 2011 revolution in Tunisia and, to a considerable extent, the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

19. The only notable regime change since 1979 that arguably involved an ideological shift was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This transition was expected to usher in a shift from communism to a market economy and democratic principles. Whether those ambitions were realized in Russia is not the focus here. What matters for present purposes is that the scope of legal restructuring in post-Soviet Russia was limited compared to the changes implemented in the Iranian legal system after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Many elements of the Soviet legal infrastructure

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[2] The term "legal system" covers both "legal sources" and "legal institutions" (such as parliament and courts).

were retained, with reforms largely operating within the preexisting framework rather than replacing it outright.

20. The absence of an ideological shift in the legal systems of these other countries distinguishes their experience from that of Iran. Consequently, their transitional periods offer limited practical guidance for addressing Iran's unique circumstances. Undoing the ideological changes imposed on the Iranian legal system in 1979 requires an approach that is equally fundamental and substantive. To draw inspiration, we must look to jurisdictions that have undergone comparable ideological changes in their legal systems.

21. The research conducted for this white paper suggests that Britain's legal experience during the Brexit transition is the most analogous and thus the most relevant example for Iran.

D. BRITAIN

22. Britain's departure from the European Union (voted for in 2016 and officially executed in 2020) has led to significant changes in British laws—a process that is still ongoing. Estimates suggest that more than 50,000 British laws were related to the EU. One might question the relevance of Brexit to this discussion, especially given that it did not even involve a change in Britain's system of government.

23. It should be noted that some of the most significant root factors behind Brexit were ideological (e.g., sovereignty and nationalism) or quasi-ideological (e.g., immigration and anti-establishment populism). These factors required changes to British laws that can be described as fundamental and substantive. Consequently, the transitional period designed by British lawmakers could serve as an important source of inspiration for us. Regardless of differing opinions on Brexit's political and economic outcomes, the task facing the British lawmakers was to create a legal framework for the transitional period, and they skillfully crafted the following.

24. Based on this framework, when Brexit took effect in 2020, a transitional period of approximately one year was implemented to prevent legal chaos. During this period—

    24.1. EU laws that applied to Britain on Exit Day remained in force as part of British domestic law; but

    24.2. specific EU laws that symbolized Britain's membership in the EU (e.g., the European Communities Act 1972) were repealed immediately on day one.

    This approach enabled British lawmakers to avoid a legal vacuum while allowing a democratic process to determine which EU laws would be retained or repealed in the years ahead.

25. The British experience with Brexit and its transitional period is highly relevant and serves as a successful example that can inspire us. The Hybrid Option proposed earlier (see above, paragraph 14) draws from this approach.

26. Legally, Britain and France represent two prominent traditions: common law and civil law, respectively; and politically, they embody two different but equally democratic systems: a parliamentary monarchy and a semi-presidential republic. Unlike France, Britain did not abandon its monarchical tradition but rather gradually evolved into a parliamentary monarchy. This continuity has allowed British lawmakers, over centuries, to master the art of implementing significant legal

changes with minimal social disruption. The design of the transitional period for Brexit exemplifies this mastery.

27. The details of the proposed legal framework in this white paper, which is based on the Hybrid Option and informed by the Brexit transition period, are outlined in Section IV.

IV. PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK

28. Upon the fall of the Islamic Republic regime, the Leader of the National Uprising will issue an official decree consisting of three parts:

–   *Part I:* Abolishing the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. From a legal standpoint, this action formally dissolves the regime, establishes the Transitional System, and creates a clear break from the previous order—thereby paving the way for gaining international legitimacy and support.

–   *Part II:* Declaring that, despite the abolition of the regime's Constitution, existing laws, regulations, institutions, and organizations shall remain in force during the transitional period, except those expressly listed in *Part III*. The objective is to maintain legal stability throughout the transitional period.

–   *Part III:* Repealing a specific set of laws and regulations, and dissolving or restructuring certain institutions and organizations. At the same time, vesting the Transitional Mehestan with the authority to enact replacement and new laws, and granting the Transitional Government the authority to restructure the remaining institutions inherited from the regime. Replacement laws and institutions shall be drawn from the Pahlavi Imperial era. If a law or institution from that era no longer meets modern needs, it will be updated or replaced with a new one—whichever is more effective.

29. This approach ensures that societal functions continue without interruption, thereby preventing sudden legal disruptions or judicial paralysis. It also lessens the workload of the Transitional Mehestan, allowing it to focus on immediate priorities. Furthermore, it enables the future elected Mehestan to debate and implement lasting legal reforms in a democratic manner.

30. A critical question arises about the formula for identifying the laws to be repealed in *Part III*. To that end, any laws and regulations that are in clear conflict with any one of the following three criteria shall be repealed in Part III of the Leader's decree.

30.1. Iran's historical and national identity;

30.2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); and

30.3. The Transitional System's progress.

CONCLUSION

31. This white paper examined potential legal frameworks for managing Iran's domestic legal affairs during the transitional period following the fall of the Islamic Republic, along with the implications of

each framework. It evaluated three options and ultimately recommended the Hybrid Option as the most suitable framework.

32. Under the Hybrid Option, despite the abolition of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, existing laws and institutions are retained, as the default rule, during the transitional period. However, those laws and institutions that are in clear conflict with any of the following three criteria are repealed and dissolved, respectively: Iran's historical and national identity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the progress of the Transitional System.

33. This phased approach ensures the continuity of societal functions without causing judicial paralysis or provoking public backlash. It enables the Transitional Mehestan to focus on urgent priorities while deferring the task of a comprehensive legal system modernization to a future democratically elected Mehestan.

34. Adopting this legal framework paves the way for a successful, peaceful transition to a democratic future for Iran.

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POLITICAL: Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic

February 2026

This white paper sets out a comprehensive political and institutional framework for Iran's transition following the fall of the Islamic Republic. It is part of the Iran Prosperity Project's governance planning, providing a legal and institutional roadmap for governing the country during the transitional period under the leadership of the Leader of the National Uprising. Within this framework, a unified Transitional System is proposed, consisting of three main pillars—the Transitional Mehestan (the legislative branch), the Transitional Government (the executive branch), and the Transitional Divan (the judiciary)—aimed at ensuring continuity of governance, maintaining territorial integrity, restoring public order, and establishing foundations for democratic legitimacy.

This white paper details the responsibilities, appointment, and oversight mechanisms, and checks and balances among the institutions of the Transitional System. It also outlines a clear timeline for the transition, starting with a referendum on the future system of government, followed by the election of a Constituent Assembly, the drafting and ratification of a new constitution, the election of the Mehestan, and ultimately the transfer of power to an elected government. The transition is designed to be neither rushed nor open-ended and is expected to last between 18 and 24 months, with limited and conditional extensions permitted. Through this framework, the white paper aims to present a realistic and principled framework for Iran's peaceful transition to a democratic, secular system based on the rule of law and equality of citizenship.

It is emphasized that this framework is intended only for the transitional period. The political structure following this period shall be set out in the new constitution, which will be drafted by representatives elected by the Iranian people. For the purposes of this white paper, the "transitional period" refers to the time between the fall of the Islamic Republic regime and the establishment of a democratically elected government, while the "emergency phase" denotes the first six months of the transitional period.

I.   PRIOR TO THE FALL OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

1. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, in his role as the leader of the national uprising and for the purpose of overseeing the transitional period (hereinafter, the "Leader of the National Uprising"), establishes two institutions:

    1.1. *National Uprising Council*: This Council shall serve as an advisory body and act as the policy and decision-making arm of the Leader of the National Uprising. Members of this Council will include individuals from both inside and outside Iran.

1.2. *Temporary Executive Team*: This Team shall be responsible for implementing policies and executing the decisions of the Leader of the National Uprising. Members of this Team will likewise include individuals from both inside and outside Iran.

2. For security reasons, the names of these individuals will be released when appropriate, at the discretion of the Leader of the National Uprising. The operational framework of these two institutions—the National Uprising Council and the Temporary Executive Team—is based on the five-pronged strategy previously emphasized by the Leader of the National Uprising, as follows:

2.1. Maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic (hereinafter, the "Regime");

2.2. Maximum support for the Iranian people;

2.3. Maximum defections from the Regime;

2.4. Maximum organization of active forces inside and outside Iran; and

2.5. Planning for the reconstruction of Iran through the "Iran Prosperity Project," after the Regime's fall.

This *Emergency Phase Booklet*, of which this white paper is one chapter, has been prepared in accordance with the fifth strategy (the Iran Prosperity Project).

II.   AFTER THE FALL OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

3. After the Regime is overthrown by the people of Iran, the Transitional System will assume control of governing the country during the transitional period. The Transitional System shall operate under the leadership of the Leader of the National Uprising and shall consist of three institutions: the *Transitional Mehestan*,[3] the *Transitional Government*, and the *Transitional Divan*.[4] This white paper will examine each of these three institutions separately.

4. The appointment and removal of the heads of the Transitional Government and the Transitional Divan shall be made by the Leader of the National Uprising, after consulting with the Transitional Mehestan. The head of the Transitional Mehestan shall be elected by its members through an absolute majority vote.[5]

5. The Leader of the National Uprising shall serve as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Iran.

6. Within the official decree issued by the Leader of the National Uprising to dissolve the Islamic Republic and abolish its Constitution, there will be a section setting out structural reforms,[6] including the following:

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[3] In line with the Iranian people's wish to replace foreign words with Persian equivalents, this white paper uses the term "*Mehestan*" instead of the Arabic term for the legislative branch, "Majles-e Shora."

[4] For the same reason mentioned in the previous footnote, the term "*Divan*" is used instead of the Arabic term for the judiciary, "Qoveh Qaza'ieh."

[5] In this white paper, "absolute majority" refers to more than half of *all* members agreeing on an issue, while "simple majority" means the majority of the members *present* at a meeting agree on that issue.

[6] The structure of the official decree of the Leader of the National Uprising is explained in the white paper "Legal: Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic."

6.1. Removing the "Islamic Republic" from Iran's official name;

6.2. Removing the flag of the Islamic Republic and restoring the Iranian Lion and Sun tricolour flag;

6.3. Removing the Islamic Republic's national anthem and replacing it with the song "Ey Iran" until an official national anthem is selected;

6.4. Dissolving the Office of the Supreme Leader,[7] the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Discernment Council, and the Guardian Council;

6.5. Dissolving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (hereinafter, the "IRGC") and all its affiliated entities, and integrating its armed wing into the national Army. The goal of this restructuring is to eliminate parallel military structures and form a unified, centralized, and professional Army under the Ministry of Defense.[8] The economic and cultural wings of the IRGC and their subsidiaries shall be transferred to the Transitional Government. Its intelligence wing shall be subject to paragraph 6.6;[9]

6.6. Dissolving the Ministry of Intelligence and all other parallel intelligence agencies to establish a new organization called the *National Intelligence and Security Service*, which will operate under the authority of the Transitional Government;

6.7. Dissolving the Islamic Revolutionary Court, the Special Clerical Court, and their respective prosecutors' offices, with the goal of restoring judicial authority to the General Court and the Office of the Attorney General (Prosecutor General);

6.8. Transferring the Office of the Attorney General (Prosecutor General) from the judiciary to the executive branch and placing it under the Ministry of Justice. This change aims to ensure fair trial procedures and eliminate conflicts of duty and interest within the current judiciary, since the authority responsible for adjudication should not also be tasked with prosecution;

6.9. Establishing a mechanism to fully ensure the independence of the Iranian Bar Association;

6.10. Dissolving the Morality Police (also known as *Gasht E Ershad*), the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace;

6.11. Dissolving the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organization to reestablish the National Iranian Radio and Television Organization;

6.12. Changing the name of the humanitarian organization "Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran" back to "Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society"; and

6.13. Establishing a transitional justice mechanism to address gross human rights violations and the appropriation or destruction of national or public property by the Regime perpetrators and their affiliates, in order to uncover the truth, deliver justice, support victims, and prevent the recurrence of such atrocities.

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[7] Ownership of the financial, economic, and service entities subordinate to the Office of the Supreme Leader shall be transferred to the Transitional Government. The Transitional Government shall, in due course, decide whether each entity should be dissolved or retained, with or without modification.

[8] For further information, see the white paper "Military and Security."

[9] *Id*.

7.   In the event that the Leader of the National Uprising is unable to fulfill his duties, a "Temporary Leadership Council" composed of the heads of the Transitional Government, the Transitional Mehestan, and the Transitional Divan shall temporarily assume those responsibilities. Decisions of the Temporary Leadership Council will be made by majority vote.

A. TRANSITIONAL MEHESTAN

8.   The Transitional Mehestan shall act as the legislative branch during the transitional period. It shall also assume the advisory role of the National Uprising Council outlined in paragraph 1.1.

9.   The appointment, removal, and adjustment of the total number of members of the Transitional Mehestan—who shall represent the diversity of the unified Iranian nation—shall be made by the Leader of the National Uprising. Other than the first action (i.e., appointment), the other two actions (i.e., removal of members and adjustment of their total number) may also be effected through an absolute majority vote of the Transitional Mehestan members, followed by the approval of the Leader of the National Uprising.

10. The responsibilities of the Transitional Mehestan shall include, but are not limited to, the following:

   10.1. Identifying which laws must be repealed after the fall of the Regime and which laws can remain in effect until the formation of the elected Mehestan. Details of this process are set out in the white paper "Legal: Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic."

   10.2. Enacting temporary new laws either to replace the repealed laws (discussed in the preceding subparagraph) or, when requested by the Transitional Government, to address matters requiring new laws for the administration of the country during the transitional period. In this regard, the Transitional Mehestan shall appoint a panel of five distinguished jurists to provide direct consultation, and the Transitional Mehestan shall consider their views in any legislative process.

   10.3. Reviewing and approving the national annual budget proposed by the Transitional Government.

   10.4. Determining the total number of seats in the Constituent Assembly and the eligibility criteria for candidates, such as the minimum age and educational qualifications, who will be elected through an election that meets international democratic standards (discussed below, paragraph 15.7). These matters shall be finalized before the referendum on the system of government (discussed below, paragraph 15.6), so that the public and political parties can engage in a national dialogue regarding the election—with full awareness of the number of seats and the candidacy criteria—during the period between the referendum and the Constituent Assembly election.

11. Once the elected Mehestan is officially formed, the legislative role of the Transitional Mehestan will end. However, it shall continue to serve as the advisory body to the Leader of the National Uprising until the Transitional Government is dissolved, which will also mark the dissolution of the Transitional Mehestan (discussed below, paragraph 15.9).

B. TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

12. The Transitional Government shall act as the executive branch during the transitional period.

13. The structure of the Transitional Government (such as the number and names of ministries, organizations, and institutions) shall be devised by the head of the Transitional Government in due course, after consulting with the Transitional Mehestan and obtaining the approval of the Leader of the National Uprising. The same process applies to reviewing institutions, organizations, and important symbols from the Islamic Republic era, aiming to identify which should be dissolved or removed and which can be retained, with or without modification.

14. All ministers, except the Minister of Defense, shall be appointed by the head of the Transitional Government, subject to approval by the Transitional Mehestan (by absolute majority vote). The removal of any minister, other than the Minister of Defense, shall also be at the discretion of the head of the Transitional Government. The appointment and removal of the Minister of Defense shall be made by the head of the Transitional Government and approved by the Leader of the National Uprising. The appointment and removal of senior military commanders shall be made by the Leader of the National Uprising.

15. The responsibilities of the Transitional Government shall include, but are not limited to, the following:

15.1. Executing laws and managing the daily affairs of the country and its people.

15.2. Protecting and defending Iran's borders and maintaining the nation's unity and security through the military, law enforcement, and security forces.

15.3. Preparing the national annual budget proposal.[10]

15.4. Managing the country's international affairs, including:

15.4.1. Assuming control of Iranian embassies and consulates worldwide and deploying interim representatives and diplomatic staff to them;

15.4.2. Replacing Iran's representatives in all international organizations of which Iran is a member;

15.4.3. Sending an official notification to the United Nations through Iran's permanent mission to: (i) remove the title "Islamic Republic" from the country's official name, (ii) restore the tricolor flag of the lion and sun of Iran as the official flag, and (iii) officially communicate these changes to all member states, the UN system, and affiliated institutions. Furthermore, and separately, announcing these changes through Iranian embassies and diplomatic missions to all countries and international organizations, and requesting that their correspondence, documents, and systems be updated accordingly;

15.4.4. Managing and safeguarding Iran's assets held abroad;

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[10] In the national annual budget proposal, a budget line item shall be allocated to the Legal Aid Office, which operates under the Iranian Bar Association. This allocation is intended to expand legal assistance to underprivileged individuals and to mitigate the harm they may suffer resulting from the rapid pace of legal changes during the transitional period. The allocation of such funds shall not entail any interference with the powers of the Bar Association.

15.4.5. Initiating negotiations with the United Nations, the European Union, foreign governments, and international organizations to lift all sanctions against Iran—including financial, trade, human rights, and military sanctions—and to remove visa restrictions currently in place against Iranians;

15.4.6. Reviewing Iran's international and regional obligations, especially in the Middle East, to ensure they align with the country's new direction;[11]

15.4.7. Implementing necessary changes to Iranian passports and other travel documents; and

15.4.8. Notifying the Swiss government (as the depositary of the Geneva Conventions) of Iran's decision to exercise its right to use Iran's distinctive emblem of the red lion and sun, along with a request for the Swiss government to officially inform other state parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of this decision.

15.5. Setting policies and making necessary changes to textbooks across all education levels (primary, secondary, and higher education) to ensure their content reflects the values of the new era in Iran.

15.6. Holding a referendum on the system of government: The Transitional Government shall, within four months, hold a referendum for the nation to choose Iran's future democratic system of government (a parliamentary monarchy or a republic).

15.6.1. Political parties and activists supporting either system shall have at least three months (within the four-month period) to present and promote their preferred system of government to the public.[12] All institutions and organizations of the Transitional Government involved in this process (such as the National Iranian Radio and Television Organization and other state-owned news outlets) shall treat supporters of both systems impartially and provide them with equal access, time, and resources.

15.6.2. This referendum shall be conducted freely and in accordance with international democratic standards, and all eligible Iranian voters shall be able to exercise their right to vote.

15.6.3. To safeguard the democratic values shared by both systems of government, the following statement shall be included on both ballots of parliamentary monarchy and republic:

"*Regardless of the nation's choice (parliamentary monarchy or republic), the following seven principles shall be immutable foundations of Iran's future legal system and shall remain enshrined and inviolable in the new Constitution and all laws of the country:*

- *The territorial integrity of Iran and the unity of the Iranian nation;*
- *Human dignity and fundamental individual rights and freedoms, inspired by the Cyrus Cylinder and grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);*

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[11] For further information, see the white paper "Foreign Policy."

[12] This timeline is intended to balance two priorities: on the one hand, allowing sufficient time for a national discussion on an important issue, and on the other hand, preventing the transitional period from becoming excessively prolonged.

- *Democracy through free, fair, and periodic elections, based on the principle of 'one citizen, one vote';*
- *The rule of law;*
- *The complete separation of religion from the state (secularism);*
- *The separation of powers; and*
- *The independence and impartiality of the Divan (the judiciary)."*

15.7. Holding an election for the Constituent Assembly: Within a maximum of two months of receiving the results of the referendum on the system of government (discussed above, paragraph 15.6), the Transitional Government shall hold the election for the Constituent Assembly. This election shall be conducted freely and in accordance with international democratic standards, and all eligible Iranian voters shall be able to exercise their right to vote. The Constituent Assembly's mandate is to draft a new Constitution based on the system of government chosen by the nation in the referendum.[13] This task shall be completed within six months. To this end, the Constituent Assembly shall:

15.7.1. Consult with expert committees on topics such as the economy, industry, health and medical services, society and culture, family, education, the environment, foreign policy, defense, and national security.

15.7.2. Appoint a seven-member panel of distinguished jurists, including three experts in constitutional law, and consult with them during the drafting of each article of the new Constitution. This is to ensure that the text of the new Constitution meets the highest legal standards.

15.7.3. Publish and widely disseminate each drafted article. This aims to inform the public continually about the process, gather their feedback, and incorporate it into the draft.

15.8. Holding a referendum on the proposed Constitution: Once the Constituent Assembly completes the draft of the proposed Constitution, the Transitional Government shall hold a constitutional referendum within no more than one month. This referendum shall be free, conducted in accordance with international democratic standards, and all eligible Iranian voters shall be able to exercise their right to vote.

15.8.1. If the Iranian people vote against the proposed Constitution, the Constituent Assembly shall revise it within a maximum of two months based on public feedback. The Transitional Government shall then submit this revised version for another referendum. If the nation once again votes against the proposed Constitution, the Constituent Assembly shall be dissolved, and the Transitional Government shall hold an election for a new Constituent Assembly within two months. This new Constituent Assembly must then revise the proposed Constitution based on public feedback within two months, after which the Transitional Government shall hold a third referendum.

15.8.2. If the nation votes in favor of the proposed Constitution, and:

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[13] If the nation selects the parliamentary monarchy option, the Constituent Assembly may draw upon the 1906 Constitution as the basis for drafting the new Constitution.

15.8.2.1 If the nation had chosen a monarchical system in the earlier referendum (discussed above, paragraph 15.6), the Transitional Government shall organize the coronation ceremony of the Monarch within a maximum of two weeks following the approval of the Constitution. The Monarch's oath shall be taken before the Constituent Assembly, after which the Assembly shall be dissolved; but

15.8.2.2 If the nation had chosen a republican system, the Constituent Assembly shall be dissolved immediately after the approval of the Constitution. The Transitional Government shall then hold a presidential election within a maximum of two months following the approval of the Constitution. The President-Elect shall take his/her oath before the elected Mehestan (discussed in the next subparagraph).

15.8.2.3 Regardless of the system (monarchy or republic), the Transitional Government shall hold an election for Mehestan within three months of the Constitution's approval. This means that, in the case of a republican system, the presidential election (as mentioned in the previous sub-paragraph) and the Mehestan election shall be held simultaneously. Both elections shall be conducted freely and in accordance with international democratic standards, and all eligible Iranian voters shall be able to exercise their right to vote.

15.9. Charting the path toward forming the elected Government: The Transitional Government shall be responsible for providing the means for one of the following scenarios, depending on the system of government selected by the nation:

15.9.1. If a parliamentary monarchy is selected, the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet shall be nominated, approved, sworn in (as provided in the new Constitution), and shall form the elected Government. Upon the swearing-in of the elected Government, the Transitional Government shall be dissolved.

15.9.2. If a republic is selected, and:

15.9.2.1 Its form is parliamentary, the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet shall (in accordance with the new Constitution) be nominated, approved by, and sworn in before Mehestan to form the elected Government. Upon their swearing-in, the Transitional Government shall be dissolved; but

15.9.2.2 If the form is presidential, the President shall (in accordance with the new constitution) nominate his/her cabinet, which shall (again in accordance with the new Constitution) be approved by and sworn in before Mehestan to form the elected Government. Upon the cabinet's swearing-in, the Transitional Government shall be dissolved.

Although the timeframe for introducing cabinet ministers to Mehestan and securing a vote of confidence will be set in the new Constitution, it is estimated that this process will take approximately two months. As mentioned, once the elected Government is sworn in, the Transitional Government will be dissolved, and with its dissolution, the Transitional Mehestan will also be dissolved (discussed above, paragraph 11).

C. TRANSITIONAL DIVAN

16. The Transitional Divan shall serve as the judicial branch during the transitional period.

17. The head of the Transitional Divan shall be a respected and distinguished jurist, whose appointment and dismissal shall be in accordance with the procedure set out in paragraph 4 of this white paper.

18. In accordance with the correct use of Persian terminology, this white paper uses the title *Dadgah-e Aali Keshvar* (Supreme Court) instead of "Divan-e Aali Keshvar," and *Dadgah-e Edalat-e Edari* (Administrative Justice Court) instead of "Divan-e Edalat-e Edari."

19. The responsibilities of the head of the Transitional Divan include, but are not limited to:

19.1. Appointment and removal of the following officials: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice of the Administrative Justice Court, Head of the National Inspectorate, Head of the Prisons and Correctional Facilities Organization, Head of the National Forensic Medicine Organization, Head of the Deeds and Properties Registration Organization, and Head of the Budget Organization of Divan (discussed below, paragraph 19.5).

19.1.1. The appointment and dismissal of the Attorney General (Prosecutor General) fall under the responsibilities of the Minister of Justice (see above, paragraph 6.8).

19.2. Determining the total number of chambers for both the Supreme Court and the Administrative Justice Court.

19.3. Nominating judges for the Supreme Court and the Administrative Justice Court to the Transitional Mehestan. Confirmation of any nominated judge shall require an absolute majority vote. Removing a judge from these high courts can only be initiated by the head of the Transitional Divan, but it takes effect after approval by the Transitional Mehestan with an absolute majority vote. The head of the Transitional Divan may submit a removal request to the Transitional Mehestan only if there is strong evidence supporting one of the following matters:

19.3.1. Commission of serious crimes (particularly treason or bribery);

19.3.2. Social misconduct causing severe damage to Iran's image, whether domestically or internationally; or

19.3.3. Physical or mental incapacity preventing the fulfillment of responsibilities for more than one month without the resignation of the relevant judge.

19.4. Establishing a council called the *Judicial Council*, as follows:

19.4.1. The Judicial Council is responsible for reviewing and changing the rules and regulations governing the appointment and removal of all judges (except those of the Supreme Court and the Administrative Justice Court), and for overseeing their appointments and removal nationwide.

19.4.2. The Judicial Council shall consist of five members, all of whom shall be appointed from respected and distinguished jurists. During their tenure, they shall not engage in judicial, prosecutorial, or academic activities, nor in the practice of law.

19.5. Establishing an organization within the Transitional Divan, called the *Budget Organization of Divan*: This organization aims to ensure the judiciary's financial independence from the executive branch. Its responsibilities include:

19.5.1. Preparing the draft of the Transitional Divan's annual budget proposal.

19.5.2. Submitting the draft budget proposal to the head of the Transitional Divan for review and approval.

19.5.3. Submitting the approved budget proposal to the Transitional Government for inclusion in the national annual budget, which will ultimately be sent to the Transitional Mehestan for review and final approval. It should be noted that:

19.5.3.1 The Transitional Government shall not alter any part of the Transitional Divan's proposed budget without approval from the Budget Organization of Divan.

19.5.3.2 If the Transitional Mehestan has any questions regarding the Transitional Divan's proposed budget during the budget review, the Budget Organization of Divan shall attend the session independently (from the Transitional Government) to defend its proposed budget.

19.5.3.3 Once the budget is approved by the Transitional Mehestan, the Supreme Audit Court shall be responsible for overseeing its proper implementation within the Transitional Divan.

19.6. Reviewing and approving the Transitional Divan's annual budget proposed by the Budget Organization of Divan (see above, paragraph 19.5.2).

19.7. Establishing the Transitional Justice Program, which includes a specialized court and a truth commission, as detailed below.

19.7.1. Transitional Justice Court: A specialized, independent, and impartial court with exclusive criminal jurisdiction shall be established, called the *Transitional Justice Court*, to judge perpetrators—including those who issued orders and those who carried them out—of gross human rights violations (such as crimes against humanity, massacres, extrajudicial killings, torture, rape and systemic sexual violence, and enforced disappearances) as well as the appropriation or destruction of national or public property. The goal is to deliver justice, provide redress to victims, and deter future violations.

Jurisdiction of the Transitional Justice Court:

19.7.1.1 This Court shall have universal jurisdiction.

19.7.1.2 Its temporal jurisdiction shall cover crimes committed from 11 February 1979 to the day the Islamic Republic falls.

19.7.1.3 Personal jurisdiction shall not be automatically exercised over a person solely because that person held a managerial or administrative position during the Regime era. As a principle, managers and administrative staff (whether civilian or military) are excluded from the Court's jurisdiction unless the Special Prosecutor (see below, paragraph 19.7.1.7) can present strong evidence that a specific

individual directly participated in gross human rights violations or in the appropriation or destruction of national or public property.

19.7.1.4 No form of political immunity (whether diplomatic or parliamentary), judicial immunity, statute of limitations, or justifications under Islamic Republic laws shall bar prosecution.

Judges and Branches of the Transitional Justice Court:

19.7.1.5 Judges of the Transitional Justice Court shall be nominated by the Judicial Council (discussed above, paragraph 19.4) and confirmed by the head of the Transitional Divan.

19.7.1.6 The number and locations of the branches of the Transitional Justice Court shall be decided by the head of the Transitional Divan, after consulting with the Minister of Justice and the head of the Budget Organization of Divan (discussed above, paragraph 19.5).

Procedures of the Transitional Justice Court:

19.7.1.7 The judicial proceedings against an individual shall commence upon indictment by the Special Prosecutor, who is appointed by the Attorney General (Prosecutor General) after consultation with the Minister of Justice.

19.7.1.8 An indictment can only be issued if a branch of the Office of the Special Prosecutor[14] receives:
- A case file from relevant military, law enforcement, or intelligence authorities;
- A file from the head of the Truth Commission (see below, paragraph 19.7.2.4); or
- A direct complaint from victims or their families/legal representatives; and

After reviewing the file, the Special Prosecutor determines that sufficient grounds exist to support a conviction.

19.7.1.9 If the Special Prosecutor declines to indict, the entities and individuals listed in the previous subparagraph have the right to appeal that decision to the Attorney General (Prosecutor General) within the designated timeframe. The Attorney General's decision is final, shall be in writing, include the reasons, and be published promptly.

19.7.1.10 Iranian domestic law (substantive and procedural) shall be applied. In cases where Iranian domestic law is insufficient, judges of the Transitional Justice Court may, with the approval of the head of the Transitional Divan, apply rules and case law from international criminal law and reference the case law of other jurisdictions that have established similar courts.

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[14] The number and locations of the branches of the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be set by the Attorney General (Prosecutor General) in consultation with the Minister of Justice.

19.7.1.11 Judgments of the Transitional Justice Court shall become final and enforceable upon completion of the appeal process, which may be initiated by either the defendant or the Special Prosecutor. The scope of appeal shall be limited to reviewing the correct application of the law.

19.7.2. Truth Commission: As the second part of the Transitional Justice Program, a commission shall be established, called the *Truth Commission*, consisting of three committees: the *Investigation Committee*, the *Conditional Amnesty Committee*, and the *High Committee*. Members of all three committees shall be appointed by the Judicial Council (discussed above, paragraph 19.4) after consulting with the Special Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice. The head of the Truth Commission shall be appointed by the head of the Transitional Divan. Each committee shall have the following responsibilities.

The Investigation Committee:

19.7.2.1 Collects, verifies, and documents evidence of gross human rights violations and the appropriation or destruction of national or public property by natural or legal persons (including state entities, quasi-state entities, religious entities, or non-religious entities) and any other institutions or groups structurally linked to or acting in furtherance of the Islamic Republic's objectives. The aim is to uncover the truth and develop a thorough, well-documented understanding of the nature, causes, patterns, and extent of these acts.

19.7.2.2 Creates a safe space for victims and survivors to openly share their experiences. The goal is to help restore and protect their human, social, and civil dignity and to present a more complete picture of the Regime's crimes.

19.7.2.3 Prepares a comprehensive report (hereinafter, the "Comprehensive Report") of its findings, along with:
- Legal, structural, and policy recommendations to prevent future systemic and organized human rights violations;
- Specific proposals for symbolic reparations (such as public memorials and establishing a national commemorative day to honor the victims of the Islamic Republic); and
- Assessments of potential financial compensation mechanisms or support funds for victims and their families, noting that decisions regarding financial reparation will be made by the elected Mehestan;

and then it shall submit the Comprehensive Report to the High Committee (see below, paragraph 19.7.2.13).

19.7.2.4 Refers a case—after approval from the head of the Truth Commission—to the Special Prosecutor if the Committee's investigation reveals that the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the

Transitional Justice Court and not the Conditional Amnesty Committee (see the next paragraph).

Conditional Amnesty Committee:

19.7.2.5 Has exclusive jurisdiction to review and grant applications for amnesty or immunity submitted by individuals whose crimes do not rise to the level of falling within the jurisdiction of the Transitional Justice Court, but are nevertheless more serious than ordinary crimes, provided that the victim(s) or their family members/legal representatives do not wish to pursue criminal charges.

19.7.2.6 Grants amnesty or immunity only to individuals and only upon their request; therefore, no group or institutional amnesty or immunity shall be granted.

19.7.2.7 Grants amnesty or immunity only if it is satisfied that:
- The applicant has fully, unconditionally, and truthfully disclosed all facts, including actions, decisions, orders, chains of command, accomplices, and context;
- The applicant's conduct was directly connected to political goals and was carried out within the framework of the Regime's policy;
- There is a reasonable proportionality between the stated political objective and the act committed (i.e., the act was not excessive, and its nature was proportionate to the applicant's role and authority); and
- The applicant accepts personal responsibility proportional to his/her level of involvement.

19.7.2.8 Respects victims' and survivors' rights to participate in proceedings, share their views, and receive official notification from the Committee regarding its final decision.

19.7.2.9 Informs every applicant that any amnesty or immunity shall be automatically revoked if, later, evidence shows that the applicant lied or deliberately withheld any material truth. The case shall then be referred for prosecution without being barred by any statute of limitations.

19.7.2.10 Issues its decisions in writing, including the reasons, and publishes them promptly.

High Committee:
(the highest committee within the Truth Commission)

19.7.2.11 Exercises overall supervisory authority over the Truth Commission.

19.7.2.12 Has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions made by the Conditional Amnesty Committee. Its decisions shall be:
- Enforceable and final (save for exceptional circumstances where the head of the Transitional Divan vetoes the granting of amnesty/immunity in a specific case); and

- Issued in writing, including the reasons, and published promptly.

19.7.2.13 Reviews, finalizes, and publishes the Comprehensive Report (see above, paragraph 19.7.2.3), and ensures its widespread dissemination at the national and international levels.

19.7.3. Principle of Public Access and Limited Exceptions in the Transitional Justice Program:

19.7.3.1 In principle, all hearings, documents, court rulings, committee decisions, and session transcripts related to the Transitional Justice Program (including both the Transitional Justice Court and the Truth Commission) shall be public and accessible to both domestic and international news outlets.

19.7.3.2 Exceptions shall only be permitted if disclosure poses a serious and direct threat to national security, critical intelligence capabilities (such as sources, methods, or networks), or the lives of innocent people. In such cases:
- The information must be specific and verifiable;
- Any decision to restrict access must be approved by the head of the Transitional Justice Court (for the proceedings before that court) or the head of the Truth Commission (for the sessions held in any of its three committees);
- When a hearing or testimony is held in camera, all related evidence shall be recorded and sealed for a duration determined by regulation; and
- A non-confidential summary of events, findings, and responsibilities shall be promptly published to uphold the public's right to know the truth.

19.7.4. Nature and Duration of the Transitional Justice Program:

19.7.4.1 The Program is temporary in nature and shall dissolve once all referred cases have been decided.

19.7.4.2 The Program's maximum duration shall be five years, with an optional one-year extension approved by the head of the Divan. There shall not be any other extension.

19.7.4.3 If after the dissolution of the Program, documents or evidence are discovered that (i) indicate the occurrence of crimes falling within the scope of the Transitional Justice Court or the Conditional Amnesty Committee, and (ii) implicate a specific individual or individuals, the file shall be transmitted to the Attorney General (Prosecutor General), who shall, at his/her discretion, refer it to the appropriate prosecutorial branch. The court to which the case is ultimately assigned shall be required to apply the judicial procedures and practices of the Transitional Justice Court.

19.7.5. Scope Limitation: The Transitional Justice Program (including the Transitional Justice Court and the Truth Commission) only addresses crimes committed before the fall of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, any crimes committed after the

Regime involving national security, public order, or the Transitional System are considered separate crimes and shall be prosecuted through the regular criminal justice system.

III.   TIMELINE

20.   The political process described in this white paper is expected to take between 18 and 24 months. In the event of unforeseen circumstances, such as natural disasters or war, the timeline may be extended. However, in such cases:

   20.1.   Any extension exceeding six months must be approved jointly by the heads of all three transitional institutions (the Transitional Mehestan, the Transitional Government, and the Transitional Divan) as well as the Leader of the National Uprising; and

   20.2.   Any extension beyond 12 months shall also require a national referendum for the nation's approval.

IV.   NATURE OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

21.   The framework proposed in this white paper is hereby designated as the "Transitional Framework." The official decree issued by the Leader of the National Uprising to abolish the Constitution of the Islamic Republic[15] shall include a clause providing that the Transitional Framework shall constitute the binding governing instrument of the State during the transitional period and shall remain in force until the constitutional institutions established under the new Constitution assume their functions in accordance with that Constitution, at which point the Transitional System shall be deemed dissolved.[16]

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[15] The structure of the official decree of the Leader of the National Uprising is explained in the white paper "Legal: Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic."
[16] See above, paragraph 15.9.

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MILITARY AND SECURITY: Managing Risks and Protecting the Security and Public Interest

February 2026

The Iran Prosperity Project introduces a comprehensive plan to reform the country's military and security structure, aimed at preserving public order, ensuring a secure and peaceful transition, defending territorial integrity, and facilitating a democratic transition. This plan draws on crucial historical lessons, including in particular the catastrophic errors made after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It is designed to prevent acts of retaliation, mass purges, and the disintegration of defense and security institutions while safeguarding the survival of the new political order, securing borders, and preventing a return of the previous regime. The approach will be constructive focused on reform, maximum reintegration, and leveraging existing capacities. It will avoid a sudden dismantling of all institutions. The plan retains individuals capable of contributing to the future of Iran, which encompasses the majority of the rank-and-file. Those who were not engaged in criminal acts but, for various reasons, cannot be integrated into the future military and security establishment will be dismissed from their duties and will be assisted in their transition to new jobs or retirement. Furthermore, this plan will ensure that those directly involved in human rights violations and serious financial crimes are referred to the judicial system.

CORE STRATEGIC PRIORITIES DURING TRANSITION

Preparedness for Crisis Management During the Transition Period

- The Transitional Government shall design and implement emergency plans to maintain security and political stability during the transition phase.

- The new military command authority shall reconstitute military forces with the active participation of organized freedom fighter cells, and the defecting service members previously identified and vetted through the secure defection platform and other means.

- The reconstituted security forces shall professionally and effectively prevent or confront any organized armed resistance, acts of sabotage, or other violent extremist threats from the repressive institutions of the Islamic Republic regime (the "regime").

- The new military command authority shall focus on preserving internal cohesion and upholding order.

- The Transitional Government shall carefully lay out and execute contingency plans to prevent coups or any attempts by the regime loyalists to reclaim power.

Immediate Reactivation of Law Enforcement, Border Security, and National Security Institutions

- The Transitional Government shall issue a directive to reinstate operational responsibilities under new guidelines and direction across institutions such as law enforcement, border control and customs, intelligence and counterintelligence, and the defenders of Iran's land, air, maritime, and cyber borders.

- Under new oversight, these institutions must resume their role in maintaining domestic order and safeguarding national borders without delay and interruption.

- Timely payment of salaries, benefits, and welfare support for all military and law enforcement personnel must be a top priority to prevent disaffection, unrest, and security gaps.

- The Transitional Government shall take measures to prevent the collapse of state institutions and to ensure their speedy restoration, while taking steps to root out corrupt regime loyalists from government and state positions.

Distinguishing Loyalty to Regime from Criminal Conduct

- The Transitional Government shall make a clear distinction between former regime loyalists found to be involved in human rights violations and financial crimes, and those who served professionally and honestly in state and military institutions.

Avoiding Widespread Purges: Lessons from Iraq and the 1979 Islamic Revolution

- The Transitional Government shall take measures to avoid a repetition of Iraq's de-Baathification process in 2003 and the collapse of Iran's military institutions following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

- Widespread purges of military personnel across various ranks can lead to instability, create security vacuums, incite violence and unrest, and enable the rise of extremist groups. However, individuals involved in human rights violations and financial crimes will be referred to the new judicial authorities.

- The Transitional Government's official policy shall emphasize optimal reintegration, retraining, and orderly, phased restructuring of military and security institutions.

Establishing Fair Vetting Committees for Personnel Review

- The Transitional Government must establish independent institutions to review, on a case-by-case basis, the backgrounds of military and security personnel, ensuring transparency and the right to defense.

- These committees must base their decisions on individual responsibility, not mere organizational affiliation.

- Those who successfully pass this process may be reintegrated into the new institutional structure at the discretion of the Transitional Government.

Temporary Use of Existing Structures to Prevent a Security Vacuum

- Until new military and security institutions are fully organized and functional, the Transitional Government must rely on existing structures to maintain public order, defend national sovereignty,

and secure the country's borders. Defectors who have joined through the National Cooperation Platform, along with revolutionary cells, will play a crucial role in this interim phase.

- Building an entirely new military from the ground is unnecessary, costly, and dangerous.

Gradual Integration of Armed Forces Instead of Sudden Dissolution

- The Transitional Government shall retrain and gradually reintegrate qualified members of the military and security forces into new national military and security services.

- This process shall be carried out with due diligence and will be aimed at maintaining security, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preventing the rise of destabilizing forces and terrorist groups.

Rebuilding Trust Among Former and New Military and Security Personnel

- The Transitional Government shall, through official messaging and concrete measures, emphasize that its objective is reform, not retribution. It shall also make clear that it distinguishes between those who ordered and perpetrated human rights violations against Iranians and those who had no role in committing such crimes.

- The treatment of mid-level and lower-level personnel shall be respectful, grounded in military rules and regulations, free from personal bias or vendettas, and conducted with due regard for job security and human dignity, in order to prevent the emergence of disobedience, mistrust, or reluctance to integrate.

- To this end, a dedicated task force shall be established to allow members of the armed forces to report internal organizational issues and grievances. This task force shall create subordinate units within affiliated services across the country and shall promptly assess and review the submitted reports.

- Nevertheless, oversight of personnel compliance with the chain of command remains essential, and personnel who violate regulations or disrupt organizational order shall, in proportion to the severity of their misconduct, be referred to the appropriate commissions and competent judicial authorities.

- Within the framework of the "Transitional Justice Program," judicial proceedings shall commence against military and security perpetrators of human rights violations—including those who issued orders and those who carried them out.[17]

Guaranteeing Livelihoods and Job Security During the Transition

- The Transitional Government shall, by adopting the necessary measures, design and implement retraining programs for personnel, while simultaneously creating pathways for the retirement of individuals who have neither committed crimes nor possess the qualifications required to continue serving in the armed forces or national law enforcement and security services, or who voluntarily submit requests to leave service.

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[17] For more information, see the white paper "Political: Process and Framework for Transition From the Islamic Republic" paragraph 19.7.

- The Transitional Government must also, as a matter of urgency, develop and allocate a dedicated budget for the recruitment of new personnel. This step can help accelerate the rebranding of the military, security services, and law enforcement agencies under a new national identity.

Preserving Institutional Military Memory

- The Transitional Government shall document, retain, and utilize the accumulated tactical, intelligence, logistical, and geographic knowledge of experienced military personnel in the design of the new defense structure.

PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC MILITARY REFORM

Separating the Military from Politics and Ideology

- The Transitional Government shall completely remove ideological influence from the military structure and disband the regime institutions such as the IRGC.

- During the transitional period, the National Army shall swear allegiance to the State of Iran and to the Transitional System, and shall operate under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief as defined in the Transitional Framework.[18] Upon the assumption of office by the constitutional institutions established under the new Constitution—which shall mark the dissolution of the Transitional System—the National Army shall swear allegiance to the Constitution of Iran and shall recognize as Commander-in-Chief the authority designated therein. In the event that the Constitution is designed based on a parliamentary monarchy (following the referendum on the system of government), the National Army's Oath of Allegiance shall also include fidelity to the Crown as defined in the Constitution.

Integration of Armed Forces and Elimination of Parallel Structures

- The Transitional Government shall merge all armed entities, including the Artesh (conventional army), and other forces, into a single, unified, centralized, and accountable military structure.

- Unified command and control, reduced bureaucracy, and enhanced operational efficiency must be prioritized.

Establishing a Professional, National, and Accountable Army

- The future armed forces and law enforcement services will be redefined as highly trained and well-equipped, sufficiently compensated, and fully motivated professional services, with reserve elements for times of emergency.

Commitment to the Principle of Iran's Territorial Integrity

- The new armed forces shall be committed to defending Iran's territorial integrity, national independence, and territorial unity against any external or internal threat. The armed forces shall at all times be prepared to confront any act of sabotage or terrorism, or any anti-security or armed

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[18] The Transitional Framework designates Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi (Leader of the National Uprising) as Commander–in–Chief. See the white paper "Political: Process and Framework for Transition From the Islamic Republic" paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 21.

activity, under any title or pretext, whether originating domestically or externally, that targets the country's territorial integrity, political and social stability, or the lives and property of its citizens. In the event of such threats, the armed forces are obligated to act with the necessary decisiveness and to fully employ all available capacities and capabilities in the shortest possible time, in order to effectively defend the homeland and restore security and calm in affected areas.

- The unified military command is required to supervise the regular and effective implementation of border coordination meetings and coordination mechanisms between the national border guard forces and neighboring countries. The Transitional Government is also obligated, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to establish the necessary diplomatic communications with neighboring states and, with the aim of preventing the use of the territory of either party to undermine the security of the other, to conclude the necessary agreements and to monitor their proper implementation continuously.

- The Transitional Government is obligated, through the Armed Forces Geographic Organization under the Ministry of Defense and in coordination with the unified military command structure, to exercise heightened oversight over border stabilization through the Border Guard Forces and, if necessary, the National Army. When required and upon the request of the unified military command, the government must immediately allocate the necessary budget for the establishment of border posts and bases.

- The Military Intelligence Directorate of the National Armed Forces shall continuously and closely monitor the movements of military and paramilitary forces in areas surrounding Iran's borders, utilizing the capacities of other relevant branches of the armed forces and in coordination with national intelligence institutions, and report its findings through the chain of command to the unified military command.

- The principle of Iran's Territorial Integrity, as outlined above, shall be institutionalized in the national defense doctrine, military training, and command structure.

INSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Focus on Modern Training and Human Capital Development

- The Transitional Government must overhaul the military education system to prioritize technical skills, drone and cyber warfare, intelligence analysis, crisis management, and democratic and human rights principles.

- Equal opportunity must be guaranteed for all segments of society.

Financial Transparency and Smart Defense Budgeting

- The Transitional Government must combat corruption, patronage, and wasteful projects within the defense sector.

- Defense budgets and financial reports must be made publicly available in a transparent and accountable manner.

Establishing a System for Performance Evaluation and Oversight

- The Transitional Government shall create mechanisms to evaluate the progress of military reforms, assess operational efficiency, and ensure accountability within the chain of command.

- Modern, data-driven technologies must be employed to enhance transparency and oversight.

Enhancing Morale and Welfare of Military Personnel

- The Transitional Government must provide competitive salaries, healthcare, educational support, and career opportunities for military personnel and their families to boost morale and self-esteem, reinforce loyalty, and restore public trust in the armed forces.

Modernization of Military Equipment and Technologies

- The Transitional Government must invest in emerging technologies such as drones, cyber defense, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence.

- The armed forces must collaborate with universities and research institutions to develop advanced military systems and replace outdated equipment.

Developing Defense Diplomacy and International Cooperation

- The Transitional Government shall end Iran's militaristic regional adventurism and instead commit to international peacekeeping efforts and United Nations missions.

- Iran must cultivate defense partnerships with regional and global states to strengthen deterrence and promote constructive military engagement.

PHASED RECONSTRUCTION TIMELINE (24 MONTHS)

Overarching Goal

To guide the country from the collapse of the Islamic Republic toward the establishment of national, democratic, accountable, and security-centered institutions.

Phase 1: Immediate Post-Regime Collapse (0 to 3 Months)

Objective

Stabilize the crisis, prevent a power vacuum, maintain order, and begin dismantling the former regime's structures.

Key Actions

- Declare the army's neutrality and call upon law enforcement, border security, and intelligence forces to return to duty under new oversight.

- Peacefully secure, repurpose, reintegrate, and where needed suspend and/or shut down critical regime's military institutions.

- Issue directives banning the use of force against civilians.

- Secure borders, key infrastructure, and national resources (oil, energy, central bank, airports, and power plants).

- Ensure immediate payment of salaries to military personnel, teachers, healthcare workers, and civil servants to prevent social collapse.

- Officially launch the project to "redefine the military's identity" as a national, non-political, and non-ideological institution under the Transitional Government.

- Launch a personnel registration and evaluation system to determine eligibility for retention, retirement, or prosecution.

Phase 2: Institutional Reconstruction (3 to 12 Months)

Objective

Design and implement national security, intelligence, and law enforcement institutions to replace the regime's repressive structures.

Key Actions

- Establish a new **National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)** with a transparent structure, operating under the authority of the Transitional Government.

- Reform the national police and retrain officers with a focus on civil order, human rights, and democratic oversight.

- Deploy Community Oversight Boards to monitor the conduct of police and security personnel.

- Design a Modern Border Security Program in collaboration with the army and retrained forces, using advanced surveillance technologies.

- Gradually integrate former members of the IRGC and intelligence organizations into new military and civilian institutions who pass rigorous vetting and are not a threat to the new political order.

- Draft a Law Prohibiting Military Involvement in Politics.

- Rebuild military academies focusing on non-ideological modern defense paradigms, professional training, cyber warfare, and international law.

Phase 3: Institutional Consolidation and Handover (12 to 24 Months)

Objective

Institutionalize professional, accountable security and defense structures and prepare for handover to an elected civilian government.

Key Actions

- Ensure that the Transitional Government exercises full control over the army, police, border forces, and national security, subject to the oversight of the Transitional Mehestan (parliament).

- Establish a professional military intelligence unit to counter espionage and hostile infiltration, under an international cooperation framework.

- Reform the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces' support institutions to reduce bureaucracy and corruption.

- Complete the integration of former regime military structures and dissolve any remaining legacy institutions.

- Launch a National Defense Studies Center to develop a defense doctrine, train officers, and promote regional cooperation.

- Gradually enroll military personnel in international training programs and multilateral defense missions.

- Design a transparent public reporting and annual review mechanism for all defense and security institutions.

- Prepare institutional infrastructure for the formal handover of power to a popularly elected government.

RESTRUCTURING IRAN'S MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

Core Principles of Transitional Security Reform

- **De-ideologization:** The complete removal of religious, sectarian, and revolutionary influence from the military, police, and security institutions.

- **Depoliticization:** A total ban on political, partisan, or propaganda activities by the armed forces and intelligence services.

- **Integration:** Gradual, transparent, and conditional incorporation of qualified personnel from previous institutions into new structures, maximizing retention of capable individuals.

- **Professionalization:** Standardization of training, promotions, command hierarchy, and oversight in line with international norms and best practices.

- **Security with Trust:** Ensuring national security while rebuilding public trust in the military, law enforcement, and intelligence services.

STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT OF ARMED FORCES AND PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

The following table outlines the restructuring and future of the former regime's military, intelligence, and law enforcement institutions. The titles and organizational names of these bodies may change during the transitional period, with their final designations to be determined by either the new Constitution or statutes enacted by the future elected Mehestan (parliament).

CURRENT INSTITUTION	MAIN FUNCTION	CATEGORY
Intelligence Agencies		
Ministry of Intelligence	Domestic and foreign intelligence	Dissolution, removal of top officials, screening, and absorption of mid-level personnel into the new intelligence organization.
IRGC Intelligence Organization	Parallel intelligence focused on dissent and cyber operations	Screening, removal of top officials, integration of staff into the new intelligence body, and dissolution of the old organization.
Basij Intelligence	Neighborhood informant network	Dissolution of the organization.
FARAJA Intelligence	Main intelligence branch of law enforcement, monitoring domestic threats and dissidents	Dismantling the repressive component and leadership, screening personnel, and restructuring the organization with the primary goal of preserving national security and public safety.
Quds Force Intelligence	Intelligence collection for external operations	Dissolution of the organization.
IRGC Counterintelligence	Internal counterintelligence within the IRGC	Dissolution and integration into the national army.
Artesh Counterintelligence	Security oversight of Artesh and its commanders	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Military Forces		
IRGC Aerospace Force	Advanced missile, drone, and space capabilities	Dissolution and integration into the national army.
IRGC Ground Force	Ground military force loyal to the Supreme Leader	Dissolution and integration into the national army.
IRGC Navy	Asymmetric naval warfare	Dissolution and integration into the national army.
Artesh Ground Force	Conventional ground warfare	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Quds Force	Foreign operations and proxy warfare	Dissolution of the organization.
Artesh Navy	Conventional naval defense	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Artesh Air Force	Conventional air force operations	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.

National Organization for Passive Defense	Technical-intelligence operations for infrastructure and cyber defense	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
General Staff of the Armed Forces	Strategic military planning and overall command	Removal of top officials; After vetting existing personnel, defectors may remain, but ideological forces will have to retire; nevertheless, the structure will be retained after significant reforms .
Office of the Supreme Leader's Military Affairs	Supreme Leader's military decision-making office	Dissolution of the organization.
Basij Organization	Paramilitary force used for domestic suppression, ideological control, cyber operations, and proxy recruitment	Dissolution of the organization.
Law Enforcement Institutions		
Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA)	Law Enforcement	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Traffic Police (Rahvar)	Urban and highway traffic control	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Public Security Police (PAVA)	Organized crime and public order enforcement	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Morality Police (Gasht-e Ershad)	Enforcing the Islamic dress code, harassment of women and the public	Dissolution of the organization.
Immigration and Passport Police	Issuing passports, monitoring border terminals and airports for legal entry and exit, control foreign nationals' residency	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Diplomatic Police	Protecting embassies, diplomats, and international facilities	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Cyber Police (FATA)	Monitoring and repressing cyber dissent and online crimes	Dismantling the repressive component and leadership, screening personnel, and restructuring the organization with the primary goal of preserving national security and public safety.
Criminal Investigation Police (Agahi)	Criminal investigations, evidence gathering, and case building	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.

Prevention Police	Command of all police stations and security outposts; general law enforcement deployment	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Border Guard Command	Border security for land, sea, and air	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Anti-Narcotics Police	Counter-narcotics operations	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Police Emergency Response Center (110)	Emergency police response and unit dispatch (Call Center 110)	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
Military Service Organization	Conscription management and exemption processing	Preserve after going through reform and professionalization.
International Police (Interpol Iran)	International criminal pursuit and coordination with Interpol	Retaining the structure and ensuring operational continuity after vetting.
FARAJA Special Units	Riot control, protest suppression, special ops, and critical site protection	Dismantling the repressive component and leadership, screening personnel, and restructuring the organization with the primary goal of preserving national security and public safety.
NOPO Special Operations Unit	Hostage rescue, anti-terror, riot response, and tactical law enforcement	Dismantling the repressive component and leadership, screening personnel, and restructuring the organization with the primary goal of preserving national security and public safety.

KEY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN MILITARY-SECURITY REFORM

Challenges and Solutions in the Process of Security-Military Reform During the Transitional Period:

Challenge	Proposed Solution
Sabotage attempts by loyalists of the former regime (within security, intelligence, and logistics forces)	Integration of organized revolutionary cells, elevation of defectors of the security and military establishment inside the organizations; immediate implementation of a personnel vetting system; identification, demobilization, and apprehension of organized loyalists to the previous regime that will be a threat to the new political order; contingency plans for different scenarios; establish confidential internal reporting channels.

Security vacuum and emergence of parallel or armed militias	Rapid deployment of neutral and trained forces to maintain public order in urban areas; temporary curfews in critical zones; phased reintegration of retrained legacy forces.
Foreign interference from hostile actors	Swift formation of a regional security coalition with neighboring states and willing global actors; joining collective defense agreements; building multilateral deterrence capacity.
Public distrust of armed institutions, particularly given the legacy of repression and violence	Structural reforms in the judiciary, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies; guarantees of transparency, civilian oversight, and command accountability; launch of national reconciliation and truth-finding initiatives.
Shortage of trained, competent, and democratically loyal personnel	Partnership with international training institutions for accelerated leadership development.
Moral and psychological collapse or demoralization among legacy personnel	Immediate improvement of welfare, pay, professional conditions, and healthcare; national messaging focused on the future and inclusive national reconstruction.
Infiltration of former regime intelligence networks into new structures	Systematic removal of suspicious elements from security systems; dismantling of parallel intelligence structures; creation of the National Intelligence and Security Service.
Separatist and ethno-sectarian threats in border regions	The new army will operate under a doctrine focused on safeguarding territorial integrity while upholding inclusive justice and equal citizenship, and will deliver firm yet measured responses to any separatist activity.

OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION COMPANION TO IRAN'S TRANSITIONAL MILITARY REFORM PLAN

Phase 0: Pre-Fall Operations and Strategic Preparation

Goal:

- Preserving and maintaining command continuity, while reducing the cohesion and effectiveness of the regime's repressive structures through a combination of available methods.

- Institutional and human-capacity preparation of transitional forces for the takeover of state and sovereign centers, as well as the orderly transfer of responsibilities in key and sovereign institutions of the country, with the aim of preventing a power vacuum and urban instability and ensuring the rapid restoration of security nationwide.

Strategic Priorities

- Achieve internal intelligence superiority.

- Encourage internal defections.

- Build forward-operational capabilities, diaspora integration, defectors and revolutionary cells.

Key Initiatives

National Defection and Cooperation Platform (NDCP)

- The establishment and strengthening of secure and reliable communication mechanisms, with a focus on protecting the safety of individuals inside Iran, in order to support those who voluntarily and peacefully disengage from the regime and seek to cooperate with the transition process.

- The conduct of real-time vetting and credential verification, including identity confirmation through biometric technologies such as facial recognition.

- The creation of an initial registration system to determine the appropriate placement and roles of these individuals within the security and military structures of the Transitional Government.

Secure Command Continuity Protocol (SCCP)

- Multi-region emergency bunkers and satellite communications systems.

- Hidden data vaults with succession orders.

- Redundant communication chains via diaspora and allied nodes.

Credentialing and Mapping Cell (CMC)

- Geospatial and AI fusion to map IRGC/MOIS assets, tunnels, airbases, and proxies.

- Predictive modeling of power vacuum zones.

Regional Threat Fusion Center (RTFC)

- Regional joint monitoring node for cross-border threats.

- Proxy monitoring (PMF, Hezbollah, others).

Diaspora Intelligence Integration Program

- Background-verified diaspora security professionals ready for redeployment.

- Immediate fill-ins for judicial, cyber, forensic, and executive security roles.

- Integration of defectors and revolutionary cells into transitional structures following the completion of individual vetting and qualification verification processes.

Red-Team Simulations (RTS)

- Insurgency drills, chemical/nuclear seizure simulations.

- Failure chain detection in the current command simulation.

War Damage Integration Protocol (WDIP)

- Leverage regional intelligence and logistics partnerships to assess military sites and prepare contingency infrastructure plans.

- Develop contingency barracks and triage hubs.

Phase A/B1: Days 1 to 10 | Seizure and Stabilization

Strategic Focus

- Decapitate regime control.

- Secure national command zones.

- Establish a visible, lawful transitional authority.

Key Actions

- **Artesh Deployment:** The targeted and responsible deployment of National Army in sensitive locations across the country, particularly in major metropolitan areas and key cities as determined by the Transitional Government, shall be carried out for the purposes of establishing and maintaining public security, supporting the continuity of vital services, and preventing the emergence of security vacuums, without creating a repressive militarized environment or disrupting the daily lives of citizens.

- **Cyber Neutralization Cell (CNC):** Shut down regime comms and databases within 48 to 72 hours.

- **Emergency Broadcast Authority (EBA):** Launch national unity messages, counter disinformation.

- **Rapid Containment Force (RCF):** Eliminate active IRGC/Basij resistance cells.

- **Critical Infrastructure Security:** Deploy vetted Artesh personnel to secure energy, water, oil, gas, and power plant facilities from sabotage attempts.

- **Curfews and Martial Law:** The implementation of martial law in critical and high-risk urban areas, strictly within the framework of the law and under the oversight of the Transitional Divan (judicial branch). These measures shall be implemented to protect citizens' lives, prevent the outbreak of violence, and rapidly restore public order.

- **Transparency:** It is self-evident that the Transitional Government is obligated to communicate transparently with citizens, through mass media, the conditions, necessities, and reasons for adopting such measures, and to provide assurances that these actions are taken solely to ensure and strengthen security and public calm.

- **Military Base Seizure Units (MBSU):** Artesh-loyal forces take IRGC arsenals.

- **Artesh Loyalty Protocol:** Redeploy vetted and retrained Artesh personnel and isolate regime loyalists.

Phase A/B2: Days 11 to 40 | Vetting, Disarmament, Neutralization

Strategic Focus

- Begin the dismantling of regime structures.

- Establish judicial and intelligence control.

- Counterintelligence.

Key Actions

- **Three-Tier Vetting Protocol (Category A/B/C):** Personnel classified for retention, retraining, or prosecution.

- **Transitional Intelligence Tribunal Command (TITC):** Establishing a coordinated mechanism for handling personnel implicated in criminal conduct, including cooperation in the detention of human rights violators and perpetrators of major financial crimes.

- **Controlled Amnesty Framework:** Disarm the regime's militant groups, provide de-radicalization programs, and monitor.

- **Basij and Herasat Dismantlement Program:** Close down university-based and mosque-linked surveillance networks.

- **Counterintelligence Surge Teams (CST):** Sweep ministries, telecom firms, and military units.

- **Aerospace and Naval Transfer:** Retain drone stockpiles, IRGC aircraft, mines, and radar.

- **Joint Airspace Monitoring Protocol**: Coordinate early warning systems with allies.

Phase A/B3: Days 41 to 100 | Institutional Establishment and Civilian Control

Strategic Focus

- Build upon the current national security and defense institutions with a renewed vision and mandate. These institutions will build on the existing national security and defense infrastructure, but under a renewed vision, mandate, and chain of command aligned with democratic principles. While physical assets and organizational structures may be retained to ensure continuity and prevent a security vacuum, the names, missions, and functions of these institutions will be redefined to reflect a new era of civilian oversight and lawful governance. Personnel from legacy institutions—such as the IRGC—may be repurposed following rigorous vetting, retraining, and psychological evaluation, provided they were not involved in acts of repression. For example, technically skilled professionals who served in non-combat or non-abusive roles may be redeployed to support the Artesh or integrated into the newly established intelligence services. This selective reintegration process is designed to preserve valuable expertise while ensuring alignment with the values and mission of the Transitional Government.

Institutionalizing Civilian Oversight as Legal and Institutional Accountability

- Civilian oversight does not imply interference in operational command or military tactical decisions. Rather, it involves the exercise of lawful authority, strategic policy direction, institutional supervision, and ensuring that military and security structures are accountable to competent civilian authorities. Such oversight will be exercised through the government and Ministry of Defense, parliamentary supervision within the framework of specialized security and defense committees, and through formal mechanisms of auditing, evaluation, and legal accountability. These measures will be implemented with full respect for information confidentiality, document classification protocols, and tiered access controls. Operational command, field decisions, and specialized military affairs will remain within the professional jurisdiction of the military chain of command.

Personnel Structuring and Selective Reintegration

- Remaining personnel from institutions affiliated with the regime, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), will be eligible to continue service or be reintegrated into the new structures only upon successfully completing rigorous, individualized, and well-documented vetting processes. These procedures will include comprehensive security screenings, professional retraining, behavioral and psychological assessments, and formal verification of commitment to political neutrality and the rule of law. Individuals who played a direct or significant role in the repression of citizens, human rights violations, financial corruption, or other unlawful acts will be excluded from this process, and their cases will be referred to the appropriate transitional judicial authorities. Conversely, technical, specialized, and expert personnel with no record of involvement in repression may, based on the needs of the new structure, be incorporated into the National Army or newly established intelligence and security institutions. This selective reintegration aims to preserve valuable human capital, ensure the transfer of critical technical expertise, and guarantee full alignment with the mission, values, and legal framework of the transitional government.

Key Actions:

- **National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and Iranian National Police:**
    - Internal (counterintelligence, state security), External (espionage, proxy tracking), and Cyber Divisions.
    - The Iranian National Police is demilitarized and civilian-trained.
- **National Security Academy (NSA)**: Rapid induction program; ethics, chain of command, global law.
- **Artesh Command Framework:** Artesh-led, accountable, zero political affiliation.
- **National Crisis Response Activation**: Rapid-response civilian support and disaster unit.
- **Transitional Financial Intelligence Taskforce (TFIT):** Seize and reallocate assets of IRGC-linked conglomerates.
- **Security Transparency Framework:** A public portal for announcing arrests, publishing vetting results, and providing updates on judicial proceedings to build public trust and enable citizen oversight.

Phase A/B4: Days 101 to 140 | Global Integration and Legalization

Strategic Focus

- Legalize and validate new structures within the intelligence and military organizations.
- Start building international alliances with regional countries and ensure transparency and accountability to the Iranian people and the international community in order to build trust in the Transitional Government.

Key Actions:

- **NSRB Oversight Activation:** A national civilian board to audit all military/security bodies.

Phase A/B5: Days 141 to 180 | Stress Testing, Trust Building, Final Transfers

Strategic Focus:

- Run simulations to validate reforms.

- Reinforce public trust and readiness.

Key Actions:

- **National Stress Test Series**

    - Cyberattack war game.

    - Civil unrest response drill.

    - Proxy insurgency simulation.

- **National Intelligence Neutrality Directive**: the intelligence agency remains non-partisan.

- **Veteran Classification Publication:** Names of all vetted actors categorized into retained, retired, and prosecuted.

- **Permanent Oversight Bodies:** Install independent civilian inspectors-general for all military/security units.

Strategic Outcomes by Day 180

- **Security Agencies**

    - The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and the Iranian National Police are fully operational.

    - IRGC, Basij, Quds Force, and all other similar institutions and affiliated forces, dissolved.

- **Military Forces**

    - Artesh is functioning under civilian command.

    - All borders secure; aerospace and navy integrated.

- **Public Institutions**

    - Oversight bodies are functional.

    - Civilian-police engagement reestablished.

- **International Legitimacy**

    - Implementation of reforms in line with international standards.

    - Joint security cooperation with allies.

- **Stability Indicators**

    - No mass surveillance.

    - Transparent justice.

    - Upholding civil-military separation.

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FOREIGN POLICY: Reorienting Priorities Based on National Interests

February 2026

This white paper outlines the foreign policy plan of Iran's Transitional Government during the transitional period following the end of the Islamic Republic. Built on the principles of pragmatism, national interest, and non-ideological diplomacy, this framework aims to address the country's immediate security and foreign policy needs, secure international legitimacy, and prepare the ground for long-term regional stability and economic recovery.

The transition period marks a historic opportunity to redefine Iran's role in the world. The ideological, confrontational, and destabilizing foreign policy of the Islamic Republic will give way to a responsible diplomacy rooted in cooperation, transparency, and national development.

This white paper presents both the foundational principles of Iran's future foreign policy and a concrete, time-bound action plan for the first 100 days of the transition. It includes immediate steps to normalize relations with key global powers, reestablish credibility with international institutions, and launch regional cooperation initiatives. It also proposes institutional reforms within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and establishes a dedicated Economic Diplomacy Task Force to lay the groundwork for attracting foreign investment in the future.

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK AFTER TRANSITION

Fundamental Objectives

The Transitional Government of Iran views the complete overhaul of the country's foreign policy as a vital prerequisite for national reconstruction, reintegration into the international community, and the establishment of a stable regional order. This transformation will pursue the following key goals:

- Building peaceful and cooperative relations with all nations and international institutions by reaffirming Iran's commitment to mutual respect, equality, and the principles of the United Nations Charter. By restoring its rightful place in the international community and expanding engagement with regional and global partners, Iran will move toward strengthening peace, stability, and shared development.

- Ending uranium enrichment and heavy-water reactor activities to reassure the international community regarding Iran's nuclear program. Iran will demonstrate full transparency, peaceful intent, and adherence to international norms. By deepening cooperation with global partners and fostering inclusive regional dialogue, Iran seeks to transform past tensions into opportunities for trust-building and partnership, with the total removal of sanctions as a primary priority.

- Ending Iran's international isolation and addressing the issue of economic sanctions, which have imposed a significant cost on the economy.

- Replacing the Islamic Republic's ideological foreign policy with a pragmatic, national-interest-based and peace-oriented strategy.

It is noted that the Transitional Government shall develop and implement its foreign policy under the leadership of the Leader of the National Uprising (Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi) and, when appropriate, in consultation with the Transitional Mehestan, in accordance with the Transitional Framework.[19]

CORE PRINCIPLES OF FUTURE IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

- **Full Transparency in the Nuclear Field**
  One of the government's first actions will be to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means. This means a cessation of any enrichment and reprocessing activities, as well as facilitating unfettered access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to nuclear sites to work toward the removal of all international sanctions.

- **Strategic Reconstruction of United States–Iran Relations**
  Iran seeks to rebuild a strategic relationship with the United States, similar in depth and scope to the partnership that existed during the 1970s—a relationship based on mutual respect, shared security interests, and economic cooperation. This renewed bond will take inspiration from the historic *Treaty of Amity* and the era when U.S.–Iran ties served as a stabilizing force in the broader Middle East. By restoring channels of dialogue and trust, Iran aims to transform decades of hostility into a framework of collaboration focused on regional peace, counterterrorism, energy development, technological exchange, and the promotion of prosperity across both nations and their partners.

- **Non-Interventionist Regional Strategy**
  Iran will adopt a foreign policy that emphasizes respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Unlike the Islamic Republic, which exported ideology, built proxies, and fomented instability, the Transitional Government is committed to internal rebuilding and peaceful coexistence.

- **Formal Recognition and Restoration of Full Diplomatic Relations with Israel**
  The Transitional Government will officially recognize the State of Israel and initiate normalization efforts without preconditions, marking a historic shift away from ideological hostility.

- **Balanced Relations with China and Russia**
  Iran acknowledges the global significance of China and Russia and will strengthen its partnerships with them based on mutual respect, transparency, and Iran's sovereign interests.

- **Pragmatic, Transparent, National-Interest-Driven Policy**
  Future foreign policy will be driven by pragmatism, accountability, and Iran's national interest—not by ideology, slogans, or antagonism.

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[19] See the white paper "Political: Process and Framework for Transition From the Islamic Republic" paragraphs 1, 3, 8, 21.

STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY GOALS DURING THE TRANSITION

Regional security cooperation will be defensive, state-to-state, and conditioned on non-intervention, with the primary focus during the transitional period placed on domestic stabilization and institutional reconstruction. Within that framework, the following policy goals will be pursued.

- **Responsible Defense as a Foundation for Cooperation**
  Iran will build credible defense and security capabilities to protect its national interests and secure peace and stability in the region.

- **Strategic U.S. Partnership for Regional Stability**
  Iran can serve as a force multiplier for regional peace and security and lessen the U.S. security burden by contributing to counterterrorism, regional integration, and economic development.

- **Strategic Relationships with Israel**
  Normalization with Israel will mark a historic break from decades of hostility and open the door to a new era of cooperation. This relationship will serve as a cornerstone of Iran's regional strategy—advancing peace and stability through counterterrorism cooperation, fostering technology and innovation partnerships, and strengthening overall regional cohesion. Before 1979, Iran and Israel maintained close diplomatic, economic, and security ties. Reviving relations—grounded in those historical foundations—and formally recognizing Israel within the framework of the "Cyrus Accord" could significantly advance regional peace and stability, while promoting shared prosperity in key sectors such as energy, water resource management, and technology.

- **Key Regional Partnerships with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye**
  Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are vital regional partners. With respect to Saudi Arabia, Iran will prioritize cooperation in energy, maritime security, and regional economic integration. In its relations with Türkiye, it will focus on expanding trade, strengthening transit routes, and enhancing coordination on counterterrorism and anti-narcotics efforts. These areas of cooperation will be pursued on the basis of mutual respect, pragmatism, and shared interests.

- **Multilateral Regional Cooperation Frameworks**
  Iran aims to join or lead initiatives across the Persian Gulf, Levant, Central Asia, and around the world—covering maritime security, reconstruction, counterterrorism, trade, and connectivity.

- **End of Ideological and Hostile Foreign Policy**
  The new era will mark a decisive shift from ideology-driven interventionism toward constructive, pragmatic, and neighborly engagement. Iran's foreign policy will be guided by national interest, mutual respect, and regional cooperation—replacing confrontation and "export of the revolution" with partnership, stability, and shared prosperity.

FIRST 100 DAYS: ACTION PLAN SUMMARY

Timeline and Key Actions

- **Week 1**

  - Dispatch official letters to the world and regional powers announcing the end of the Islamic Republic and renewed cooperation.
  - Recognize Israel.
  - Request the start of immediate negotiations with the U.S., the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) Security Council with the objective of removing sanctions.
  - Appoint transition envoys to global institutions.

- **Month 1**

  - Open diplomatic channels.
  - Enter formal talks on priority issues with the U.S., EU, Israel, China, Russia, and neighbors.
  - Officially start negotiations to remove sanctions.
  - Accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

- **Months 2 to 3**

  - Draft memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on trade, non-aggression, and security cooperation.
  - Launch regional security/economic initiatives.
  - Sign preliminary agreements with the U.S. and Israel.

IRAN AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Week One: Official Messages to Neighboring Countries

- **Objective**

  Prevent misunderstandings, reaffirm commitment to good neighborly relations, and invite regional cooperation.

- **Actions**

  The Transitional Government will issue formal diplomatic communications to all neighboring states, outlining the following reciprocal commitments:

  - A reaffirmation of friendship and a pledge of mutual non-interference.
  - A commitment to secure borders on both sides to prevent the infiltration of armed and terrorist groups.
  - A mutual guarantee of respect for each other's territorial integrity.

- An open invitation to launch a regional dialogue aimed at stabilization and cooperation.
- A pledge to uphold existing bilateral agreements on trade, transit, and customs, to combat drug trafficking, and to avoid any disruption of these commitments, while agreeing to negotiate certain arrangements at an appropriate time.

Month One: Regional Visits by Interim Officials or Special Envoys

- **Türkiye**
  Core Objective: Joint cooperation to counter terrorist and separatist groups, enhance stability along the western border, and combat drug trafficking.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Border security cooperation and joint intelligence coordination hub.

- **Iraq**
  Core Objective: Expand bilateral trade and prevent militias that were previously backed by the IRGC, as well as separatist groups, from crossing into Iran and intervening in its internal affairs.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Joint border monitoring and terminating the Islamic Republic's proxy and separatist-group influence.

- **Azerbaijan**
  Core Objective: Expand trade relations, de-escalate tensions, and agree to refrain from unilateral geopolitical changes.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Non-support pact on separatist groups and maintenance of current geopolitical borders.

- **Armenia**
  Core Objective: Secure uninterrupted transit access and stabilize the Syunik corridor.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Transit corridor guarantees and commitment to the Tatev–Aghvani road (Syunik alternative road).

- **Pakistan**
  Core Objective: Cooperate on countering cross-border terrorism and separatism.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Termination of any support for armed groups and joint border monitoring and outposts.

- **Afghanistan**
  Core Objective: Secure the eastern border, manage migration, and combat drug trafficking.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Develop a joint framework for migration management and require a bilateral commitment to non-interference in internal affairs.

- **Saudi Arabia**
  Core Objective: Initiate de-escalation and redefine regional ties.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Joint statement condemning proxy warfare and fostering regional détente.

- **Qatar**

  Core Objective: Establishing a mutual commitment to non-interference in internal affairs, ending support for affiliates of the Islamic Republic, and expanding bilateral trade.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: MOU on regional stability cooperation and joint non-intervention declaration.

- **UAE**

  Core Objective: De-escalate tensions and secure energy and trade flows.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Strengthening diplomatic and trade relations and energy corridor guarantees.

- **Oman**

  Core Objective: Build on long-standing diplomatic and commercial ties.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Coordinate on regional diplomacy, maritime security, and commerce.

- **Bahrain**

  Core Objective: Reassure on cessation of sectarian influence and respect for national sovereignty.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Joint non-intervention declaration and confidence-building dialogue.

- **Kuwait**

  Core Objective: Strengthen diplomatic ties and regional coordination.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: MOU on diplomatic cooperation.

- **Turkmenistan**

  Core Objective: Preserve stability along the northeast border and ongoing energy partnerships.
  Initial Agreement Proposal: Border and energy agreements and continuation of joint gas and transit projects.

Key Topics for Bilateral Negotiation

- **Security and Borders**
  - Immediate cooperation on border management.
  - Preventing arms and militant infiltration into each other's territory.
  - Establishment of Joint Border Operations Rooms with each neighboring country.

- **Intelligence and Counterterrorism**
  - Intelligence-sharing on IRGC remnants, terrorist and separatist threats, and security and intelligence cooperation agreements.

- **Non-Support for Separatist Groups**
  - Mutual pledges to refrain from granting asylum or political support to separatist or militant groups.

Immediate Actions in Cooperation with Neighbors

- **Official Declarations from Neighboring States**

  The Transitional Government will reaffirm its commitment to the principle of good neighborliness and extend a hand of friendship to all neighboring countries, emphasizing mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, non-interference, and cooperation.

- **Action**

  - Establish Joint Border Commissions with each neighboring country.
    Purpose: 24/7 bilateral monitoring of borders and swift resolution of tensions.
  - Reopen Military and Security Communication Channels.
    Coordination between Iranian border commanders and their counterparts in neighboring states.
  - Enforce a Mutual Ban on Non-State Armed Group Movements.
    Joint measures to prevent the cross-border movement of militant or non-state actors.
  - Coordinate Humanitarian Aid Access.
    All humanitarian relief must flow through official, internationally monitored channels under the authority of the Transitional Government.

- **Proposal for a Regional Framework**

  - Iran proposes the establishment of a joint mechanism titled "*Framework for Regional Stability*" with the participation of all neighboring countries to enhance coordination, transparency, and mutual trust across the region.
  - Under this proposal, Iran will host monthly meetings with all its neighboring states to review regional developments, facilitate regular exchanges of security information, and promote confidence-building measures.
  - If deemed appropriate, international observers from the UN or the EU will be invited to attend these meetings to ensure the transparency and impartiality of this mechanism.

STRATEGIC EXTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS DURING THE TRANSITION

During the transitional period, Iran's Transitional Government will redefine its foreign policy based on mutual respect, international trust-building, and pragmatic cooperation with global powers. The primary objective is to ensure internal stabilization, address immediate security and economic threats, and reintegrate Iran into the international system.

United States of America

The Transitional Government will prioritize full normalization of relations with the United States. This renewed relationship must be founded on mutual respect and shared interests—not hostility or dependence.

Iran seeks a strategic partnership with the U.S. that supports the full removal of sanctions, reinforces regional stability, and facilitates Iran's reintegration into the global economy.

Three-Month Roadmap

- **Week 1**

    - Send formal communications to the White House, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Mission to the United Nations, including:
        - Official declaration of the end of the Islamic Republic.
        - Willingness for immediate talks on sanctions and regional stability.
        - Commitment to non-proliferation measures and treaties.
        - Invitation to reopen embassies.

- **Month 1**

    - Submit a formal request to remove key sanctions (banking, energy, etc.).
    - Issue a public statement of commitment to full cooperation with the IAEA and nuclear transparency.
    - Propose bilateral talks and appoint a dedicated negotiation team.

- **Months 2 to 3**

    - Begin technical discussions on a phased sanctions removal mechanism.
    - Draft a bilateral agreement on trade and investment.
    - Initiate dialogue toward a strategic partnership modeled after the U.S.–Iran cooperation in the 1970s.

Israel and the Cyrus Accord Framework

Iran will legally recognize the State of Israel and initiate a rapid normalization process. This strategic pivot will mark a definitive end to the Islamic Republic's adversarial ideology and open a path to long-term regional security and development partnership. This regional transformation will be guided by the principles of the Cyrus Accord—a doctrine of post-Islamic Republic foreign policy aimed at fostering normalization, regional trust-building, and multilateral engagement grounded in mutual respect and national sovereignty.

The **Cyrus Accord** serves as the cornerstone of Iran's new foreign policy approach toward a strategic relationship with Israel, which will include, but not be limited to:

- **Normalization and coexistence** with Israel as a foundation for regional peace.
- **Shared responsibility** in addressing regional challenges such as terrorism.
- **Economic integration** via open trade corridors connecting the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Jordan, and through Israel to the Mediterranean.
- **Cultural diplomacy** via promoting pluralism and coexistence among communities historically divided by sectarian policies.

This framework reflects the transition from the Islamic Republic's era of hostility to one of constructive relations based on close cooperation and mutual prosperity.

Three-Month Roadmap

- **Week 1**

  - Issue an official statement:
    - Recognizing the State of Israel.
    - Declaring the end of the Islamic Republic's hostile policies.
    - Inviting direct talks on the Cyrus Accord framework.

- **Month 1**

  - Establish a communication channel to initiate consultations.
  - Begin discussions on:
    - Opening embassies.
    - Joint efforts to neutralize sabotage by remnants of the Islamic Republic.
    - Cooperation in technology, agriculture, water security, cybersecurity, and energy.
    - A mutual pledge to avoid unilateral or uncoordinated actions.

- **Months 2 to 3**

  - Sign a preliminary memorandum of strategic cooperation.
  - Launch institutional and security training programs, including:
    - Transfer of knowledge and best practices to Iran's law enforcement, intelligence, and border security forces.
    - Expansion of cyber, intelligence, and judicial cooperation.

European Union

The EU will be one of Iran's most important partners during the transitional and reconstruction periods. The Transitional Government seeks a multidimensional partnership with the EU covering trade, investment, security, and humanitarian cooperation (including refugees and migration management).

Three-Month Roadmap

- **Week 1**

  - Send formal communications to the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament:
    - Announcing the end of the Islamic Republic regime.
    - Proposing enhanced cooperation on shared security challenges.
    - Confirming the release of all wrongfully detained European citizens.

- **Month 1**

  - Request the lifting of sanctions, including those in the banking, energy, and transportation sectors.

- - Extend an invitation to an official European Union delegation to visit Tehran for talks with the Transitional Government.
  - Initiate discussions on emergency infrastructure investment.

- **Months 2 to 3**

  - Establish a joint task force to:
    - Restore banking and financial ties, including a return to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).
    - Attract EU investment in energy, transport, and advanced industries.

China and Russia

Iran recognizes the global standing of both China and Russia. The Transitional Government will seek a constructive, balanced, and transparent relationship with both countries.

Foundational Principles

- Continuation of economic and technological cooperation.

- Comprehensive review and clarification of all opaque or non-transparent agreements.

- Shift from geopolitical dependency to a beneficial partnership.

Three-Month Roadmap

- **Week 1**

  - Send formal messages to Beijing and Moscow affirming:
    - Continued friendship.
    - The end of the Islamic Republic's dependency model.
    - A proposal for renewed dialogue.

- **Month 1**

  - Establish a review committee for strategic agreements, including:
    - The Iran–China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (also known as the Iran–China 25-year Cooperation Program).
    - The Iranian–Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
    - Invite selected Chinese and Russian firms to participate in transparent investment initiatives.

- **Months 2 to 3**

  - Draft a new framework for economic and defense cooperation.

  - Define clear limits and mutual expectations—particularly non-interference in domestic and political affairs.

  - Sign a "Statement of Principles for Independent and Reciprocal Relations."

India, Japan, and South Korea

As advanced democratic Asian powers, India, Japan, and South Korea will be indispensable partners for Iran in energy, technology, sustainable development, and maritime security.

Three-Month Roadmap

- **India**: Resume the Chabahar Port project and position it as a commercial hub for southeastern Iran, while also reviving long-term crude oil exports to India's growing market.
- **Japan**: Engage Japan to participate in health, green energy, and reconstruction projects, and restore Iran's role as a stable oil and LNG supplier to Japanese refineries.
- **South Korea**: Resolve the issue of frozen Iranian assets; normalize banking and trade channels; and reestablish crude oil and condensate exports as a foundation for broader cooperation in technology and maritime security.

Geoeconomic Role

Iran will position itself as a regional geoeconomic hub connecting the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to Asia. Energy exports to India, Japan, and South Korea will anchor long-term partnerships, complemented by cooperation in technology, trade, and sustainable development. This integration will reinforce stability of energy flows, secure sea lanes, and Iran's return as a reliable supplier to Asian democracies.

International Institutions

Iran will immediately and comprehensively resume its engagement with international organizations. At the forefront of this effort is cooperation with the IAEA.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

- **Week 1**
    - Submit a formal letter to the IAEA:
        - Declaring readiness for unrestricted inspections of all nuclear sites.
        - Committing to full transparency and cooperation.

- **Month 1**
    - Welcome the IAEA inspectors to begin on-site evaluations.
    - Develop a technical roadmap to resolve all outstanding nuclear issues.
    - Officially commit to the Additional Protocol and full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

- **Months 2 to 3**
    - Facilitate the publication of a preliminary positive report.
    - Use the IAEA cooperation as a basis to remove nuclear-related sanctions.

Other International Institutions

- **Week 1**

  - Formally notify the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank of the establishment of the Transitional Government and its intention to maintain and deepen cooperation as the new sovereign authority.

- **Month 1**

  - Begin discussions with both institutions for technical and financial assistance to support stabilization, public finance reform, and critical service restoration.
  - Establish joint working groups on governance, public health, and education.

- **Months 2 to 3**

  - Negotiate and secure emergency financing packages to help rebuild essential infrastructure and public services.
  - Lay the groundwork for reengagement with global development and trade initiatives.

IRAN'S ROLE IN REGIONAL ORDER AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS

During the transitional period, Iran must redefine and solidify its role as an anchor of regional stability. Guided by a non-ideological foreign policy, the Transitional Government will seek to end the country's isolation and actively participate in shaping a new regional security and economic architecture.

Iran's regional policy will center on three strategic geographic zones:

- The Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.
- The Levant and Iraq.
- Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

The Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

Strategic Objective

Iran will seek to rebuild relations with the member states of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), end sectarian and ideological rivalries, and establish a regional framework for cooperation on security, energy, and maritime transit.

Actions and Timeline

- **Week 1**

  - The Transitional Government will send formal diplomatic letters to all GCC member states, reaffirming:
    - Commitment to good neighborliness and non-intervention.

- - Respect for the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of Arab states.
  - An invitation to launch regional security and economic dialogue.

- **Month 1**

  - Official visits or the dispatch of special envoys to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait City, Manama, and Muscat.
  - Begin bilateral talks on:
    - Maritime security.
    - Energy corridors and joint investments.
    - Cooperation on curbing extremism.

- **Months 2 to 3**

  - Propose a multilateral mechanism involving:
    - Iran, the six GCC states, and observers from the UN or the EU.
    - Advance the formation of a joint commission on energy and maritime security to manage crises and ensure stability in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Levant and Iraq

Strategic Objective

To end Iran's interventionist policies in the Levant and Iraq and replace them with a framework based on trade, peace diplomacy, and joint management of migration, terrorism, and drug trafficking crises.

Actions and Timeline

- **Week 1**
  Send formal messages to the governments of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, declaring:

  - The complete termination of support for proxy groups.
  - A firm commitment to respect national sovereignty.
  - A readiness to cooperate on trade and border security.

- **Month 1, 2, 3**
  Bilateral talks with the aforementioned governments focused on:

  - Full cessation of support for IRGC-linked paramilitary elements.
  - Maintaining diplomatic and security ties with official governments.
  - Deepening ties in economic, diplomatic, security, and cultural relations.
  - Counterterrorism and anti-narcotics cooperation.
  - Strengthening border management.

Central Asia and the South Caucasus

Strategic Objective

To reinforce Iran's role as a geopolitical and economic bridge between the Middle East, Russia, China, and Central Asia, through expanded transit, energy, and border security cooperation, as well as Iran's cultural and historic ties with Persian-speaking communities.

Actions and Timeline

- **Week 1**
  Send formal diplomatic outreach to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, including:
    - An expression of readiness to deepen economic and transit ties.
    - A request for joint efforts to secure borders and counter smuggling and extremism.

- **Month 1**
  Bilateral discussions aimed at:
    - Activating key transport corridors (such as the INSTC and Sarakhs–Bandar Abbas railway).
    - Expanding exports of electricity, gas, and engineering services.
    - Launching trilateral consultations between Iran, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.

- **Months 2 to 3**
  Iran will express its intent to take a more active role in regional economic bodies, such as:
    - The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
    - Participation in regional rail and road connectivity projects.

Summary: Proposal for a Comprehensive Regional Stabilization Mechanism

Proposed Mechanism: "*Iran Regional Transition and Stability Framework*"

Component	Description
Objective	Prevent foreign intervention, reduce tensions, and stabilize borders.
Members	Iran and neighboring states (Türkiye, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, GCC, etc.).
Support	Monitored by the UN, the EU, and regional institutions.
Mechanism	Monthly meetings, Border Security Coordination Center, Counterterrorism intelligence sharing.
Message	Iran seeks peace, stability, and an active role in regional cooperation—grounded in mutual respect and national interest.

EMERGENCY FOREIGN MINISTRY RECONSTRUCTION PLAN DURING TRANSITION

In the early days of the transition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must come under the full political, administrative, and strategic control of the Transitional Government. The objective is to restore international connectivity, prevent diplomatic vacuums, and initiate institutional rebuilding grounded in national interests and professional diplomacy.

Key Goals

- Immediate control over the Islamic Republic's diplomatic network.

- Appointment of interim representatives to key countries and international bodies.

- Ensuring uninterrupted embassy and consular services.

- Launch of merit- and loyalty-based screening of diplomats.

First 14-Day Action Plan

- **Week 1: Official Announcement by the Transitional Government**

  - Declare the end of ideological foreign policy.
  - Issue directives to all embassies:
    - Maintain administrative order and avoid abandonment or destruction of documents.
    - Ban any independent political statements.

- **Week 2: Appoint Interim Special Representatives to Key Countries and Institutions**
  Due to the urgency of certain relationships, the Transitional Government will immediately dismiss current ambassadors of the Islamic Republic in key countries and appoint interim special envoys to:

  - Deliver the message of regime change.
  - Open new diplomatic channels.

Country / Institution	Government Action	Mission of Interim Representative
United States (UN & Washington DC)	Dismiss the current ambassador, send an interim envoy.	Announce regime change, begin diplomatic engagement.
United Kingdom	Dismiss the ambassador, appoint an interim envoy.	Maintain ties with the Foreign Office; review financial/legal files; coordinate on sanctions relief.
France	Dismiss the ambassador, appoint an interim envoy.	Rebuild ties with the Elysée, EU's support for sanction relief, and explore cooperative investment projects.
Germany	Dismiss the ambassador, appoint an interim envoy.	Resume engagement with the Chancellor's Office; advocating for the European Union to adopt an expansionary economic strategy and a liberal trade policy

		toward Iran; and promote expanded technological cooperation and investment.
China	Dismiss the current ambassador, send an interim envoy.	Reset relations; expand trade dialogue; explore cooperative investment projects.
Russia	Dismiss the current ambassador, send an interim envoy.	Reset relations; manage security dialogue; explore new areas of cooperation.
Belgium (EU Institutions)	Dismiss the ambassador, send an envoy to the EU bodies.	Redefine Iran-EU relations.
Austria and Switzerland (IAEA & UN)	Dismiss the current ambassadors, send interim envoys to UN bodies.	Reset relations; enhance cooperation and gain technical support from key UN agencies (including the IAEA) needed for the success of the transition.
Israel	Appoint an interim special envoy.	Establish diplomatic ties; initiate strategic security and intelligence cooperation.

Handling Other Embassies and Diplomatic Personnel

For all other ambassadors and mission staff:

- Those without ties to the Islamic Republic's intelligence, security, or ideological apparatus may, with the head of the Transitional Government's approval, continue temporarily in their roles.

- If a senior diplomat is suspected of ideological or security ties, their authority will be immediately transferred to a bureaucratic officer at the mission, pending further orders.

- In all cases, mission performance will be monitored by the central office in Tehran.

Continuity of Consular and Citizen Services

To prevent disruption in services for Iranian citizens abroad, the Transitional Government will implement the following:

- Establishment of an Emergency Consular Task Force within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- Issuance of urgent directives to all embassies to continue:

  - Issuing passports and visas.
  - Verifying official documents.
  - Providing emergency services to Iranians abroad.
  - Offering guidance on immigration, residency, marriage, birth, and death.
  - Prohibiting any security-related or discriminatory behavior in handling citizen affairs.
  - Providing immediate assistance to those with special circumstances, such as second-generation Iranians who lack Iranian passports or citizenship.

PROPOSAL: SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE IRANIAN DIASPORA

The Transitional Government recognizes the Iranian diaspora as one of the nation's greatest resources for reconstruction and reintegration into the international community. With millions of Iranians abroad contributing to science, business, culture, and civic life, the diaspora is uniquely positioned to support Iran's transition while remaining an integral part of the national community.

To institutionalize this engagement, the Transitional Government will appoint a Special Envoy for the Iranian Diaspora, tasked with serving as a bridge between Iranians abroad and the Transitional Government. The envoy's mandate will include:

- **Economic and Technical Mobilization:** Facilitate diaspora investment, entrepreneurship, and the transfer of technical skills to accelerate reconstruction and modernization.

- **Community Engagement:** Maintain open dialogue with diaspora organizations, cultural institutions, and civic networks to ensure that the voices of Iranians abroad are represented in the transition process.

- **Support for Diaspora Needs:** Address the practical concerns of Iranians abroad—including consular services, visas, documentation, and citizenship matters—by working with embassies and the Emergency Consular Task Force.

- **Humanitarian and Social Support:** Leverage diaspora networks to expand access to humanitarian relief, medical assistance, and educational opportunities.

- **Public Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange:** Promote cultural, academic, and scientific exchanges that reflect the aspirations of the Iranian people and strengthen Iran's global image as a country committed to openness and cooperation.

EMERGENCY STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DURING THE TRANSITION

Core Principle: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must not collapse; it must be swiftly freed from ideological control and rebuilt on the basis of professionalism, national interest, and responsible global engagement. This transformation will begin through immediate stabilization, fair screening, and professional retraining.

Domain	Proposed Action	Details
Leadership	Appoint a temporary head of the Ministry	Must be experienced, non-ideological, and patriotic.
Administration	Establish a Diplomatic Vetting Committee	Review diplomats' records for past affiliations and conduct.
Training	Launch a Diplomatic Reorientation Center	Align diplomats with the new foreign policy framework.

Media & Transparency	Form a Diplomatic Transparency Unit	Publish reports on foreign contacts and communications.
Regional Coordination	Set up a Neighboring States Coordination Desk	Facilitate regional diplomacy on security and border affairs.

PROPOSAL: FORMATION OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Overall Objective

To create a cross-sectoral, professional mechanism within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to steer, facilitate, and accelerate foreign investment through proactive economic diplomacy in full coordination with the Transitional Government's economic team.

Rationale for the Task Force

- Urgent need for economic reconstruction and access to external resources.
- Repositioning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a driver of economic development alongside diplomatic representation.
- Intense regional competition for foreign capital.
- Iran's vast opportunities in energy, transit, industry, agriculture, and technology.
- Necessity of strategic, internationally targeted economic diplomacy.

Proposed Task Force Structure

Section	Responsibilities
Central Secretariat	Strategic planning, coordination with the government economic team, and supervision of embassy-level operations.
Public Sector Investment Office	Engage with governments, development funds, and multilateral banks (IMF, World Bank, ADB).
Corporate Engagement Unit	Interface with multinationals, SMEs, and global entrepreneurs.
Public Economic Diplomacy Office	Craft Iran's investment messaging, media campaigns, and international content.
Events and Outreach Division	Organize conferences, expos, investment summits, and "Iran Economic Week."

International Opportunity Office	Active presence in global economic forums, workshops in target countries, and promotion of Iranian projects abroad.

Key Missions and Action Items

Short-Term (First 3 to 6 Months)

- Draft a comprehensive roadmap to strengthen economic diplomacy and attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through a coordinated interagency effort.
- Produce an Iran Economic Opportunities Booklet in the six UN official languages (namely English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, and Russian) as well as in German and, if need be, other languages.
- Launch a multilingual online investment platform for Iran.
- Participate in at least three major global economic conferences (e.g., Davos, OECD, JETRO, GITEX).
- Host investment opportunity workshops in strategic countries.

Medium-Term (6 to 18 Months)

- Deploy Economic Counselors to 20 key embassies.
- Organize an annual "New Iran Economy International Conference" in Tehran or other countries.

Core Principles

- Transparency and anti-corruption in investment promotion.
- Guarantee of capital repatriation and protection of property rights.
- Focus on job-creating and export-oriented projects.
- Pragmatic, non-ideological engagement with all global powers and markets.

Coordinating Body

- Office of Economic Diplomacy.
- Under the Special Economic Deputy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- In coordination with the Ministries of Economy, Oil, Industry, Central Bank, Chamber of Commerce, and the Office of the Head of the Transitional Government.

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GOVERNMENT ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS:
Maintaining Services and Activities, and Fulfilling Obligations

February 2026

This white paper establishes the continuity operating framework for the first 180 days. It defines essential functions, prioritization rules under constraint, and the governance mechanism for cross-sector allocation and standardized provincial execution. Detailed procedures are provided in the referenced chapters.

PURPOSE

The Transitional Government's first obligation is to ensure uninterrupted state function. This white paper summarizes the essential functions that directly affect daily life and public confidence, and it states the prioritization rules for the first 180 days. Operational detail is provided in the relevant white papers (Energy, Water, Health, National Assets, and Military and Security).

Continuity Objectives

- Maintain availability of essential services nationwide, with priority protection of life-safety and critical loads.
- Preserve public safety and basic order while minimizing rumor, hoarding, and coercion.
- Sustain essential economic participation and protect critical productive capacity.
- Retain essential personnel and safeguard institutional knowledge required to operate the state.

Governance and Coordination

The transitional authority will set national priorities, adjudicate cross-sector allocation decisions under constraint, and ensure consistent provincial implementation through standardized reporting and rapid escalation pathways. Public communication will follow a predictable cadence focused on service priorities, reporting channels, and enforcement against diversion and price gouging.

Essential Functions to Protect

In the first 180 days, the following functions must remain operational nationwide, with prioritized allocation of resources during shortages:

- Food availability and distribution.
- Critical supply chains.

- Transportation and logistics.

- Utilities.

- Public health services.

- Emergency response, municipal services, and public order.

- Personnel continuity and institutional knowledge.

ACTIONS BY TIME HORIZON

H-Hour to H+72 (Immediate Stabilization)

The first 72 hours will set the tone of the transition. Visible continuity in food, fuel, electricity, and emergency care is the fastest way to reduce panic and prevent unrest.

- **Secure continuity nodes:** fuel depots, grain storage and warehouses, ports of entry, major hospitals, water treatment plants, utility dispatch and control centers, telecommunications hubs, and key logistics corridors.

- **Stabilize essential service operations:** triage critical outages, prioritize repairs that restore systemwide capacity, and establish an emergency routing plan for priority goods.

- **Issue a short public continuity directive:** what is operating, what is prioritized, where to report outages and abuse, and how price gouging and diversion will be enforced.

Days 3 to 30 (Stabilization and Triage)

- **National availability assessments:** food, medicine, fuel, and spare parts, with clear identification of import dependencies and bottlenecks requiring emergency procurement or corridor protection.

- **Utilities continuity posture:** Prioritize utility service to essential facilities and life-safety needs, implement contingency measures; communicate service management rules to sustain public cooperation.

- **Health continuity posture:** protect emergency capacity, execute essential medicine procurement and distribution, and establish surge protocols for shortages and outbreaks.

- **Public service continuity:** protect emergency response and municipal functions; deploy contingency staffing, protective measures, and rapid escalation protocols where credible threats, intimidation or organized disruption affect personnel.

Days 31 to 180 (Operational Continuity and Institutionalization)

- **Shift from emergency measures to repeatable operations:** contracting, warehousing, maintenance cycles, verified staffing pipelines, and standardized provincial execution.

- **Preserve institutional knowledge:** secure and digitize essential operating procedures, registries, and records; retain experienced operators to train replacements and stabilize handover.

- **Strengthen local delivery capacity:** improve provincial performance while maintaining national standards, accountability, and transparency.

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MACROECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: Managing Fiscal and Monetary Risks

February 2026

This white paper outlines the core strategies for restoring Iran's economic functionality during the transitional period. It focuses on reasserting control over fiscal institutions, stabilizing the banking system and monetary framework, and rebuilding the integrity of financial markets. These efforts are essential to prevent economic collapse, maintain fiscal and monetary stability, preserve consumption and investment, and create the foundation for credible reform and long-term recovery.

This white paper is organized into three interrelated areas: fiscal policy, banking and monetary stabilization, and financial market restructuring. While each area requires targeted interventions, they all share the common goal of restoring public and investor confidence in the state's ability to manage the economy. The subsections below lay out clear objectives, priorities, and actions, along with monitoring mechanisms to ensure effective implementation and accountability.

It is important to note the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) performs two critical and distinct roles that are particularly relevant during the transition period. First, as the monetary authority, the CBI is responsible for conducting monetary policy, managing inflation, stabilizing the exchange rate, and regulating the banking sector. Second, and less commonly seen in advanced economies, the CBI also acts as the fiscal agent and account holder of the Treasury, responsible for processing government payments, disbursing subsidies and pensions, and maintaining the operational flow of public expenditures. This dual role means that control over the CBI is not only essential for macroeconomic stabilization but also for ensuring the continuity of basic state functions and household consumption. In the following sections, references to the CBI will depend on the context: its fiscal agent role is discussed under Fiscal Policy, while its monetary authority role is examined under Stabilizing Banks and Money. In the short run, immediately following the collapse of the regime, these dual roles are not expected to change dramatically and will remain in place until the necessary steps are taken to modernize both fiscal operations and monetary policymaking under a future constitutional framework.

FISCAL POLICY

Overview

This transition plan outlines the strategic approach for stabilizing Iran's fiscal policy during the transitional period, focusing on securing control over public finances, maintaining essential government functions, and reestablishing administrative and international legitimacy. The plan aims to implement immediate, actionable steps that preserve core state outlays, prevent institutional collapse, and create the fiscal space necessary for recovery and reform.

Importance of Fiscal Policy Stabilization

Stabilizing fiscal policy is crucial during the transition period, as it enables the government to maintain regular payments, fund critical services, and assert sovereignty over national resources. Without clear fiscal control, disruptions to pensions, subsidies, and administrative operations could erode public confidence and exacerbate economic instability. A credible and functional fiscal framework is also a prerequisite for reengaging with international institutions and unlocking frozen assets.

Objectives

- Establish economic and administrative stability.
- Assert state sovereignty.
- Preserve basic functions during Iran's transitional phase.

Key Priorities

- Control fiscal and monetary institutions.
- Securing essential public spending.
- Streamline the administrative state as much as feasible.
- Reestablish basic international economic relations.

Assumptions

- Widespread political consent for the Transitional Government.
- Sufficient support among mid-level managers of ministries and agencies.
- No credible alternative entity to challenge international legitimacy.

Actions

- **Economic Stabilization**
  - **Control fiscal institutions:** Secure the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) role as the fiscal agent and account holder of the Treasury to maintain regular government payments and preserve private consumption (~50% of GDP), including through public subsidies on essential goods.
  - **Monetary policy:** Empowering the CBI as an Independent Institution (Managing interest rates to curb inflation).
  - **Capital controls on public institutions:** Temporarily imposed to prevent capital flight and freeze and immobilize assets of former regime affiliates.
  - **Domestic debt issuance:** Issue bonds through local financial institutions to cover short-term budgetary gaps.
  - **Support existing pensioners:** Ensure minimal disruption for current pensioners.

- **International Relations**
  - **Seek International Recognition and Access to Frozen Assets:** Secure formal recognition of the Transitional Government by key global actors (e.g., the US, EU, China, IMF, UN) as a prerequisite for unlocking $120–150 billion in frozen reserves and initiating access to international funding (e.g., IMF lending programs).
  - **Deploy Emergency Funds Strategically:** Use recovered assets to stabilize the financial sector, finance urgent government operations (including pensions and subsidies), and restart oil and gas exports to restore fiscal capacity.
  - **Re-engage with Global Standards and Institutions:** Begin formal negotiations with international financial institutions and regulatory bodies (e.g., IMF, World Bank, FATF) to rebuild credibility and reenter the global financial system. Engage with the three major credit rating agencies (CRAs)—Fitch, Moody's, and S&P—to obtain sovereign credit ratings. This process requires certain legal and institutional reforms, including dismantling ideological institutions, as will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection.

- **Administrative Streamlining**
  - **Downsize Ideological Institutions:** Dismantle or significantly reduce the scope of entities tied to the former regime to ease fiscal burdens and signal institutional reform. This includes dismantling the Securities and Exchange High Council of Iran (SEHC) and phasing out mandatory adherence to Islamic finance frameworks, which have constrained market development and transparency.
  - **Consolidate and Reform State-Affiliated Entities:** Merge redundant or parallel ministries and agencies to improve administrative efficiency. In particular, Bonyads—quasi-state foundations with vast untaxed holdings—must be downsized, brought under formal oversight, and subjected to taxation to ensure fiscal accountability.
  - **Defer Major Structural Reforms:** Postpone deep constitutional or systemic overhauls until a legitimate, democratically elected government is in place and empowered to undertake such changes with broad-based political support.

Recommendation

Act swiftly, prioritizing:

- Securing fiscal control.
- Seeking international recognition.
- Initiating modest but credible administrative reforms.
- Monitor financial stability and public sentiment closely to adjust policies as needed.

Expected Outcomes

- Prevent economic collapse, stabilize inflation, and restore public confidence.
- Unlock critical funds and trade opportunities by reestablishing international engagement.

- Reduce costs and lay the groundwork for long-term governance reforms through administrative streamlining.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- **Budget Execution and Fiscal Balance:** Monitor revenues, expenditures, and the overall fiscal balance on a monthly basis, including the use of domestic debt instruments and emergency funds.

- **Government Payment Continuity:** Track the timeliness and completeness of key government payments, including wages, pensions, and subsidy transfers.

- **Public Sector Spending Efficiency:** Measure the share of spending allocated to essential functions versus legacy or ideological institutions, and assess the pace of administrative consolidation (e.g., ministry mergers, Bonyad reforms).

- **Access to External Resources:** Monitor progress toward unlocking frozen assets and securing short-term financing from multilateral institutions.

STABILIZING THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE CURRENCY

Overview

This transition plan outlines the strategic approach for stabilizing banks and money during the transitional period, focusing on reestablishing monetary authority, stabilizing bank operations, restoring public and foreign confidence, safeguarding financial integrity, and deploying emergency liquidity as needed. The plan aims to implement actionable steps that facilitate a smooth transition while addressing immediate challenges.

Importance of Stabilizing Banks and Money

Stabilizing banks and money is crucial during the transition period, as it ensures economic stability, access to financial services, and boosts public confidence, which are essential for national recovery and growth. Without re-establishing the central bank's authority and maintaining banking operations, savings erode, capital flight accelerates, inflation surges, and trust from both domestic investors and the international community collapses.

Objectives

- Assess banks' health and deploy emergency liquidity support.

- Maintain banking operations and payment system continuity.

- Restore confidence among the public and foreign counterparties in Iran's banking system, and safeguard financial integrity.

Key Priorities

- Reestablish operational control over the Central Bank of Iran and national payment systems to ensure continuity of banking services and prevent financial disruption.

- Restore monetary policy credibility by empowering an independent central bank to address inflation and transition to a floating exchange rate regime.

- Safeguard financial system integrity through temporary capital controls and asset freezes targeting politically exposed persons and regime-linked entities.

- Mobilize external financial resources by securing international recognition and access to frozen assets to stabilize the financial sector and rebuild confidence, including through reestablishing links to global financial systems such as SWIFT and compliance with FATF standards.

Assumptions

- Functioning transitional authority with control over key institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the Ministry of Economy and Financial Affairs (the Treasury), and major banks.

- Relative stability with no active war and a peaceful or contained transfer of power, preserving core infrastructure.

- Access to financial infrastructure, including payment systems, CBI facilities, and communications.

- Openness to international engagement, including potential recognition by major powers.

- The path to sanctions relief or legal access to frozen assets is available or negotiable.

Actions

- **Leadership and Institutional Control**
  - Appoint a new CBI Governor, an interim Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, and caretaker administrators for public and private banks.
  - Secure physical and administrative control over the Central Bank of Iran and the national payment infrastructure.
  - Establish a financial stabilization task force to coordinate banking operations, liquidity management, and public communication.

- **Monetary and Banking System Stabilization**
  - Grant the CBI operational independence to set interest rates, manage liquidity, and implement anti-inflation policy.
  - Restricting liquidity growth (M2) by limiting the growth of the banking sector's balance sheet and eventually raising interest rates to counter inflationary pressures.
  - Reform the Foreign Exchange Market by consolidating the current multiple exchange rates into a dual-rate system as a transitional step. This approach can help stabilize the currency and prioritize essential imports in the short run, while maintaining capital controls to preserve reserves.

- ○ Maintain uninterrupted banking and payment services to support private consumption and public sector operations.
- ○ Issue domestic bonds via local financial institutions to address short-term budget deficits.

- **Financial Integrity and Controls**
  - ○ Provide 100% deposit insurance for retail and commercial accounts for the first 100 days, with withdrawal limits.
  - ○ Implement temporary capital controls to restrict outbound financial flows.
  - ○ Freeze large foreign currency accounts linked to regime affiliates, public institutions, and politically connected persons.
  - ○ Flag and scrutinize high-value transactions (e.g., above $1 million).
  - ○ Prohibit insider transfers and fire sales of assets by regime-linked entities.
  - ○ Coordinate with foreign jurisdictions (e.g., China, UAE) to freeze and protect Iranian public assets abroad.

Recommendations

- Act swiftly to establish control over fiscal and monetary institutions to prevent systemic collapse.
- Prioritize leadership appointments in financial institutions to signal stability and technocratic governance.
- Use capital controls and asset freezes strategically to safeguard national wealth while allowing time for legal investigations.
- Focus early actions on deposit guarantees and payment system continuity to maintain public confidence.
- Seek international recognition (from the US, EU, China, IMF, UN) to unlock access to $120−150 billion in frozen reserves.
- Use emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, support fiscal operations, and reinitiate trade in oil and gas.
- Begin diplomatic engagement with multilateral institutions to rebuild Iran's credibility in global financial markets.
- Defer large-scale structural or constitutional reforms until a democratically elected government assumes office.
- Downsize ideological or parallel institutions to signal reform and reduce fiscal burdens.
- Continuously monitor public sentiment and financial conditions to recalibrate measures in real time.
- Hiring external auditors to conduct a comprehensive audit of financial institutions and their financial statements and meanwhile placing a regulatory capital forbearance policy.
- Tasking CBI with a dual mandate: price stability and financial stability. Anchoring its policies around the three main pillars of modern central banking governance: independence, transparency, and accountability, supported by regular public reporting.

Expected Outcomes

- Stabilized banking operations and uninterrupted financial services.

- Reduced inflation and currency volatility through credible monetary policy.

- Increased public confidence in financial institutions via guarantees, transparency, and leadership change.

- Prevented capital flight and asset stripping through targeted controls and asset freezes.

- Secured access to financial resources by protecting public assets and reengaging internationally.

- Established groundwork for long-term reform under future elected leadership.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- **Metrics for Success**
  - Appointment and activation of key leadership positions (CBI Governor, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, bank administrators).
  - Decline in inflation rate.
  - Containing the growth of money supply (M2).
  - Containing the growth of the banking system's balance sheet.
  - Reduction in exchange rate volatility.
  - Increase in volume of bank deposits.
  - Continuous and uninterrupted Operation of bank branches, payment system, and ATMs.
  - Reduced outbound capital flow volume.
  - Increase in the value of regime-linked assets secured domestically and abroad.
  - Progress in unlocking and utilizing frozen foreign assets.

- **Review Process**
  - Weekly transition authority meetings with published agendas and decisions.
  - Regular public disclosure and leadership appointments, mandates, and transitions.
  - Regular bulletins on market conditions, policy changes, and reopening timelines.
  - Monthly monetary and financial stability reports from the CBI and treasury.
  - Periodic public updates on banking access, deposit insurance, and reform progress.
  - Standardized internal reporting from market institutions to the transition authority.
  - Monthly tracking of frozen assets abroad and progress on international legal cooperation.

Anticipated Political Challenges

- **Challenges**
  - Resistance from former regime loyalists.
  - Bureaucratic inertia and institutional fragmentation.

- ○ Lack of political consensus on reform priorities.
- ○ Public district and political volatility.
- ○ Interference in technocratic institutions.

- **Mitigation Strategies**
  - ○ Secure institutional control and physical access.
  - ○ Appoint clear and credible transitional leadership.
  - ○ Establish a centralized economic command structure.
  - ○ Build political and public communication channels.
  - ○ Defer structural reforms and focus on stabilization consensus.

STABILIZING FINANCIAL MARKETS

This transition plan outlines the strategic approach for stabilizing Iran's financial markets during the transitional period, focusing on preventing systemic disruption, restoring transparency, protecting national wealth, and rebuilding investor confidence. The plan aims to implement actionable steps—such as targeted market closures, foreign exchange reform, and phased reopenings—while addressing immediate risks of capital flight, asset mispricing, and institutional breakdown.

Importance of Stabilizing Financial Markets

Stabilizing the financial market is crucial during the transition period, as it ensures effective capital allocation, investor confidence, and the emergence of real and meaningful prices, all of which are essential for restoring economic stability and enabling national recovery and growth. Without stabilization, market volatility, distorted pricing, and capital flight could undermine broader reform efforts and delay economic normalization.

Objectives

- Prevent systemic disruption in financial markets.
- Ensure accountability and investor protection.
- Stabilize the foreign exchange market.
- Reopen and normalize financial markets.

Key Priorities

- Prevent market disruption by temporarily closing vulnerable market segments (e.g., equity and corporate debt markets) to avoid panic-driven selloffs and insider asset stripping.
- Conduct audits, reassess asset valuations, and strengthen governance, disclosure, and regulatory frameworks before market reopenings.

- Reopen financial markets selectively, beginning with the Treasury market under transparent issuance procedures, followed by phased equity and debt market reopenings tied to reform benchmarks.

Assumptions

- Functioning transitional authority with control over financial regulatory institutions, including the Securities and Exchange Organization.
- Relative stability with no active war and a peaceful or contained transfer of power, preserving core infrastructure.
- Sufficient physical and digital control of financial infrastructure, including the Tehran Stock Exchange, trading systems, and market data platforms.
- Availability of technocratic expertise to conduct audits, manage capital controls, and oversee market reform.
- International channels are open for coordination on asset freezes, capital monitoring, and eventual reintegration into global markets.

Actions

- Appoint new leadership at key financial market institutions, including the Tehran Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange Organization, and Capital Market Development Fund, to ensure credible oversight and policy alignment.
- Temporarily suspend trading on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for 90–180 days to prevent panic selloffs and enable audits.
- Close the corporate debt market for 100 days due to illiquidity and lack of pricing integrity.
- Conduct independent audits and valuation reassessments of listed companies and publicly traded financial instruments.
- Implement a dual exchange rate system as a transitional step, with a managed rate for essential imports and a floating rate for other transactions.
- Enforce capital controls to prevent outflows linked to former regime affiliates or illicit wealth holders.
- Resume Treasury market operations within 30 days, prioritizing short-term instruments and requiring full disclosure of yields and maturities.
- Establish investor protection rules before market reopenings, including enhanced disclosure, governance standards, and insider trading restrictions.
- Set benchmarks and conditions for phased market reopenings, linked to transparency, legal reform, and audit completion.
- Coordinate with international financial institutions and market regulators to align post-transition reforms with global standards.

Recommendations

- Act swiftly to suspend vulnerable markets to prevent disorderly selloffs and preserve asset value during the early transition period.

- Prioritize transparency and legal safeguards before reopening any financial markets to ensure integrity and investor protection.

- Use the Treasury market as a credibility anchor, reopening it early under strict disclosure and pricing standards.

- Phase reopenings based on verifiable benchmarks, such as completion of audits, establishment of investor protections, and regulatory readiness.

- Maintain capital controls until asset tracing and legal reviews are complete, especially for politically exposed persons and regime-linked entities.

- Engage international partners to align financial reforms with global standards and attract future capital inflows.

- Defer complex financial liberalization or structural reforms until a constitutionally elected government is in place.

- Communicate consistently and publicly to manage expectations and build trust with domestic and international investors.

Expected Outcomes

- Avoided financial market collapse through timely closures and capital flow controls. Preserved national wealth by preventing insider selloffs and illicit capital outflows.

- Restored investor confidence via enhanced transparency, regulatory safeguards, and credible leadership.

- Stabilized foreign exchange flows through a dual-rate system (as a transitional step) and targeted FX market reforms.

- Improved market integrity through audits, legal reform, and governance restructuring.

- Phased return to market functionality, beginning with the Treasury market under credible pricing and disclosure.

- Strengthened international credibility, laying the foundation for post-transition capital market reintegration.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- **Metrics for Success**
  - Appointment and public disclosure of new leadership at TSE, Securities and Exchange Organization, and related bodies.
  - Operational status of key market infrastructure (trading platforms, data systems) and market segments (TSE, corporate debt, Treasury).

- Completion of external audits and asset valuation reviews.
- Adoption of investor protection and disclosure regulations.
- Daily exchange rate spread between official and floating rates.
- Volume of FX transactions processed under each rate.
- Volume of outbound capital transactions blocked or reviewed.
- Number and value of accounts frozen or flagged for legal action.
- Progress in legal review of regime-linked financial holdings.
- Trading volume and participation after phased reopenings.
- Bond yield curve publication and market responsiveness.

- **Review Process**
  - Weekly transition authority meetings with published agendas and decisions.
  - Regular public disclosure and leadership appointments, mandates, and transitions.
  - Regular bulletins on market conditions, policy changes, and reopening timelines.
  - Monthly transparency reports on audit progress, capital control enforcement, and FX operations.
  - Third-party audits of valuation, financial disclosures, and regulatory compliance.
  - External advisory board to review market reopening conditions and benchmarks.
  - Standardized internal reporting from market institutions to the transitional authority.
  - Investor engagement sessions to gather input and communicate reform milestones.

Anticipated Political Challenges

- **Challenges**
  - Resistance from Former Regime Loyalists.
  - Bureaucratic Inertia and Institutional Fragmentation.
  - Lack of Political Consensus on Reform Priorities.
  - Public Distrust and Political Volatility.
  - Interference in Technocratic Institutions.

- **Mitigation Strategies**
  - Secure institutional control and physical access.
  - Appoint clear and credible transitional leadership.
  - Establish a centralized economic command structure.
  - Build political and public communication channels.
  - Deter structural reforms and focus on stabilization consensus.

Oversight of the Unregulated Financial Sector

Within two weeks of the regime's collapse, the Transitional Government shall establish a Joint Financial Task Force, composed of members drawn from the provisional financial authority and national security agencies, to prevent the immediate outflow of funds and restore control over informal payment networks. These networks—linking individuals seeking to send funds abroad with others remitting money into Iran—have long facilitated large-scale, unmonitored transactions outside the banking system, posing severe risks of capital flight, money laundering, and potential financing of illicit or terrorist activities.

The Task Force shall move immediately to identify, monitor, and disrupt the operations of key actors within these networks. As its first operational measure, it shall implement a mandatory registration and approval system requiring all individuals and institutions conducting large-sum or cross-border payments to register and obtain authorization. No high-value payments shall be permitted outside this framework. The Task Force shall also initiate direct coordination with foreign financial intelligence units to trace offshore linkages, freeze suspicious assets, and prevent illicit transactions.

In the medium term, the government shall redirect all legitimate transfers through regulated banks and licensed exchange institutions, establishing transparent reporting standards and preparing for Iran's accession to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) framework.

PRIVATIZATION

Overview

While immediate privatization of assets owned by the government and semi-government organizations may not be feasible in the emergency phase following the fall of the Islamic regime, it is critical that the Transitional Government establish a clear and effective framework to stabilize these assets and prepare them for eventual reform.

Objectives

The focus during this interim period must be on:

- Securing public property.
- Restoring transparency.
- Ensuring operational continuity.

These steps are essential not only for rebuilding trust in public institutions but also for laying the groundwork for long-term economic recovery and sustainable privatization.

Key Priorities

The following measures should be taken promptly:

- Taking control of assets, safeguarding, and recordkeeping.
- Removing political appointees from SOEs and appointing interim management.

- Maintaining the operations of productive enterprises.
- Hiring accounting/auditing firms to oversee past transactions, monitor ongoing finances and perform full risk assessment.
- Assessing liabilities and preserving enterprise value.
- Defining a prioritization framework for privatization.

Assumptions

- Mostly peaceful transition.
- Minimal physical damage to the economic infrastructure.

Actions

- Create a comprehensive list of SOEs, including all government and semi-governmental organizations, foundations, religious endowments, and related entities.
- Assert full administrative control over SOE assets:
  - Physical Property.
  - Digital Records.
  - Financial Holdings.
  - Corporate Shares.
  - Other Investments.
- Establish a transparent and centralized system of recordkeeping to protect assets, prevent misappropriation, and facilitate future restructuring.
- Remove key leadership positions (political appointees) within SOEs and public institutions and sever their influence. This ensures restoring professional integrity.
- Appoint interim management teams, composed of qualified technocrats, industry experts, and neutral civil servants. Their primary responsibility is to maintain institutional stability and transparency until permanent, merit-based leadership structures can be implemented.
- Maintain the operation of Entities with positive economic output without any disruption.
  - Mandate the interim management to maintain production levels, fulfill existing contracts, and safeguard employment during the emergency phase. Doing so will help minimize economic shocks, maintain public confidence, and reassure domestic and international partners that the country's economic infrastructure remains functional despite the political transition.
- Appoint independent and reputable accounting firms—domestic and international—to oversee past and future transactions.
- Mandate the accounting firms to conduct forensic audits of major SOEs and foundations to uncover past corruption, embezzlement, fraudulent contracts, dangerous exposures, or illicit asset transfers.

- Mandate accounting firms to provide real-time oversight of financial operations during the transition to detect and prevent ongoing mismanagement. Their work will support accountability, inform future legal action, and lay the groundwork for permanent transparency mechanisms.

- Mandate accounting firms to identify the full extent of liabilities held by SOEs, with the aim of preventing the government from inheriting bottomless financial exposure. Their mandate should be to chart a path forward that preserves the operational and economic value of these enterprises while minimizing future fiscal risk to the state.

- Develop a strategic framework and priority list to guide the order and method of privatizing state-owned assets. This framework should prioritize enterprises based on their potential to maximize economic value, minimize disruption to the economy, and avoid rewarding or embedding loyalists of the former regime. Privatization should be carried out in a transparent, phased, and deliberate manner that supports the broader goals of economic renewal and justice.

PENSIONS

Objectives

- Ensure minimal disruption for current pensioners.

- Implement reforms to improve the governance and fiscal sustainability of the current system before the eventual transition to a Funded Defined Contribution (FDC) system.

Key Priorities

- **Collect pension contributions:** The government should continue to collect contributions to the existing pension funds (including SSO, CSPF, etc.) to the extent possible. This is necessitated by the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) nature of those funds, where payments to current pensioners are financed by the contributions of current workers.

- **Support existing pensioners:** Maintain the payment flow and make the necessary adjustments for inflation.

- **Inject emergency funds If necessary:** The government should be prepared to provide additional funding on an emergency basis to the pension system in case its ability to collect contributions in the short term is severely disrupted.

Assumptions

- The country's banking and payments system remain sufficiently operational.

- The government will have the ability to borrow funds or access frozen assets (at least partially) in order to provide emergency support to the pension system in the event of a severe loss in the government's tax collection capacity.

Actions (Recommended by the World Bank)

- **End All Lending to the Government:** Pension funds should not be used as lenders of last resort to the government, but act in the best interest of their beneficiaries.

- **Halt asset transfers made in lieu of government debt payments:** The Islamic Republic has developed a habit of transferring unprofitable public companies at highly inflated valuations to pension funds instead of honoring the government's debt obligations to those funds. This process must be immediately stopped.

- **Reinstate the High Council for Social Security:** The High Council for Social Security was a tripartite body made of government representatives, worker representatives, and employer representatives that was abolished in 2010. It was tasked with appointing the Board of Directors of the SSO. Reinstating the Council will enhance independent oversight over the activities of the SSO.

- **Require relevant expertise for board membership:** Newly appointed board members of the SSO and the other funds currently supervised by the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare (MCLSW) will be required to possess relevant expertise and follow fiduciary obligations to plan beneficiaries.

Monitoring and Evaluation (Recommended by the World Bank)

- The first external audits of the pension funds currently under the supervision of the MCLSW (SSO, CSPF, AFPF, and RNPF) will be conducted at the earliest opportunity (if possible, by international accounting firms) and repeated on a periodic basis.

- The central bank will become the independent custodian of those funds "to ensure the physical and legal integrity of the assets and to oversee the transactions of the assets manager" (World Bank, 2003).

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NATIONAL ASSETS: Recovering and Safeguarding

February 2026

This white paper outlines the strategic approach for Iran Asset Recovery during the transitional period, focusing on providing an actionable blueprint to enable a transitional authority or an international coalition to locate, secure, and repatriate Iran's stolen or endangered public wealth while preventing regime loyalists from using these assets to sabotage the transition.

This paper focuses exclusively on organizations and assets under the direct control of the Supreme Leader, including Bonyads, Setad Ejraiye Farmane Emam (SEFE), Astan Quds Razavi, and the non-military corporate holdings of the IRGC.

Assets controlled by conventional ministries and government agencies will be addressed separately in the Military and Security chapters.

It provides a comprehensive, detailed operational plan to secure, freeze, and recover all significant assets controlled by the Islamic Republic regime, with specific details for each category of assets and the mechanisms of their control, ownership, or transfer.

IMPORTANCE OF PBAD[20]

The recovery of the Islamic Republic's assets is crucial during the transition period to ensure the financial viability of a new governing authority. The repatriation of this wealth is essential for funding national reconstruction, stabilizing the economy, and providing essential services to the Iranian people. Crucially, securing these assets prevents former regime loyalists and their networks, particularly the IRGC and associated bonyads, from financing an insurgency, fomenting instability, or otherwise sabotaging a peaceful and democratic transition. This operation is a cornerstone of ensuring national security and establishing a foundation for legitimate governance and long-term economic prosperity.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this operational plan are clearly defined goals that are both strategic and measurable. The primary objectives are:

- **Locate and Secure Public Wealth:** To systematically identify, locate, and secure all significant assets, both domestic and international, that are under the direct or indirect control of the Islamic Republic regime and its key institutions.

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[20] The acronym PBAD is based on the Farsi designation for the "Recovering Assets Project."

- **Prevent Sabotage:** To neutralize the financial capacity of regime loyalists and prevent them from using these vast resources to undermine the transitional authority or instigate conflict.

- **Identifying the Financial Structure of Foundations and Asset Control Paths:** Bonyads and Setad control hundreds of companies across almost every sector of the Iranian economy, including finance, construction, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. The most significant parastatal organizations include *EIKO*, *Bonyad Mostazafan*, and the *IRGC Cooperation Foundation*, each of which manages vast and diverse portfolios through complex holding structures. For example, we can name Bank Sina (Mostafaan Foundation), Tadbir Group (Setad), and Sadra Marine Industries Iran (Khatam Al-Anbiya). Ownership is deliberately obscured through complex, multi-layered holding structures, where a parent bonyad owns a holding company, which in turn owns a portfolio of subsidiaries, making it difficult to trace ultimate beneficial ownership.

- **Enable Recovery and Repatriation:** To establish the legal and operational groundwork for the eventual recovery and repatriation of all stolen or misused public wealth for the benefit of the Iranian people.

- **Promote Accountability:** To preserve financial records, archives, and other digital evidence essential for future investigations into corruption, human rights abuses, and the regime's military and nuclear programs.

KEY PRIORITIES

The key priorities are the areas of focus that will guide resource allocation to ensure the successful achievement of the objectives.

- **Speed and Secrecy in Initial Operations:** The highest priority is the rapid execution of the initial asset seizure and freezing operations (H-Hour to H+72) with maximum operational security. This is critical because any delay or information leak would allow regime insiders to transfer liquid assets (cash, crypto, electronic funds) and destroy incriminating records, rendering subsequent recovery efforts exponentially more difficult and less fruitful.

- **Securing Physical and Digital Infrastructure:** The immediate physical control of critical economic and administrative locations (e.g., Central Bank, bonyad headquarters, data centers) is a top priority. This is to prevent looting by the public, sabotage by loyalists, and the destruction of crucial evidence and institutional records needed for governance and future prosecutions.

- **Targeting Regime Mega-Debtors:** Priority will be given to identifying and pursuing the nation's 'mega-debtors,' the small set of individuals and entities whose concentrated debts and offshore holdings represent the single largest source of regime-linked ill-gotten wealth. Immediate legal, financial and diplomatic measures will be deployed to freeze, forensically audit and seek rapid recovery of these exposures so recovered funds can be redirected to national reconstruction and essential services.

- **International Legal and Diplomatic Action:** A concurrent priority is the immediate activation of international legal mechanisms and diplomatic channels. This is essential because a significant portion of the regime's wealth is held offshore, often through complex ownership structures. Swift

notification to international bodies like FATF, Interpol, and partner nations is required to freeze these assets before they can be moved to non-cooperative jurisdictions.

- **Establishing Legitimacy Through Communication:** A proactive and transparent public communication strategy is a vital priority. This is necessary to build domestic and international support for the transitional authority, prevent public panic, manage expectations regarding the recovered wealth, and counter disinformation from regime remnants.

ASSUMPTIONS

The viability of this plan rests on several key assumptions, which are the conditions that should be satisfied for the plan to work.

- **Scenario Assumption:** The plan operates under the assumption of a collapse of central authority in Iran following an external attack or people's uprising event, creating a window of opportunity for a transitional authority to act.

- **Operational Control:** It is assumed that a nascent transitional authority, supported by either cooperative elements of the regular military (Artesh) or an international coalition, can establish physical control over key locations in Tehran and other major cities.

- **International Cooperation:** The plan assumes the political will of key international partners (e.g., the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the UAE) to act swiftly on notifications to freeze assets and provide intelligence support. It also assumes that international sanctions frameworks can be repurposed to support the new authority.

- **Insider Cooperation:** It is assumed that a certain number of technocrats, bank officials, and bureaucrats within the targeted organisations will be willing to cooperate in exchange for amnesty or other incentives, providing crucial intelligence on asset locations and ownership structures.

- **Existence of Records:** The plan assumes that despite potential efforts at destruction, significant digital and physical records of asset ownership, financial transactions, and corporate structures will still exist and be accessible within the secured facilities.

ACTIONS

The actions are the specific tasks required to execute this operational plan. They are sequenced to maximize effectiveness in a post-collapse environment.

Foundational Action: Identification and Description of Assets

This phase involves the detailed cataloging of all known significant assets controlled by the regime.

To effectively prevent the flight or destruction of assets during a regime collapse, it is essential to understand the different types of assets controlled by regime-aligned entities, identify the key holders and brokers, and develop operational methods to detect, stop, and reverse their misuse.

This typology provides a strategic overview of each major asset category, associated risks, and the immediate actions required to neutralize threats. A more detailed operational annex containing sensitive tactical measures will be maintained as a classified document.

Asset Type	Primary Holders	Brokers / Intermediaries	Potential Abuses	Countermeasures (Stop / Detect / Reverse)
Foreign Currency Reserves	Central Bank of Iran (CBI), Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah, Bank Tejarat, Bank Mellat	Senior currency managers, politically connected families, high-level financial officers	– Large-scale transfers to offshore accounts during regime collapse. – Concealing reserves via private exchange networks and shell companies. – Emergency withdrawals through coordinated insiders.	**Stop**: Issue emergency freeze orders on all state banks. **Detect**: Real-time monitoring of high-value transactions and currency conversion patterns. **Reverse**: Work with FATF, Interpol, and foreign regulators to seize illicit funds.
Domestic Rial Accounts	Bonyads (Mostazafan, Setad), Astan Quds Razavi, IRGC foundations	State-owned commercial banks, trusted regime-linked bank executives	– Moving regime-linked funds into multiple nominee accounts. – Sudden withdrawals to convert to foreign currency or gold. – Temporary "ghost accounts" created to hide final transactions.	**Stop**: Freeze accounts tied to bonyads, Setad, and IRGC entities. **Detect**: Deploy forensic banking teams to trace transaction spikes. **Reverse**: Reclaim funds through national courts and public treasury transfers.
Gold & Precious Metals	CBI Treasury, Bonyad Mostazafan, IRGC elite units	Trusted family networks, private vault operators, foreign smuggling rings	– Smuggling gold abroad through private operators. – Rapid conversion of gold to offshore currency or cryptocurrency. – Diversion of gold reserves before transition.	**Stop**: Secure key vaults, refineries, and border checkpoints. **Detect**: Monitor large gold sales and track exports in customs. **Reverse**: Coordinate with foreign customs agencies to recover smuggled assets.
Cryptocurrency	IRGC cyber units, Setad-linked tech companies, covert mining operations	Mining farms, crypto wallet managers, foreign exchanges	– Laundering funds through anonymous wallets. – Rapid cross-border transfer of wealth outside regulated banking systems.	**Stop**: Shut down domestic mining farms and block suspicious exchanges. **Detect**: Use blockchain analytics to trace suspicious wallet activity. **Reverse**: Work with

			– Use of privacy coins to evade detection.	international crypto compliance networks to freeze assets.
Bearer Bonds & Certificates	Ministry of Economy, Setad subsidiaries	Overseas shell companies, offshore investment brokers	– Secret sale of bearer bonds to foreign buyers before transition. – Concealing wealth via unregistered certificates.	**Stop**: Recall and legally void unregistered bearer instruments. **Detect**: Cross-check foreign exchange transactions with overseas regulators. **Reverse**: Pursue arbitration to nullify fraudulent bond sales.
Foreign Real Estate	Bonyads, Setad, Astan Quds Razavi	Real estate holding companies in UAE, Türkiye, Europe and Canada.	– Transferring ownership to foreign front companies. – Concealing assets using trusts and foreign lawyers. – Firesale to sympathetic buyers at below-market rates.	**Stop**: Issue global freeze notifications through Interpol and partner governments. **Detect**: Investigate suspicious property transfers and title registry changes. **Reverse**: File legal claims in foreign courts to recover ownership.
Domestic Real Estate & Land	Bonyad Mostazafan, Setad, Astan Quds Razavi, IRGC Cooperative Foundation	Corrupt notaries, domestic shell companies, complicit real estate brokers	– Last-minute transfer of titles to regime insiders. – Alteration of land registry data to obscure true ownership. – Intentional destruction of properties or records.	**Stop**: Freeze all land transactions for identified entities. **Detect**: Audit land registry logs for irregularities. **Reverse**: Use court orders to nullify illegal transfers and reconstruct records from backups.
Strategic Infrastructure	NIOC (Oil & Gas), Telecommunication Company of Iran, state utilities, airports, seaports	IRGC units controlling security, facility managers, politically connected contractors	– Sabotage of oil facilities, power grids, or telecom networks. – Misrouting resources or revenues to secret accounts. – Occupation of facilities by IRGC units as leverage.	**Stop**: Deploy security forces to secure vital sites. **Detect**: Real-time operational monitoring of output vs revenue. **Reverse**: Replace hostile managers, restore functionality, and trace diverted revenues.
Corporate Holdings	Tadbir Group (Setad), Mostazafan corporate subsidiaries, IRGC companies	Law firms, accountants, foreign shell companies, loyal board executives	– Asset stripping by moving funds to foreign companies. – Sale of businesses to proxies at below-market value. – Destruction of	**Stop**: Suspend all mergers, sales, and share transfers. **Detect**: Deploy forensic auditors to track sudden payments and capital movements. **Reverse**: Reverse fraudulent corporate deals through

	(Khatam al-Anbiya)		shareholder records to hide ownership.	emergency decrees and litigation.
Digital Records & Databases	Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Real Estate Registration Organization, Civil Registry, corporate registries	System administrators, external software contractors, regime-aligned IT specialists	– Wiping or encrypting ownership data to hinder recovery. – Copying data to sell or ransom. – Altering records to falsify ownership trails.	**Stop**: Isolate and secure all critical servers immediately. **Detect**: Monitor for unusual logins or deletion scripts. **Reverse**: Use forensic recovery and backups to rebuild databases and prosecute offenders.

Table 0-1 - Overview of Key Assets, Risks, and Recovery Actions

FINANCIAL ASSETS

Domestic Bank Accounts

- **Names of Banks:** Central Bank of Iran (CBI), Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Bank Mellat, Bank Tejarat, Bank Sepah. These institutions are used to hold the state's primary accounts, process oil revenues, and finance government operations. Parastatal entities like bonyads also hold vast portfolios in these banks, often in complex, layered accounts to obscure ownership.

- **Estimated Balances:** While precise figures are unattainable, estimates place tens of billions of dollars in accessible foreign currency reserves within the CBI and other state-owned banks. Domestic currency (Rial) accounts held by bonyads and Setad are estimated to be in the trillions.

- **Account Structures:** Use of layered accounts, nominee accounts held by trusted individuals, and inter-bank transfers designed to obfuscate the ultimate beneficiary.

Offshore Accounts

- **Jurisdictions:** United Arab Emirates (Dubai), Canada, Türkiye, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Malaysia, China (Hong Kong), and various Caribbean nations.

- **Front Companies:** Extensive use of front companies in trading, construction, and consulting sectors, registered in the above jurisdictions, to hold accounts and conduct international transactions. Notable examples include companies linked to the IRGC's Khatam al-Anbiya and subsidiaries of bonyads.

- **Known Intermediaries:** A network of trusted businessmen, dual nationals, and family members of senior officials act as signatories and beneficial owners for these offshore accounts.

Known Cash Reserves and Gold Holdings

- The Central Bank of Iran's treasury in Tehran is the primary repository for the nation's gold reserves and physical foreign currency.

- Significant undeclared cash and gold holdings are believed to be stored in secure vaults controlled by the bonyads (especially Bonyad Mostazafan) and the IRGC, outside of the official state system.

Cryptocurrencies or Other Digital Assets

- The regime has utilized cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (BTC) and Monero (XMR) for sanctions evasion and illicit financing.

- Mining operations have been established within Iran, and assets are held in a combination of domestic and international exchanges, as well as private, un-hosted wallets that are difficult to trace.

PHYSICAL ASSETS

Real Estate Portfolios

- **Properties and Locations:** Bonyad Mostazafan is Iran's largest property holder, controlling vast portfolios of commercial, residential, and agricultural land, much of it confiscated post-1979. This includes prime real estate in Tehran, Isfahan, and other major cities, as well as significant holdings abroad, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, held through front companies. Setad (EIKO) also controls thousands of properties seized by court order.

- **Valuation:** The total value of real estate controlled by bonyads and Setad is estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Infrastructure

- **Facilities:** All major oil fields, refineries (e.g., Abadan, Isfahan), petrochemical plants (e.g., Bandar Imam), and export terminals (e.g., Kharg Island) are under state control via the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

- **Pipelines and Storage:** The national pipeline network and all strategic storage facilities are critical state assets. The IRGC, through Khatam al-Anbiya, has significant influence and control over the construction and security of this infrastructure.

Power Plants, Telecom Networks, Transport Hubs

- Major power generation facilities, the national electricity grid, and the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) are controlled by state-owned or IRGC-linked entities. TCI, for instance, is majority-owned by a consortium linked to Setad and the IRGC.

- Transport hubs like Imam Khomeini International Airport and the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar are under state control, with the IRGC having a pervasive presence in their security and operations.

CORPORATE HOLDINGS

Major Domestic Companies

- Names and Sectors: Bonyads and Setads control almost every sector of the Iranian economy, including finance, construction, pharmaceutical production, and telecommunications. Among these companies are Sina Bank (Mostazafan Foundation), Tadbir Group (Executive Headquarters), and Sadra Iran Marine Industrial Company (Khatam-e-Anbia).

- Layers of Ownership: Ownership is intentionally hidden through complex, multi-layered holding structures, where a parent foundation owns a holding company that in turn owns a series of subsidiaries, making it difficult to trace ultimate beneficial ownership.

Subsidiaries Abroad and Shell Companies

- Numerous subsidiaries and shell companies are maintained in Europe (especially Germany), the Middle East (UAE, Türkiye), and Asia for sanctions evasion, procurement of dual-use technology, and investment of surplus capital. These are often presented as legitimate, independent businesses.

DIGITAL / INTANGIBLE ASSETS

Databases and Registries

- Control over critical national databases, including the National Organization for Civil Registration (NOCR), the Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties, and company registries. These are highly valuable for identifying individuals, assets, and corporate networks.

Proprietary Technology

- Inventions and proprietary technologies developed by defense-affiliated companies (under the control of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics) and by knowledge-based firms supported by foundations.

Archives

- Extensive archives containing evidence of corruption, records of nuclear and military programs, intelligence files, and documents related to illegal international activities. These archives are held by various ministries, the IRGC, and foundations, and face a high risk of immediate destruction.

FOUNDATIONAL ACTION: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ORGANIZATIONS

The plan targets all major organizations controlling strategic resources.

Organization Name	Description	Estimated Worth / Economic Clout	Key Sectors of Operation
Bonyad Mostazafan (Foundation of the Oppressed)	A massive parastatal conglomerate (bonyad) formed from confiscated assets of the former monarchy. Reports directly to the Supreme Leader.	Estimated at over $20 billion. Iran's second largest commercial company after the National Iranian Oil Company.	Real Estate, Construction, Finance (Sina Bank), Manufacturing, Beverages, Logistics.
Setad Ejraiye Farmane Emam (EIKO—Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order)	A parastatal holding company controlled by the Supreme Leader, built on systematically seizing assets from religious minorities, dissidents, and Iranians abroad.	Estimated as high as $95 billion. A secretive economic empire.	Pharmaceuticals (Barekat), Finance, Real Estate, Telecommunications, Energy.
Astan Quds Razavi	A bonyad managing the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, but also a massive business conglomerate with vast land and industrial holdings. Reports to the Supreme Leader.	Estimated in the tens of billions of dollars. Dominates the economy of northeastern Iran.	Agriculture, Food Processing, Real Estate, Automotive, Financial Services.
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction HQ (KAA)	The primary engineering and construction arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Acts as a massive government contractor.	Awarded government contracts worth billions annually. Controls a significant portion of Iran's infrastructure development.	Oil & Gas, Petrochemicals, Pipelines, Dams, Roads, Telecommunications.
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)	The state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Petroleum responsible for all of Iran's oil and gas production and sales.	Controls assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars. The financial lifeblood of the state.	Oil & Gas Exploration, Production, Refining, Marketing.

Table 2: Key Financial and Economic Organizations

FOUNDATIONAL ACTION: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY INDIVIDUALS AND ROLES

This involves targeting the key personnel controlling the above organizations. The following table provides examples; a full, classified list must be developed and continuously updated.

Name	Position / Role	Organization	Connections to Assets
Parviz Fattah	Head of Setad (EIKO); Former Head of Bonyad Mostazafan	Setad (EIKO), Bonyad Mostazafan	As chief executive, has ultimate signatory and operational control over the domestic and international assets of these entities. His family members are also suspected proxies.

Hossein Dehghan	Head of Bonyad Mostazafan	Bonyad Mostazafan	Former Minister of Defense with deep ties to the IRGC. Controls the foundation's vast real estate and corporate portfolio.
Ahmad Marvi	Custodian of Astan Quds Razavi	Astan Quds Razavi	Appointed by the Supreme Leader, he controls all religious endowments and the massive business empire attached to the shrine.
Abdolali Ali-Asgari	CEO of Tadbir Group (Setad's primary holding company)	Setad (EIKO)	Manages the day-to-day operations of Setad's corporate empire and its network of subsidiaries.
Saeed Mohammad	Former Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya HQ	Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA)	Oversaw the IRGC's massive construction and infrastructure projects, likely with access to associated slush funds and front companies.
Family members of Senior Officials (e.g., Khamenei, Larijani families)	Proxies, beneficial owners	Various	Used as proxies to hold assets, particularly real estate and corporate shares, both in Iran and abroad (e.g., Canada, Germany) to circumvent sanctions and obscure ownership.

Table 3 - Key Individuals and Roles (It's an exemplary table and will be updated in a detailed operational plan.)

PRELIMINARY ACTION: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

This assessment identifies the primary risks to the assets during a period of instability.

- **Risk of Looting**
  - High risk of widespread looting of physical assets, particularly from the offices of bonyads and the residences of regime officials, by a population impoverished and angered by decades of corruption. This can lead to the loss of not only material wealth but also critical documents and records.

- **Risk of Sabotage**
  - High risk of deliberate sabotage by regime loyalists, especially within the IRGC. This includes the destruction of critical infrastructure (oil pipelines, power plants), the erasure of digital databases, and the burning of archives to cripple the incoming transitional authority and conceal evidence of past crimes.

- **Risk of Illicit Transfer**
  - The highest and most immediate risk. In a crisis, regime insiders will immediately attempt to transfer liquid assets (electronic funds, cryptocurrency) to pre-established offshore accounts. They will also attempt to smuggle out high-value physical assets like gold, cash, and bearer bonds.

- **Risk of Personnel Defection (with Assets)**
  - A significant risk involves key personnel (e.g., bank managers, IT administrators, corporate officers) who possess the knowledge and access codes to control assets. While some may cooperate, others may flee the country, taking their knowledge with them or using it to "ransom" assets for personal gain.

SEQUENCED RECOVERY MEASURES

This section outlines the sequenced operational measures for the recovery plan.

Phase 1: Immediate Measures (First 72 Hours)

This phase is focused on securing assets and preventing immediate loss.

- **Immediate Securing of Physical Locations**
  - **Objective**

    To establish a physical cordon around all critical economic and administrative centers to prevent looting, sabotage, and the removal of documents or assets.
  - **Target List (Priority 1)**
    - Central Bank of Iran (Tehran)—Main building and treasury vaults.
    - Bonyad Mostazafan Headquarters (Tehran).
    - Setad (EIKO) Headquarters (Tehran).
    - National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) Headquarters (Tehran).
    - Major State Bank Headquarters (Bank Melli, Saderat).
    - Key Data Centers for civil registration and financial networks.
  - **Execution**
    - Deploy pre-designated units of the regular military (Artesh) or coalition forces with clear rules of engagement.
    - Establish a multi-layered security perimeter. The inner layer secures all entrances and exits, while the outer layer manages public access and prevents crowds from forming.
    - Simultaneously, "inside teams" composed of vetted technocrats and security personnel will enter the facilities to secure server rooms, file archives, and executive offices. All personnel will be prevented from leaving until cleared.

- **Digital Asset Backup and Forensic Preservation**
  - IT teams will immediately begin creating forensic images of all critical servers and databases.
  - Network access to the outside world will be severed to prevent remote wiping of data.
  - All available digital records will be preserved as evidence for future legal action.

- **Legal Orders and International Notifications**
  - The transitional authority will issue an immediate emergency decree freezing all accounts associated with the targeted organizations and individuals within the Iranian banking system.
  - Simultaneously, pre-drafted notifications will be sent via the most rapid diplomatic channels , Interpol (Red Notices for key individuals), the World Bank StAR Initiative, and the governments of all jurisdictions known to hold Iranian assets, requesting an immediate freeze on all related accounts and properties.
  - This emergency decree will serve as a moratorium on the sale, transfer, or privatization of all significant state and parastatal assets, specifically to prevent illicit "fire-sales" to politically connected networks until a transparent and legal oversight structure is established.

Phase 2: Mid-Term Measures (Days +3 to +30)

- **Establishment of the Asset Recovery Task Force**

  Formalize the creation of a dedicated task force with sub-committees for forensic accounting, legal affairs, international diplomacy, and physical security.

- **Creation of a centralized National Asset Inventory**

  Following the establishment of the Asset Recovery Task Force, its immediate priority will be to commence the creation of a centralized National Asset Inventory. This task will involve deploying vetted technical teams to the secured locations to begin a systematic cataloging of all physical assets, financial records, and digital data preserved during Phase 1.

  This inventory will serve as a live, continuously updated ledger, forming the evidentiary basis for the subsequent full-scale forensic audits and providing the transparent data required for the public communication strategy.

- **Launch Comprehensive Forensic Audits**

  The Asset Recovery Task Force will deploy specialized forensic accounting teams to:
  - Analyse all secured digital records, interbank transfers, and international transactions, as well as other relevant records, to map the full extent of domestic and offshore holdings.
  - Trace ownership through complex layers of shell companies and front companies to identify the ultimate beneficial owners.
  - Create a detailed and verified inventory of all financial assets, which will form the legal basis for international recovery actions and domestic prosecutions.

- **Whistleblower Program**

  Launch a public campaign encouraging insiders to provide information on hidden assets, offering financial rewards and amnesty where appropriate.

Phase 3: Long-Term Measures (Month 2 Onwards)

- **International Legal Action:**

  Initiate legal proceedings in foreign jurisdictions to recover frozen assets. This will involve hiring international law firms and working closely with the justice departments of partner nations.

- **Asset Management and Disposition:**

  Develop a transparent framework for managing the recovered assets. This may include creating a national wealth fund to use the assets for reconstruction and social programs.

- **Prosecutions:**

  Use the preserved evidence to initiate domestic prosecutions of individuals involved in corruption and the theft of public wealth.

RECOMMENDATIONS

These are advisory suggestions that provide strategic direction for the operation.

- **Establish a Unified Command Structure**
  - Create a single, unified Asset Recovery Task Force, reporting directly to the head of the transitional authority. This task force must be empowered with executive, legal, and operational authority to act decisively and cut through any bureaucratic red tape.

- **Develop and Implement a Proactive Public Communication Strategy**
  - **Objective:** To build domestic and international legitimacy, prevent panic, and counter disinformation.
  - **Key Messages:** Emphasize that the operation is targeting stolen "public wealth," not private property. Regularly communicate progress and highlight how recovered funds will be used to benefit the people (e.g., restoring pensions, funding hospitals, public transport, etc.).
  - **Channels**: Use all available media to disseminate information. Establish a dedicated website to serve as the official source of information, providing updates and debunking false rumors.

- **Leverage Diaspora Expertise and International Cooperation**
  - **Diaspora Expertise**: Actively recruit and vet experts from the Iranian diaspora with experience in international finance, forensic accounting, and law. Create a formal advisory council to assist the task force.
  - **International Cooperation:** Formalize partnerships with international bodies like the World Bank/UNODC Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, FATF, and Interpol. These organizations can provide technical assistance, training, and a global platform for coordinating legal and diplomatic efforts.

- **Establish a centralized digital asset registry**

  The Asset Recovery Task Force is to be mandated to develop and maintain a publicly accessible Centralized Digital Registry. This platform will provide real-time tracking of:
    - Significant physical properties and their estimated value.
    - The total value of recovered domestic and international funds.
    - The status of major state-owned and parastatal enterprises under the authority's control.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

These are the clearly defined results that stem from the successful execution of the plan's actions.

- The successful prevention of large-scale asset flight and the physical and digital securing of the majority of the former regime's domestic economic infrastructure within the first 72 hours.

- The legal freezing of a significant portion (estimated in the tens of billions of dollars) of the regime's offshore assets within the first month.

- The preservation of critical evidence needed to support future domestic and international legal proceedings against corrupt officials.

- Increased public trust and confidence in the transitional authority, demonstrated by its decisive action to reclaim national wealth and hold the former regime accountable.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

This section outlines the metrics and processes to track progress and ensure accountability.

Metrics for Success

- **Financial**

  - Total dollar value of domestic bank accounts frozen.
  - Total estimated value of recovered domestic assets in Rials.
  - Total estimated value of international assets frozen.
  - The quantity of physical gold and cash secured from vaults.

- **Operational**

  - Number of high-priority physical sites successfully secured.
  - Percentage of critical databases forensically imaged and preserved.
  - Number of Interpol Red Notices issued and acted upon.

- **Legal**

  - Number of formal asset recovery cases filed in foreign jurisdictions.
  - Number of domestic indictments prepared based on recovered evidence.

Review Process:

- The Asset Recovery Task Force command will hold daily operational briefings for the first 14 days.

- A weekly progress report will be submitted to the leadership of the transitional authority.

- A monthly public report will be issued via the official website to maintain transparency and public support, outlining the total value of assets secured and the progress of recovery efforts.

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ENERGY: Managing Critical Infrastructure and Ensuring Continuity of Supply

February 2026

This Emergency Phase plan outlines a strategic approach for stabilizing, restoring, and reforming Iran's critical oil, gas, electricity, and nuclear infrastructure over the first 180 days following the fall of the Islamic Republic. Designed to be implemented by a vetted Transitional Energy Command Unit (TECU), the plan integrates security, governance, technical, and geopolitical risk management elements across multiple phases.

CORE OBJECTIVES

- Prevent sabotage, chaos, and operational collapse in the energy sector.

- Restore and secure domestic electricity and fuel flows across all provinces.

- Resume export operations to generate revenue for national recovery and ensure international confidence in Persian Gulf energy stability.

- Establish the foundation for long-term institutional transition, regulatory reform, and public trust through transparency and phased handover to a restructured Ministry of Energy (MoE).

KEY PRIORITIES

- **Establish the Transitional Energy Command Unit (TECU):** Centralize control of energy institutions under a vetted and secure operational body to manage the entire emergency phase.

- **Secure and lock down physical and digital control systems:** Rapidly isolate SCADA, dispatch, and fuel infrastructure networks to prevent sabotage or hostile takeover.

- **Stabilize domestic electricity and fuel flows:** Prioritize hospitals, water systems, and critical urban infrastructure; initiate modular power and voucher-based reforms as stopgaps.

- **Reintegrate and restructure the energy workforce:** Vet and redeploy mid-level technical staff while launching diaspora reintegration to restore institutional capacity.

- **Transition from the TECU to the Ministry of Energy (MoE):** Merge the Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) and the existing Ministry of Energy (MoE-Niroo) into a unified structure with clear regulatory, operational, and innovation divisions by the end of Phase 5.

- **Begin infrastructure upgrades and legal reforms:** Launch early-stage upgrades to aging refineries and power plants to improve fuel quality, reduce blackouts, and restore safe operations.

Simultaneously, establish a legal review body to evaluate and renegotiate regime-era energy contracts to align with international norms.

- **Reframe nuclear oversight under civilian and international norms:** Suspend operations, secure materials, initiate inspections, and conduct contamination and storage safety audits.

- **Build international investor and institutional trust:** Coordinate observer access, release reform roadmaps, and launch the Iran Energy Dialogue Forum.

ASSUMPTION

- Basic security and territorial control have been achieved in most energy-producing regions.

- International technical and financial support is available.

- Regime-aligned actors in the IRGC, Basij, and Harasat will be isolated quickly.

- Mid-level engineers and technicians are willing to cooperate with TECU.

- Targeted sanctions relief is expected to begin within the first 90 days through diplomatic channels.

Phase 0: Pre-Entry Coordination (Before Day 1)

- **Form Transitional Energy Command Unit (TECU):** A high-trust command body composed of experts in oil and gas, electricity, cybersecurity, strategic planning, physical security, water and economic stabilization. TECU will serve as the central node for all planning, operations, and policy control. Establish a tiered field structure under TECU, including Regional Command Units (RCUs) to coordinate implementation at the provincial level, ensure rapid deployment, and manage site-specific operations.

- **Legal empowerment**: A formal, written, and signed directive from Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi authorizes TECU to serve as an advisory and coordinating body to support the transitional ministries in maintaining control and stability of energy institutions post-regime.

- **Identify and vet internal technocrats and Engineers:** Conduct structured mapping of personnel within the MoP and the MoE-Niroo, extending down through operational and technical levels as necessary. Using intelligence and insider inputs, flag regime-linked or IRGC-aligned personnel for dismissal while quietly identifying competent, apolitical personnel suitable for retention under TECU supervision.

- **Develop critical asset maps and SOPs:** Prepare pre-written operational procedures for refinery lockdowns, SCADA isolation, personnel dismissal, and site transition protocols.

- **Secure logistics and communications:** Set up hardened, encrypted comms (satellite, ground-based) for TECU and rapid-deployment teams. Establish staging points in neighboring countries. Prepare Top-20 critical nodes list ranked by impact and exploitability (export terminals, 500kV nodes, refineries, trunk pipelines, etc.).

- **Create the International Coordination Unit (ICU):** ICU will liaise with the U.S. Department. of Energy, EU external action services, Persian Gulf energy ministries, IEA, OPEC, IMF, World Bank, and others to coordinate technical aid, fuel stabilization, and to establish international credibility.
- **Conduct strategic volumetric analysis of national refining capacity:** Prepare a full assessment of Iran's petroleum refining infrastructure to determine real-time operational output versus nominal rated capacity, with emphasis on gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
    - Identify and map supply-demand gaps across urban, military, and critical services.
    - Evaluate the technical and operational feasibility of restoring or maximizing the domestic supply within 30 days of transition.
    - Shortlist external procurement options from regional allies to bridge anticipated shortfalls during the stabilization phase.
    - Launch a Digital Twin of the national power grid and key refineries, using engineering diagrams to create a virtual model that can test how the system recovers from total shutdowns (blackstarts) and how it holds up if any single major line, plant, or piece of equipment fails (the N-1 rule).

Phase 1: Emergency Seizure and Lockdown (Days 1 to 10)

- **Personnel suspension and detention:** Immediately suspend or detain senior personnel at MoP and MoE-Niroo under TECU supervision, with security escorts as needed. Access to payroll, bank accounts, and control systems will be frozen to prevent interference. Temporary freeze-in-place orders (48–72 hours) may be issued to maintain continuity at critical sites during vetting. Exception: staff already vetted through the defection platform or verified channels may remain in place. This measure is temporary and aims to secure operations while encouraging further defections and cooperation.
- **Curtail Harasat units:** Seize and isolate all Harasat units embedded within energy institutions. Disarm personnel; confiscate surveillance hardware and encrypted archives. Issue blackout on any further internal intel reporting chains.
- **Lock down SCADA and digital control systems:** Change all root access credentials. Isolate networks from external servers. Manual fallback protocols are initiated where automation is compromised.
- **Activate a Day-1 digital security reset:** change all system passwords, cut off outside access, and put backup copies of critical data in safe storage to prevent hacking or sabotage.
- **Activate civil-military coordination protocol:** TECU and security forces coordinate on securing physical energy infrastructure, enforcing curfews, and protecting returning personnel. Deploy rapid-response security teams and anti-drone defenses to protect the 20 most critical energy sites in the country, including refineries, power stations, and export terminals.
- **Launch energy financial stability:** Begin immediate freeze and audit of regime-linked energy export accounts, domestic subsidies, and sovereign fund diversions.
- **Establish a pattern of regular communication:** (for example, daily morning briefing and update) between a designated subcommittee of the TECU and managerial/technical leadership of the oil, gas, and energy assets around the country.

Phase 2: Stabilization and Triage (Days 11 to 40)

- **Conduct national technical audit:** Initiate a multi-disciplinary audit of all energy facilities, including damage reports, capacity status, personnel loyalty assessment, and infrastructure integrity checks.

- **Restore priority energy flows:** Reestablish electricity and fuel delivery to all provinces. Prioritize hospitals, water systems, and urban centers. Initiate public messaging campaigns to explain fuel pricing realities and prepare for subsidy reform. Launch targeted pilot programs using smart fuel vouchers to manage consumption and protect vulnerable households.

- **Begin cautious restaffing via vetted mid-level engineers, specialists, and staff**: All appointments are subject to Emergency Vetting Commission protocols.

- **Import mobile power generation units:** Lease or purchase modular gas turbine units and emergency fuel depots from regional allies to plug temporary supply gaps.

- **Review and renegotiate existing contracts:** Initiate a comprehensive review of all active oil, gas, electricity and supplier agreements initiated in the past five years to verify legality, transparency, and national interest. Where necessary, temporarily suspend execution pending renegotiation under the transitional legal framework, prioritizing continuity of essential operations while preventing exploitation or irregular payments.

- **Launch environmental and safety rapid response team:** To handle immediate environmental hazards and facility safety risks.

Phase 3: Operational Continuity and Trust Building (Days 41 to 100)

- **Establish institutional security units:** Dismantle Harasat presence and replace with neutral security arms accountable to TECU and a forthcoming civilian oversight authority.

- **Launch public transparency dashboard:** Publish daily updates on fuel output, refinery capacity, blackout zones, and audit summaries to rebuild public trust and reduce misinformation.

- **Begin structural bundling pilots:** Initiate pilot programs to structurally redefine MoP and MoE-Niroo.

- **Initiate whistleblower and loyalty programs:** The aim is to encourage employee cooperation and retain critical expertise.

- **Coordinate international observer access:** Facilitate entry for IEA, IAEA, World Bank, and insurers to verify control, enhance global confidence, and support external credit flows.

- **Initiate judicial and regulatory reform taskforce:** for transparent governance, compliance, and international alignment.

- **Initiate post-regime nuclear energy evaluation taskforce:** Establish a specialized technical and legal taskforce under TECU oversight to assess the future of nuclear energy in Iran in alignment with national needs and international expectations.
  - Coordinate with the IAEA to facilitate full inspections and monitoring of nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan sites.
  - Reassess the operational safety and strategic value of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in coordination with international safety standards.

- Suspend all nuclear activities indefinitely, pending national strategic review.
- Secure and safeguard nuclear materials under international supervision to prevent leakage, theft, or misuse during the transition.
- Conduct air, soil, and groundwater contamination testing within a 50–100 km radius of major enrichment and suspected storage sites to assess environmental and public health risks.

Phase 4: Transition and Institutional Transfer (Days 101 to 130)

Following the initial 100-day stabilization period, the focus shifts toward formal institutional restructuring, workforce stabilization, and laying the groundwork for national reform. This phase marks the strategic handoff of operational control from the Transitional Energy Command Unit (TECU) to the newly created Ministry of Energy (MoE).

The transition is phased to preserve continuity, minimize operational risk, and avoid political or bureaucratic bottlenecks.

- **Stage the merger of MoP and MoE-Niroo into MoE:** Launch the legal and administrative merger in two phases.
  - Phase 1 includes establishing a joint coordination office with shared governance.
  - Phase 2 activates full operational divisions:
    - Oil and Gas.
    - Electricity.
    - Renewables and Nuclear.
    - Strategic Planning and Regulation.
  - All existing water governance entities will continue operating under their current frameworks to ensure stability in allocation and distribution. A roadmap for comprehensive institutional reform of the water sector will be prepared in parallel, with the transfer of water responsibilities to a newly appointed minister to be decided after the 180-day transition period.
- **Finalize refinery audits and initiate upgrades:** Complete detailed audits of national refineries. Begin modernization of refineries at key sites to reduce pollution, improve fuel quality, and meet international safety and efficiency standards.
- **Cyber-physical system transfer:** Transition SCADA and cybersecurity control to MoE regional command centers under a phased access model. Introduce zero-trust protocols and retain TECU as a cybersecurity backstop.

Phase 5: Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Legal Reset (Days 131 to 160)

This phase initiates infrastructure upgrades and regulatory reboot. Activities shift toward modernization of core assets, pilot renewables, contract reform, and environmental recovery, setting the tone for a credible and rules-based energy sector.

- **Prepare grid stabilization pilots:** Focus on reinforcing transmission reliability and reducing diesel dependence in critical provinces. Begin site selection for potential future clean energy pilots after Phase 6.

- **Thermal plant retrofitting:** Start phased upgrades at older gas-fired plants to improve efficiency and load-following. Use feasibility assessments from Phase 4 to guide contractor mobilization.

- **Grid reinforcement (staged):** Begin route studies, right-of-way security assessments, and procurement processes for the national 500kV transmission backbone. Physical construction begins in late Phase 6 or Year 2.

- **Contract review tribunal:** Stand up an independent body with legal experts and international observers to review and renegotiate regime-era energy contracts. Establish fast-track dispute resolution and investor protection principles.

- **Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR):** Finalize site selections and secure funding commitments. Begin earthworks and fuel logistics planning; physical construction follows donor agreement.

- **Anti-corruption and integrity programs:** Launch MoE's internal oversight office.

- **Environmental remediation scale-up:** Expand testing and cleanup around nuclear, petrochemical, and enrichment sites.

Phase 6: Economic Opening and Regulatory Alignment (Days 161 to 180)

This final transition phase focuses on legal and market readiness to reintroduce Iran as a credible energy actor in the international system. Regulatory structures are piloted, investment groundwork is laid, and the energy governance model is made public.

- **Draft emergency energy charter:** Release an interim charter outlining rules on market access, regulatory independence, and emissions targets. The Full Energy Act will be developed over 12 months through consultative processes.

- **Stand up independent energy regulatory authority:** Empower a provisional body to issue interim tariffs, oversee grid pilots, and ensure non-discriminatory access. Staffed with vetted experts and supported by international advisors.

- **Electricity pilot market (staged):** Launch limited demand response and time-of-use simulations for government and commercial users. Begin national AMI (Advanced Metering Infrastructure) roadmap development.

- **Iran energy dialogue forum:** Position the summit as a platform for transparency and constructive engagement. Present technical audit findings, outline investment pathways, and gather stakeholder feedback without initiating premature capital discussions.

- **Revise and publish national energy reform roadmap:** Release a 2-year action plan covering reforms, incentives, budget allocations, and market transition steps.

- **Launch the MoE emergency innovation unit:** Create a rapid-response innovation team to support near-term recovery challenges—such as leak detection, grid repair analytics, and dispatch optimization—through applied technologies and diaspora talent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Establish a standing energy emergency council reporting directly to national leadership:** A high-level council composed of TECU leadership, select MoE transition officers, and national security advisors should be created to ensure fast decision-making, resource prioritization, and deconfliction across sectors (e.g., energy, defense, finance, environment).

- **Formalize international technical and financial partnerships within the first 60 days:** Engage and sign working agreements with the international agencies and institutes, and regional allies to secure emergency credit lines, technical assistance, and external validation of Iran's energy recovery efforts.

- **Prepare early legal architecture for a future transparent energy sector:** Begin drafting the foundational legal instruments—such as an Energy Reform Act and Independent Regulator Charter—to shape the long-term energy market. These efforts will help attract credible investment and assure the public of fair governance.

- **Launch a national public education campaign on energy realities and reform:** To maintain public trust and prevent unrest, a targeted media campaign should inform citizens about the state of the energy system, subsidy transitions, and the long-term benefits of reform. Messaging must be transparent, consistent, and apolitical.

- **Prioritize coordinated energy diplomacy for targeted sanctions relief:** Within the first 90 days, launch a coordinated diplomatic effort—centered on transparent energy sector reform and nuclear cooperation—to unlock targeted sanctions relief. This should focus initially on unfreezing energy revenues held abroad, securing humanitarian energy exemptions, and facilitating technical trade essential for infrastructure recovery.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- **Operational continuity of energy supply across Iran:** Restoration of electricity and fuel flows to all provinces, with priority to hospitals, water systems, and critical services.

- **Secured control of energy institutions:** Full seizure of physical and digital infrastructure, including SCADA systems, oil terminals, and power plants, with IRGC-linked personnel removed.

- **Revenue generation from stabilized exports:** Restart of export operations from key terminals and refineries, securing short-term revenue for national stabilization and international credibility.

- **Public confidence in transitional governance:** Daily communications, visible energy improvements, and the dismantling of regime-linked security forces build legitimacy and national trust.

- **Institutional foundation for reform:** Merged and restructured the Ministry of Energy (MoE) prepared to take over from TECU, with legal review mechanisms, staffing plans, and infrastructure upgrades in motion.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

- **Metrics for Success**

    - **Electricity and fuel flow restoration:** Daily megawatt output and provincial fuel supply benchmarks, with 70% baseline service restoration targeted by Day 45.

    - **Personnel vetting and replacement:** Percentage of critical posts refilled through Emergency Vetting Commission, with biweekly reports on staffing gaps.

    - **Infrastructure recovery:** Facility-level audit dashboards tracking functional recovery, outages, and technical upgrade status.

    - **SCADA and cybersecurity hardening:** Network integrity reports confirming full root access control and elimination of foreign-linked vulnerabilities.

    - **Public trust and stability:** Monitoring public sentiment via hotline volume and social media trends. Tracking participation in fuel voucher pilots and feedback loops.

    - **Diaspora integration metrics:** Number of returnees onboarded, assigned, and retained within the TECU and MoE system.

- **Review Process**

    - Daily Situation Reports compiled by TECU regional command centers and aggregated at HQ.

    - Weekly National Energy Briefings shared with the Crown Prince's Transitional Authority and international liaisons.

    - Monthly Independent Oversight Summaries to be released publicly, covering restoration, safety, and staffing KPIs.

ANTICIPATED POLITICAL CHALLENGES

- **Resistance from entrenched regime-linked personnel at the provincial level**

    Many mid- and upper-level energy officials have personal or financial ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Removing them may trigger local sabotage or bureaucratic delays.

    Mitigation: Immediate dismissal of top two ranks with simultaneous deployment of TECU-trained replacements backed by visible enforcement units.

- **Populist backlash against international coordination or diaspora leadership**

    Anti-reform factions may frame the return of diaspora experts or coordination with international agencies as foreign interference, aiming to delegitimize transitional leadership and inflame nationalist sentiment.

    Mitigation: Emphasize national ownership of reforms, with diaspora leadership framed as patriotic service. Appoint vetted local experts to key positions alongside diaspora professionals to ensure continuity and trust. Maintain transparency in selection processes, publicize stories of successful cooperation, and use targeted media campaigns to counter regime narratives and promote unity.

- **Sabotage and espionage during early SCADA or facility handovers**

  IRGC remnants may exploit digital or physical access points to sabotage key infrastructure during the transition window.

  Mitigation: Isolate all SCADA systems on Day 1, purge foreign-linked VPNs, and deploy plainclothes counter-sabotage units with rapid intervention authority.

- **Opposition to transparency and audit-driven accountability**

  Regime beneficiaries and corrupt actors may obstruct or discredit TECU's transparency efforts (e.g., public dashboards, contract reviews).

  Mitigation: Tie transparency to national dignity and recovery. Empower public watchdog groups and international observers to amplify legitimacy.

- **Delayed international financial support**

  Uncertainty over legal recognition or geopolitical risk may slow the release of frozen assets or emergency credit.

  Mitigation: Coordinate early with international partners. Secure pre-drafted credit instruments and public commitments during pre-entry (Phase 0).

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INDUSTRY: Managing Assets and Maintaining Output

February 2026

This Emergency Phase plan provides a national strategy for restoring industrial output, securing critical supply chains, and laying the groundwork for long-term manufacturing and export-led growth in the aftermath of regime collapse. It prioritizes security, workforce stabilization, infrastructure continuity, and governance reform across Iran's core and enabling industries.

The plan will be coordinated by the Transitional Industrial Recovery Authority (TIRA) operating in collaboration with local technical teams, international advisors, and vetted diaspora professionals.

The plan covers three functional layers:

- **Tier 1:** Immediate recovery and protection of vital production systems (food, health, defense-related manufacturing).

- **Tier 2:** Stabilization and restart of foundational sectors with economic and employment impact (construction materials, automotive, mining).

- **Tier 3:** Coordination and planning for high-tech and value-added sectors to enter full recovery in Phase 2 (post-180 days).

KEY PRIORITIES

- **Establish Transitional Industrial Recovery Authority (TIRA):** Central body with oversight over all industrial sites, manufacturing zones, and nationalized economic infrastructure. TIRA shall co-govern industrial assets with the Ministry of Economic Affairs' Privatization Implementation Committee (PIC), using per-enterprise special accountants to supervise transactions and prevent tunneling, with external Big-4 style oversight.

- **Secure and assess Tier 1 industries (Food, Pharma, Agro):** Ensure continuity of food production, distribution, medical supply chains, and fertilizer access within two weeks.

- **Conduct national industrial asset census**: Map and assess industrial parks, refineries, plants, and major Small and Medium-sized Enterprises zones. Identify sabotage, looting risks, and restart potential.

- **Launch Industrial Workforce Stabilization Plan:** Vet and rehire skilled workers, engineers, plant managers, and factory operators; prevent black market diversion.

- **Restore electricity and water to Tier 1 and Tier 2 clusters:** Coordinate with TECU and municipalities to prioritize high-employment and food/pharma-linked industrial zones.

- **Initiate legal reform and inventory cleanup:** Place IR-linked and quasi-state assets under temporary custodianship/receivership (not blanket nationalization), conduct audits, and prepare clean re-privatization channels via PIC.

- **Create Emergency Import Facilitation Framework:** Work with international partners to ensure the import of critical inputs: active pharmaceutical ingredients, wheat, medical supplies, fertilizer, machine parts, and clean packaging materials. Coordinate import financing with short-term domestic government issuance and banking forbearance to ensure working capital for Tier 1 and 2 inputs.

- **Stand up Supply Chain Risk Control Unit:** Monitor bottlenecks, hoarding, and sabotage risks across transportation, agro-logistics, and industrial inputs.

- **Form Industrial Situation Room under TIRA:** 24/7 cross-functional team (power, water, customs, parts, security) with an hourly Service Level Agreement to clear blockers for Top-100 plants; publish a public burn-down chart of resolved vs. open issues.

- **Prepare Transitional Industrial Law:** Set legal foundation for factory property rights, custodianship/receivership powers (not blanket nationalization), 30-day fast-track dispute resolution, temporary indemnity for vetted emergency managers acting in good faith, and a re-privatization roadmap.

- **Embed early financial-stability measures:** Support a 3–6 month temporary, market-wide suspension of trading on the Tehran Stock Exchange, enforce withdrawal caps, freeze conversion of investment accounts, and ban fire-sale ownership changes during stabilization.

ASSUMPTIONS

- Territorial and energy security are largely stabilized (per TECU Phase 1–2 completion).

- Domestic fuel and electricity flows are resuming in 70%+ of provinces.

- The transitional authority has initial public legitimacy and international recognition.

- IRGC and Bonyad-linked industrial assets have been partially frozen or secured.

- Short-term import credit lines or barter arrangements are available with neighboring countries and Western allies.

- Time-bound capital controls and transparent timelines will be maintained while monetary/exchange frameworks shift to a floating or crawling-peg regime, and FATF engagement begins.

Phase 0: Pre-Entry Coordination (Before Day 1)

- **Form the Transitional Industrial Recovery Authority (TIRA):** TIRA will be formed under the directive of the leader of the national uprising.

- **Develop Tiered Industrial Prioritization Map:** Classify industrial clusters into Tier 1, 2, and 3.

- **Create Emergency Supply Chain Surveillance System:** Map the movement of wheat, APIs, medical goods, and other essentials.

- **Pre-announce finance safeguards:** With CBI and MoF, prepare deposit-insurance extension/blanket guarantee, bank-holiday toolkit, and a 3–6 month temporary, market-wide suspension of trading on the Tehran Stock Exchange, halt with external audits of listed companies.

- **Coordinate with TECU and Emergency Water Unit:** In order to ensure industrial cluster readiness for phased energy restoration.

- **Coordinate with international partners for rapid import of essential items:** This will bridge inventory (medicines, food inputs, seeds, agricultural chemicals, etc.)

- **Publish a Top-100 Restarts list** (plant, location, product, jobs, utility status, missing spares) within 72 hours, updated daily.

Phase 1: Emergency Seizure and Lockdown (Days 1 to 10)

- Seize and secure major production facilities previously operated by IRGC-linked foundations (Khatam al-Anbia, Bonyad-e Mostazafan, EIKO). Detain or suspend senior leadership and replace with vetted local professionals.

- Protect Tier 1 facilities (wheat mills, dairy, pharma plants, poultry feed processors) with military security and local workforce support.

- Deploy coordinated security measures including military guards, rapid perimeter fortification, and community-based monitoring, to protect factories, warehouses, and raw material depots from looting or sabotage, which historically cause irreversible asset loss during transitions.

- Issue joint TIRA–Central Bank (CBI) decree:
    - Cap daily cash withdrawals from bank branches/ATMs (thresholds set by MoEcon/CBI and reviewed weekly).
    - Freeze conversion or transfer from brokerage/investment accounts into checking/savings to prevent panic liquidity drains.
    - Ban fire-sale asset transfers/ownership changes (block trades, control transactions) without explicit approval.
    - Enforce foreign-exchange (FX) cash-carry limits at borders with declaration requirements and penalties for excess.

- Deploy Rapid Inventory and Capacity Teams to assess functionality of core agro-processing and pharmaceutical lines.

- Seize and safeguard customs warehouses, industrial input depots, and black-market medical storage.

- Ban the export of critical health and food items until national stabilization.

Phase 2: Stabilization and Triage (Days 11 to 40)

- **Restore and restart Tier 1 production lines**: This includes production lines for flour, rice packaging, edible oil, dairy, vaccines, insulin, IV fluids, antibiotics, poultry and cattle feed, seed processing, etc. Priority should also be given to labor-intensive industries with low import dependency, which can be restarted rapidly to absorb unemployed workers and stabilize communities.

- **Stabilize critical packaging sectors (plastic, aluminum, cardboard):** This will prevent bottlenecks in food/pharma delivery.

- **Begin plant-level audits for Tier 2 sectors:** Specifically for cement, steel, construction materials, auto parts, fertilizer.

- **Launch Emergency Workforce Retention Scheme:** Implement temporary wage support for returning skilled labor in Tier 1–2 industries.

- **Initiate national machine tool registry and reactivation program:** Map CNC, extruders, injection molders, kilns, and packaging equipment that can be restarted.

- **Logistics Industrial Situation Room:** Designate three trucking corridors, two rail paths, and two ports with 24/7 staffing, secure parking, escorted fuel convoys, and daily throughput dashboards.

Phase 3: Industrial Continuity and Public Confidence (Days 41 to 100)

- **Activate National Industrial Dashboard** for daily and weekly production stats for critical goods.

- **Launch Pharmaceutical GMP Compliance Unit** in partnership with WHO or EMA technical advisors to accelerate restoration of trust in medicine quality and safety.

- **Finalize emergency tenders** for parts, seeds, and chemicals to fill production gaps.

- **Stand up the Public Procurement Review Board** to prevent price manipulation, political favoritism, or crony contracts.

- **Expand diaspora deployment** to pharma, agro-processing, construction material, and logistics clusters.

- **Begin rebranding and sanitation of products** previously branded under regime labels (medicines, fertilizers, food staples).

Phase 4: Institutional Activation (Days 101 to 130)

- **Launch the Transitional Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Production:** Merge regime-era ministries of Industry, Mine and Trade, Bonyads, and key holding companies into a single interim structure focused on industrial stabilization, legal reform, and reactivation.

- **Initiate National Industrial Re-Registration:** Place all public, private, and semi-public (IRGC-linked) firms under transitional legal protection. Begin asset verification and provisional licensing under the Emergency Privatization Transition Board.

- **Expand Tier 2 Activation:** Reopen cement, copper, urea fertilizer, auto parts, and ICT assembly clusters based on audit status and energy availability. Prioritize job preservation and key inputs for broader recovery.

- **Sanctioned Industries:** For sanction industries, such as petrochemicals and defense-linked manufacturing, a phased reopening strategy should be adopted: maintaining essential domestic supply while deferring export-focused expansion until international frameworks permit, thereby preventing idle assets and layoffs.

- **Activate National Strategic Industries Taskforce:** Convene vetted local and diaspora experts to define reindustrialization pathways for priority sectors including automotive, petrochemicals, mining, defense, and ICT.

Phase 5: Regulatory and Legal Reset (Days 131 to 160)

- **Launch Transitional Industrial Courts:** Begin legal proceedings on property disputes, monopoly dissolution, and worker reinstatement. Ensure transparency and judicial integrity.

- **Labor rights:** Interim labor protections, including wage guarantees, collective bargaining rights, and grievance redress mechanisms, should be codified to prevent worker exploitation and maintain social stability during restructuring.

- **Issue the Industrial Compliance Blueprint:** Publish interim standards covering emissions, water use, safety, labor rights, and anti-corruption, aligned with IPP principles and export market requirements.

- **Environmental safeguards:** Including air and water emission standards, industrial waste treatment, and efficient resource use, must be integrated into all restart approvals to prevent repeating the chronic pollution and mismanagement of the past.

- **Expand Coordination with TECU and Energy Teams:** Integrate industrial recovery plans with fiscal stabilization and utility access across major clusters.

- **Deploy Industrial Watchdog Units:** Field teams to monitor implementation, prevent sabotage or re-monopolization, and collect feedback from industrial stakeholders.

Phase 6: Investment Readiness and Transition Completion (Days 161 to 180)

- **Publish the Clean Industry Investment Registry:** Launch a transparent, publicly accessible list of restructured industrial assets, such as manufacturing plants, processing units or infrastructure, with legal status, compliance level, and investment-readiness tags.

- **Draft Emergency Industry Investment Law Package:** Propose reforms on bankruptcy, joint ventures, foreign direct investment, labor protections, and post-conflict privatization pathways.

- **Reopening preconditions:** Complete external audits of listed industrial firms and demonstrate capital-flight risks are contained; consider coordination with an experienced global exchange operator.

- **Diaspora Outreach:** Targeted outreach should be launched to Iranian diaspora investors and industry leaders, offering co-investment schemes and preferential entry into export-oriented sectors to accelerate industrial revival with trusted management expertise.

- **Consolidate the 2-Year Modernization Roadmap:** Finalize internal draft integrating energy access, skilled labor pipeline, small and medium enterprises development, export targeting, and industrial resilience. Public release scheduled after Day 180.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Establish National Industrial Emergency Council chaired by the Crown Prince's delegate:** This council will include representatives from the Transitional Industrial Recovery Authority (TIRA), the interim leadership of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Production (MITP), the Transitional Energy Coordination Unit (TECU), and designated international observers.
- **Prioritize Tier 1 continuity in public messaging:** Daily updates, press briefings, and transparency to counter rumors, corruption, or regime counter-narratives.
  - Pre-approve import corridors for agro and health inputs under humanitarian protocols.
  - Publish a rebranding campaign to distinguish clean, post-regime production from corrupt legacy brands.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- No disruption in staple food, medicine, or supplies.
- Visible economic activity in urban and rural production zones within 30 to 45 days.
- Growing public trust in transitional governance through transparency and stabilization.
- Partial activation of heavy industry, construction materials, and agro-processing by Day 90.
- Legal and institutional groundwork laid for full industrial revival in Years 1 to 2.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Metrics for Success:
- **Industrial Output Recovery:**
  - Percentage of production capacity restored by different sectors.
  - Number of active industrial sites re-licensed and re-operational under provisional permits.
- **Workforce Continuity and Confidence:**
  - Percentage of skilled workforce reactivated and retained in critical facilities.
  - Number of retraining and co-leadership initiatives launched with diaspora professionals.
- **Export and Logistics Reactivation:**
  - Export volume of key goods vs. baseline pre-collapse figures.
  - The number of cross-border logistics corridors stabilized and was monitored.
- **Governance and Transparency:**
  - Number of privatization audits completed.
  - Volume of recovered industrial assets from IRGC-linked entities.
  - Registry entries in the Clean Industry Investment Portal.

- **Public Engagement and Communication:**
  - Number of town halls, stakeholder roundtables, and local-diaspora coordination sessions.
- **Review Process:**
  - Biweekly reporting to the Crown Prince's Transitional Council.
  - Public performance dashboards are updated at 30, 90, and 150 days to build public trust.
  - External technical audits at Days 60 and 180, conducted by international observers.
  - Feedback from industrial unions, integrated quarterly into revised policies.

ANTICIPATED POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Challenge 1: Resistance from IRGC-linked industrial monopolies

- **Risk:** Efforts to audit, freeze, or privatize regime-linked conglomerates (e.g., Khatam al-Anbiya) may trigger obstruction or covert sabotage.
- **Mitigation:** Legal asset freeze orders, visible international support for clean privatization, and security deployments at sensitive plants.

Challenge 2: Public backlash over privatization or diaspora involvement

- **Risk:** Populist actors may frame privatization as foreign theft or diaspora co-leadership as elitist favoritism.
- **Mitigation:** Public communication campaigns emphasizing national ownership, jobs, and public benefit; pair diaspora with domestic counterparts; prioritize transparency.

Challenge 3: Smuggling, looting, or illicit markets during transition

- **Risk**: As legal systems reset, illicit trade in fuel, steel, and medicines may rise.
- **Mitigation**: Customs task force under ISTF with border coordination; fast-track industrial zoning, police presence; tech-enabled tracking.

Challenge 4: Skilled flight or brain drain continues

- **Risk**: Remaining experts may emigrate due to uncertainty, hampering restarts.
- **Mitigation**: Offer 12-month transitional retention contracts; coordinate with the Ministry of Labor and Education to reskill and stabilize.

Challenge 5: Legal uncertainty delays private investment

- **Risk**: Absence of commercial court reform, bankruptcy laws, or JV frameworks may deter diaspora and FDI capital.
- **Mitigation**: Draft temporary legal guarantees under MITP with transitional parliamentary oversight; publish timelines for full regulatory reset.

Challenge 6: Bureaucratic inertia from former regime-affiliated managers

- **Risk**: Some mid-level administrators may slow implementation or sabotage reforms.

- **Mitigation**: Use vetting and loyalty review; pair transitional leadership with local counterparts on interim contracts; rotate regional leadership as needed.

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CYBERSECURITY: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems

February 2026

This report presents a national strategy for stabilizing and securing critical cyber and industrial infrastructure during a period of national transition. It addresses the protection of operational technology (OT) systems, including industrial control systems in energy, water, transport, and manufacturing, alongside telecommunications networks and core digital infrastructure that support national connectivity and information exchange. Legacy SCADA-centric industrial environments and centrally controlled telecommunications systems were not designed for today's interconnected and adversarial cyber landscape. As these systems have become more digitally integrated, they present systemic vulnerabilities that threaten public safety, economic stability, and national resilience. Disruption of industrial control or communications infrastructure can produce cascading effects across essential services and governance. The strategy prioritizes rapid reduction of cyber-physical risk, restoration of secure and accountable network operations, and establishment of national visibility and defensive control. It combines emergency exposure reduction, monitoring and response capability development, and institutional coordination mechanisms to ensure operational continuity while strengthening cybersecurity posture. This stabilization effort creates the secure foundation required for long-term modernization of industrial control systems, telecommunications infrastructure, and national cyber governance frameworks aligned with international best practices. By integrating cybersecurity into the core design and operation of critical infrastructure, the strategy supports resilience, economic recovery, and sustainable digital transformation.

CORE OBJECTIVES

- **Protecting critical cyber-physical infrastructure** including industrial control systems in energy, water, transport, and manufacturing from disruptive cyber threats.

- **Securing national telecommunications and digital connectivity systems** to ensure stable, reliable communication and prevent malicious interference, surveillance abuse, or systemic network disruption.

- **Rapidly reducing exposure in legacy operational technology (OT), SCADA, and network control environments** that were not designed for hostile or highly connected digital conditions.

- **Establishing national visibility and coordinated defensive control** over industrial networks, telecommunications backbone infrastructure, and key digital systems.

- **Preventing cascading societal and economic impacts** resulting from cyber incidents affecting essential services or communications networks.

- **Building integrated monitoring, detection, and incident response capability** across industrial and telecommunications domains.

- **Restoring secure, accountable, and transparent governance of national cyber infrastructure**, replacing opaque or security-compromised control structures.

- **Creating the institutional and technical foundation for long-term modernization**, including secure industrial architectures, resilient telecom networks, and internationally aligned cybersecurity standards.

KEY PRIORITIES

- **Protecting the most critical industrial and energy control systems first,** including national dispatch centers, major substations, refineries, water treatment facilities, and transport control hubs.

- **Securing core telecommunications infrastructure,** including backbone networks, switching centers, data routing facilities, and international connectivity gateways.

- **Eliminating uncontrolled remote access** and unauthorized external connectivity across operational technology and telecom environments.

- **Deploying monitoring and detection capabilities** before attempting major system changes, ensuring visibility into threats and system behavior.

- **Stabilizing digital communication services to prevent outages,** manipulation, or large-scale disruption that could undermine public trust and emergency coordination.

- **Ensuring the safe and continuous delivery of essential services**, including electricity, water, fuel distribution, and communications, throughout the cybersecurity stabilization phase.

- **Establishing centralized national coordination for cybersecurity response,** integrating industrial operators, telecom providers, and government technical teams.

- **Preserving operational continuity while introducing defensive controls,** avoiding abrupt technical interventions that could destabilize legacy systems.

- **Laying the groundwork for long-term secure modernization of industrial control systems,** telecommunications networks, and national cyber governance frameworks.

ASSUMPTION

- **Physical security and access control** are established at most critical industrial and telecommunications facilities.

- **International cybersecurity and technical assistance** are available to support stabilization efforts.

- **Malicious or regime-aligned actors** within critical infrastructure and telecommunications institutions may not be immediately identifiable, early risk reduction depends on systematic insider risk management, controlled access, and continuous monitoring rather than rapid personnel replacement alone.

- **Qualified engineers, network operators, and technical staff** are willing to cooperate with the transitional cybersecurity authority.

- **Regulatory flexibility** will enable rapid deployment of cybersecurity tools and emergency communications support.

- **Long-term modernization** will follow once immediate cyber risks and operational exposure are reduced.

TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE

A dedicated Transitional National Cybersecurity Task Force is established from Day 0 as the central operational authority for stabilizing industrial, telecommunications, and critical digital infrastructure. This task force functions as the national coordination body for cyber incident response, exposure reduction, and cross-sector technical alignment during the stabilization phase.

The task force is composed of vetted domestic specialists, trusted diaspora experts, and selected institutional personnel with critical operational knowledge. Accelerated vetting procedures and role-based access controls are implemented to ensure both trustworthiness and operational continuity. The structure includes defined operational units responsible for OT security, telecommunications security, national monitoring and incident response, technical standards coordination, and sector liaison functions.

Operating on a 24/7 basis, the task force provides centralized situational awareness, rapid decision-making support, and coordinated guidance to critical infrastructure operators. It serves as the bridge between emergency stabilization efforts and the future permanent national cybersecurity institutions that will assume long-term governance and regulatory responsibilities.

EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY SUPPORT AND PROCUREMENT FRAMEWORK

Recognizing that early-stage stabilization may exceed existing national technical capacity, the strategy establishes a structured framework for rapid, secure, and transparent procurement of international cybersecurity expertise, tools, and operational support. This framework enables timely access to trusted external assistance for specialized monitoring technologies, incident response support, telecommunications resilience measures, and industrial control system security advisory services. Procurement is conducted through pre-approved vendor and partner lists, prioritizing providers that meet strict security, transparency, and interoperability standards. All external technical engagement is subject to defined oversight mechanisms, access control restrictions, and contractual safeguards to protect national sovereignty, sensitive infrastructure data, and operational integrity. This ensures that international cooperation strengthens national resilience while maintaining full national authority over critical systems. The framework is designed as a temporary capacity bridge, supporting stabilization and capability transfer until national institutions are fully equipped to manage long-term cybersecurity operations independently.

Insider Risk Management and Controlled Access Strategy

During periods of institutional transition, insider-related risk within critical infrastructure and telecommunications environments must be treated as a primary cybersecurity concern. Immediate identification and removal of malicious or regime-aligned personnel is often impractical due to incomplete records, operational dependencies, and the risk of disrupting essential services. The strategy therefore adopts a defense-in-depth approach to insider risk, focusing first on reducing the ability of any individual to cause systemic harm while enabling gradual personnel vetting. This approach is implemented through a combination of technical, procedural, and legal controls:

Privileged Access Governance: All administrative, engineering, and supervisory accounts across industrial control and telecommunications systems are inventoried. Access rights are reduced to least privilege, multi-factor authentication is enforced where feasible, and session activity is logged for oversight.

Access Pathway Restriction: Unmanaged remote access mechanisms, shared credentials, and undocumented VPN connections are disabled. All remaining remote access is routed through controlled, monitored gateways.

Continuous Activity Monitoring: Monitoring capabilities are deployed to detect anomalous behavior in engineering workstations, SCADA and DCS servers, telecom core systems, and identity management platforms. Behavioral anomalies are flagged for rapid investigation.

Change Control Enforcement: Critical configuration changes to industrial control logic, routing systems, and security devices require dual authorization and are recorded in centralized logs.

Segregation of Duties: Operational authority, system administration, and cybersecurity oversight functions are separated to prevent unilateral, unmonitored control over high-impact systems.

Legal and Administrative Safeguards: Emergency authorities are established to allow temporary suspension of access privileges, reassignment of duties, and immediate credential revocation when suspicious activity is detected.

Phase 0: Pre-Transition Cyber Coordination (Before Day 1)

Objectives: Establishing authority, readiness, and technical preparation

- Establishing a national transitional cybersecurity coordination authority for OT and telecom security.

- Identify and prioritize critical industrial control centers and telecommunications backbone nodes.

- Developing emergency cybersecurity response procedures and communication protocols.

- Pre-positioning passive monitoring tools and rapid technical response teams.

- Preparing initial asset risk lists using available intelligence and operator cooperation.

- Securing encrypted communication channels for coordination independent of national networks.

- Engaging trusted domestic and international technical partners for rapid advisory support.

- Drafting emergency directives for remote access control, credential resets, and network isolation.
- Preparing sector-specific stabilization playbooks for energy, water, transport, and telecom.

Outcomes: A ready command structure, technical playbooks, and coordination mechanisms are in place so cybersecurity stabilization actions can begin immediately on Day 1.

Phase 1: Emergency Seizure and Visibility (Days 1 to 10)

Objectives: Rapidly reducing systemic cyber exposure while establishing operational visibility.

During the first ten days, priority is given to immediate containment of the most dangerous exposure pathways while building situational awareness. In the highest-risk industrial and telecommunications environments, credential control and external network isolation are implemented immediately on Day 1, focusing on administrative accounts, remote access gateways, and unmanaged external connections. These actions are designed to reduce the risk of active interference without altering control logic or interrupting essential services. In parallel, passive monitoring capabilities are deployed across priority sites to establish real-time visibility into system behavior, network activity, and potential anomalies. Monitoring is implemented in a non-intrusive manner that does not modify control processes or introduce operational instability.

Key actions include:

- Launching national OT and telecom asset discovery and risk classification efforts.
- Restricting high-risk external connectivity and uncontrolled remote access beginning Day 1.
- Enforcing emergency credential governance for privileged and engineering accounts.
- Deploying passive monitoring sensors in the most critical and exposed environments.
- Activating interim incident response procedures and sector-specific emergency playbooks.
- Establishing baseline situational awareness without altering core industrial control logic.

Outcomes: Immediate attack surface reduction is achieved through access control and isolation, while non-intrusive monitoring establishes real-time visibility into critical cyber-physical environments without disrupting essential services.

Phase 2: National Visibility and Asset Discovery (Days 11 to 40)

Objectives: Strengthening defensive posture and formalizing cybersecurity governance.

- Expanding segmentation across OT and telecom networks using zone-and-conduit principles.
- Formalizing secure remote access mechanisms with identity-based controls.
- Integrating OT and telecom telemetry into national monitoring and incident response functions.
- Standardizing baseline security configurations and change management procedures.

- Launching targeted workforce training to support operational cybersecurity functions.

Outcomes: Legacy infrastructure becomes segmented, monitored, and governed under unified cybersecurity oversight, significantly reducing systemic risk. In parallel, essential service continuity is strengthened through preparedness for major cyber or system disruptions. This includes validating manual and offline operating procedures for critical industrial systems, preparing safe grid restart (blackstart) capabilities following a cyber incident, ensuring fallback telecommunications routing and emergency communications resilience, and defining clear operational protocols for when manual overrides may be used in legacy control environments. These measures ensure that essential services can be maintained or safely restored even under degraded digital conditions.

Phase 3: Defensive Stabilization and Hardening (Days 41 to 100)

Objectives: Introducing modern secure platforms alongside legacy systems.

- Deploying secure edge gateways and data aggregation nodes to decouple monitoring from legacy SCADA environments.
- Migrating non-critical monitoring and reporting functions to secure cloud-integrated platforms.
- Launching pilot projects for segmented substation automation and secure engineering access workflows.
- Establishing standardized zero-trust access models for operators, engineers, and vendors.
- Expanding monitoring coverage to substations, plants, and high-value field locations.

Outcomes: Modern monitoring and supervisory capabilities begin operating in parallel with legacy control systems.

Phase 4: Institutionalization of Cyber Defense (Days 101 to 130)

Objectives: Expanding secure architecture and reducing dependence on legacy SCADA.

- Transitioning distribution operations into secure, standardized platforms.
- Expanding edge-based control environments to selected plants and substations.
- Integrating WAMS/PMU telemetry into AI-assisted monitoring and stability analytics.
- Replacing high-risk legacy SCADA components in prioritized sites.
- Formalizing lifecycle security management for PLC, DCS, and IED assets.

Outcome: Modern architecture becomes operational across key sectors, significantly reducing reliance on legacy supervisory systems.

Phase 5: Controlled Transition Preparation (Days 131 to 160)

Objectives: Establishing modern architecture as the dominant operational model.

- Scaling modular, software-defined control layers across transmission and distribution environments.

- Expanding secure orchestration services for EMS/DMS analytics and coordination.

- Migrating remaining monitoring and supervisory integrations away from legacy SCADA dependencies.

- Validating resilience through simulation, digital twin testing, and sector-wide exercises.

- Preparing structured decommissioning plans for legacy SCADA systems.

Outcomes: Modern secure architecture becomes the primary platform for monitoring and supervisory control, with legacy systems confined to isolated roles.

Phase 6: Modernization Readiness and Regulatory Alignment (Days 161 to 180)

Objectives: Establishing the foundation for long-term transition and embedding sustainable cyber resilience.

- Confining and isolating the highest-risk legacy SCADA-centric supervisory components.

- Retiring unsafe remote access pathways and vendor-dependent external connections.

- Finalizing prioritized decommissioning and replacement plans for legacy EMS, DMS, and substation supervisory systems.

- Initiating pilot replacements and controlled modernization projects in selected non-critical environments.

- Expanding AI-driven anomaly detection and predictive maintenance capabilities.

- Integrating digital twins into operational planning, resilience validation, and change testing.

- Establishing continuous improvement processes and aligning regulatory frameworks with international cybersecurity and infrastructure standards.

Outcomes: Legacy dependencies are reduced and high-risk exposures are contained, while structured modernization plans and pilot deployments prepare the ground for a multi-year architectural transition. Industrial cybersecurity becomes embedded as a sustained engineering and governance function, supporting resilient, adaptable, and internationally aligned infrastructure operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Establishing a National Cyber Governance Council reporting directly to national leadership:**
  Creating a high-level body responsible for unified oversight of cybersecurity across critical infrastructure, telecommunications, finance, defense, and public services, ensuring rapid decision-making, cross-sector coordination, and national risk prioritization.

- **Formalizing a National Cybersecurity Authority with regulatory and supervisory powers:**
  Defining essential and high-impact digital operators, setting mandatory baseline security

requirements, conducting audits, and enforcing compliance to ensure consistent national protection standards.

- **Standing up a National CERT/CSIRT with sector-wide coordination authority:**
Operating a 24/7 national cyber incident response center to coordinate detection, response, threat intelligence sharing, and recovery support across industrial, telecom, and government networks.

- **Mandating time-bound incident reporting for critical operators and telecommunications providers:**
Requiring standardized reporting procedures, severity classification, and escalation protocols to ensure national visibility into major cyber incidents and coordinated response.

- **Publishing a national cybersecurity strategy with measurable implementation milestones:**
Defining roles, funding priorities, timelines, and accountability structures to guide national cyber resilience efforts and track progress through regular public reporting.

- **Institutionalizing cybersecurity risk management at ministerial and executive levels:**
Embedding cyber risk into national governance and enterprise oversight processes, with clear accountability, performance metrics, and risk ownership.

- **Standardizing baseline security controls for industrial, telecom, and government networks:**
Requiring segmentation, identity-based access control, secure remote access, continuous monitoring, and tested recovery procedures across critical digital environments.

- **Implementing secure procurement and supply chain governance:**
Requiring vendor accountability, lifecycle security support, vulnerability disclosure practices, and contractual audit rights for systems supporting critical infrastructure and telecommunications.

- **Reforming lawful interception and network control mechanisms under democratic oversight:**
Ensuring that any state access to telecommunications infrastructure is transparent in law, independently supervised, and subject to accountability safeguards.

- **Building a national transparency and trust framework for cybersecurity performance:**
Publishing resilience indicators, anonymized incident statistics, and audit outcomes to strengthen public trust and investor confidence in national digital stability.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- Achieving national visibility across critical industrial, telecommunications, and government digital infrastructure.

- Reducing systemic cyber exposure in legacy OT, SCADA, and core network environments.

- Establishing continuous monitoring and coordinated incident response capability at the national level.

- Stabilizing essential services, including electricity, water, transport, and communications, against cyber disruption.

- Embedding unified cybersecurity governance and regulatory oversight across sectors.

- Strengthening resilience against state-sponsored and criminal cyber threats.

- Creating institutional readiness for long-term modernization of industrial and telecommunications infrastructure.

- Improving international confidence in the security and reliability of national digital and critical infrastructure systems.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

- **Metrics for Success**
    - **Critical infrastructure cyber stability:** Tracking percentage of priority industrial and telecom facilities operating without cyber-related disruption, with a target of 70% monitored and stabilized coverage by Day 45.
    - **Asset visibility and monitoring coverage:** Measuring the proportion of critical OT and telecom assets under continuous passive monitoring, with weekly expansion targets.
    - **Exposure reduction:** Reporting reductions in uncontrolled remote access pathways, exposed services, and unsegmented network zones across critical sectors.
    - **Incident detection and response performance:** Tracking means time to detect and respond to significant cyber incidents across industrial and telecommunications networks.
    - **Security control implementation:** Monitoring progress in segmentation, identity-based access enforcement, and secure remote access deployment at priority facilities.
    - **Workforce and capability readiness:** Measuring the number of trained OT and telecom cybersecurity personnel assigned to national and sectoral monitoring and response roles.
    - **Public digital service stability:** Tracking continuity of essential communication services and absence of large-scale cyber-related outages affecting the public.

- **Review Process**
    - **Daily Situation Reports:** Compiled by national and sectoral monitoring centers, summarizing incidents, exposure changes, and system stability.
    - **Weekly National Cybersecurity Briefings:** Delivered to national leadership and key sector authorities, covering risk trends, incident response performance, and stabilization progress.
    - **Monthly Public Oversight Summaries:** Releasing high-level, non-sensitive metrics on infrastructure stability, response readiness, and cybersecurity improvement to strengthen transparency and trust.

ANTICIPATED POLITICAL CHALLENGES

- **Entrenched security-service capture of telecom and digital institutions**
  Legacy actors may resist reforms that reduce opaque control over backbone networks, data centers, and lawful interception capabilities.
  Mitigation: Establishing clear statutory authority and independent oversight, separating operational

network management from security/political chains of command, and enforcing executive accountability for cyber risk governance.

- **Backlash against tightening incident reporting and external audit powers**
Operators may frame mandatory reporting and audits as "politicization," cost burdens, or national-security exposure, delaying compliance.
Mitigation: Mandating time-bound incident reporting and regulated supervision as national resilience requirements, with clear thresholds and protected reporting channels.

- **Disinformation framing cyber reform as "foreign control"**
Hardliners may portray adoption of international norms and cooperation as surrendering sovereignty.
Mitigation: Positioning reforms as sovereignty-strengthening (resilience, continuity of essential services), publishing transparent performance metrics, and emphasizing domestic ownership of standards and enforcement.

- **Sabotage and cyber disruption during institutional handover**
Actors with privileged access may attempt to wipe logs, disable monitoring, or trigger outages during transition windows.
Mitigation: Executing rapid credential control, privileged access management, and continuous monitoring through a national CSIRT-led coordination model.

- **Resistance to executive-level liability and board-level cyber accountability**
Senior leaders may oppose governance models that make management bodies explicitly responsible for cyber risk measures.
Mitigation: Codifying leadership accountability and oversight duties as part of national cyber governance, tied to audits and enforcement.

- **Delay or conditionality in international technical support and procurement**
Geopolitical uncertainty can slow access to telecom equipment, security tooling, and capacity-building support.
Mitigation: Pre-negotiating technical assistance frameworks, diversifying suppliers, and standardizing secure procurement and lifecycle obligations.

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ENVIRONMENT: Managing and Protecting Natural Resources

February 2026

This white paper outlines a strategic framework for environmental management and governance during the emergency phase of Iran's post-regime transition. It focuses on the stabilization of critical ecosystems, the restoration of core environmental governance functions, and the urgent mitigation of acute pollution threats with direct risk to public health. The plan also aims to lay the foundation for long-term reform by engaging stakeholders, the private sector, academic networks, NGOs, and the public, while restoring institutional legitimacy and mobilizing international cooperation. Given the acute state of water bankruptcy in Iran and its urgent implications for national security, a dedicated "Water" chapter has been included separately, while remaining closely coordinated with the environmental transitional plan.

IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Environmental management is a pillar of national recovery and security during the post-regime transition period. Decades of governance failure, mismanagement, corruption, and destructive policies have pushed Iran to the brink of ecological collapse, manifesting in water scarcity, poor water quality, polluted air, soil, and agricultural products, land subsidence, deforestation, wetland loss, and biodiversity decline. These systemic failures threaten public health, undermine food and water security, and weaken the social fabric of the nation. Addressing these challenges is essential not only to alleviate humanitarian risks but to restore public trust and uphold the integrity of the nation's natural heritage. Moreover, an effective path to environmental recovery can catalyze renewed engagement with the international community, opening communication and access to technical expertise, climate and environmental funding, and regional cooperation on transboundary challenges.

OBJECTIVES

- Stabilize and protect the country's most critical ecosystems to prevent further irreversible environmental loss.
- Mitigate immediate pollution threats to safeguard public health.
- Rebuild institutional trust and international cooperation through transparency, civic engagement, and partnerships with global environmental bodies.
- Establish the foundation for long-term environmental reform, transparency, and sustainable management frameworks.

KEY PRIORITIES

- Establishing emergency environmental governance and assessment capacity: Form the Transitional Environmental Emergency Task Force (TEETF) to assume operational oversight, coordinate response efforts, and facilitate rapid national assessments that re-evaluate and prioritize critical needs, including ecological damage, pollution hotspots, and associated public health risks.

- Stabilizing critical ecosystems and preventing irreversible ecological loss in high-risk areas: Direct emergency resources toward protecting the country's most endangered ecosystems, aiming to maintain ecological resilience and avoid long-term national and regional consequences.

- Restoring institutional functionality and preserving environmental capacity: Maintain the core operations of the Department of Environment and regional offices by retaining and educating vetted technical staff and protecting monitoring infrastructure.

- Protecting public health through urgent pollution control response: Prioritize immediate interventions to address critical air and water pollution issues, conflict-related contamination, and hazardous waste in affected communities, with a focus on safeguarding vulnerable populations.

- Rebuild public trust and reestablish international cooperation: Initiate a national communication and education campaign to promote transparency and civic engagement in environmental protection and restoration. Engage with regional partners and international institutions to unlock emergency and climate-related funding, facilitate technical cooperation, donor engagement, and multilateral environmental diplomacy in support of environmental restoration efforts.

ASSUMPTIONS

- A coherent, functional, and stable political structure will exist to issue executive decrees, mobilize national institutions, and enforce environmental emergency measures.

- Environmental professionals, particularly vetted mid-level technical staff in the Department of Environment and universities, will be present and willing to support the transition.

- Key international actors, including UN agencies, regional environmental organizations, and donor institutions, will be positioned to rapidly initiate cooperation, provide technical assistance, and support financing mechanisms once a transitional framework is in place.

- The public will respond positively to transparent communication and opportunities for civic participation, enabling effective outreach, volunteer mobilization, and local engagement in emergency environmental efforts.

- The Transitional Government will be able to secure legal instruments to impose moratoria, declare emergency zones, and restructure institutional mandates as needed.

Phase 0—Before Day 1

- **Assemble a Transitional Environmental Emergency Task Force (TEETF)**: Establish the Transitional Environmental Emergency Task Force (TEETF) as an inclusive core of technocrats, environmental professionals, and experts, with representation from academia, agriculture, industry, and local communities to maintain readiness to assume control of environmental governance structures, draft immediate stabilization protocols, and identify priority ecological zones during the transitional period. The Transitional Water Governance Sector (TWGS) will be formed as a sub-entity of TEETF, responsible for overseeing and coordinating national water resource management. Its specific mandate and authorities are detailed in the Water chapter. TEETF should coordinate closely with the TWGS to prevent duplication and conflict of interest and ensure integrated recovery planning. TEETF and its sub-entities will be dismantled once institutional stability is restored or upon completion of the transitional period.

- **Develop a Preliminary National Ecological Triage Map**: Using existing satellite data, NGO reports, and academic research, the TEETF will produce a triage map of Iran's most endangered ecosystems, including wetlands, lakes, river basins, forests, coastal zones, and biodiversity hotspots, to enable the Transitional Government to deploy resources selectively where collapse is imminent and recovery is still feasible.

- **Identify International Environmental Agencies for Emergency Assistance:** Identify key international environmental agencies and regional multilateral institutions to coordinate emergency assistance when conditions allow. These agencies will be critical for deploying rapid technical missions, supplying equipment, and unlocking multilateral environmental funds immediately after regime change.

Phase 1—Emergency Response and Stabilization (Days 1 to 10)

- **National Environmental Emergency:** Issue an executive emergency decree placing key critical ecosystems under immediate legal protection. This decree empowers rapid response, halts extractive activities, and signals national prioritization of ecological survival.

- **Environmental Governance Capacity:** Reaffirm and maintain the operational structures of the Department of Environment (DoE) and provincial environmental offices. Retain technical and mid-level staff to ensure continuity in any essential ongoing efforts of environmental monitoring, protected area management, and pollution control. Conduct rapid and transparent vetting to identify and suspend individuals with proven records of corruption or politically motivated environmental negligence. Engage highly motivated and experienced individuals to manage new efforts and projects.

- **High-Risk Activities:** Assess all deforestation-driven industries, sand mining, and hunting licenses in priority zones, and suspend them where harmful impacts are confirmed, pending further evaluation.

- **Secure Strategic Environmental Assets:** Deploy security and enforcement teams to protect strategic sites and prevent the looting of equipment and vandalism of monitoring stations.

- **Emergency Water and Air Pollution Response:** Support TWGS-led efforts to mobilize potable water delivery, mobile water purification units, and water tankers to high-risk urban centers and impose high-pollution emergency controls in cities facing critical smog levels.

Phase 2—Rapid Assessment and Pollution Response (Days 11 to 40)

- **Immediate Field Assessment:** Initiate rapid environmental field surveys of high-priority regions to generate fast-turnaround reports on ecological function, contamination, immediate needs, and restoration potential. Incorporate appropriate satellite and cloud technologies for climate risk screening to identify regions facing compounding vulnerabilities due to desertification, water scarcity, or heat stress.

- **Emergency Pollution and Conflict Waste Cleanup:** Launch a rapid environmental assessment to identify health-threatening conflict and industrial pollution. Initiate emergency cleanup of pollution hotspots to prevent secondary health crises. Implement an emergency mandate to strictly control and prohibit the use of unregistered or unsafe chemicals across municipal, agricultural, and industrial sectors.

- **Air Quality Emergency Measures:** Institute temporary traffic restrictions in severely affected cities to reduce urban emissions. Assess halting the burning of high-emission fuels in power plants and industrial boilers, particularly in areas with acute pollution episodes, and prioritize the distribution of cleaner fuels to smog-prone cities.

- **Enforce Emergency Protections for National Fisheries:** Review and monitor trawling activities and contracts, and strengthen scientific stock assessments for vulnerable species. Temporarily suspend new industrial fishing licenses in coastal areas to protect depleted marine biodiversity pending further assessments.

- **Environmental Public Education and Communication:** Launch a national public information and educational campaign to reassure citizens about the government's commitment to urgent environmental protection. Promote transparency on environmental risks, encourage civic participation in conservation efforts, and build public trust in the Transitional Government's response.

- **Local Leadership Engagement:** Engage trusted local leaders and community representatives to identify site-specific environmental risks, mediate local disputes, and support rapid response operations, leveraging their local knowledge and influence to help tailor interventions to regional realities and improve cooperation in affected areas.

Phase 3—Institutional Coordination and Reform Planning (Days 41 to 100)

- **Strategic Projects Assessments:** In coordination with TWGS and relevant sectoral agencies, review all major infrastructure and development projects to identify those lacking valid Environmental Impact Assessments or requiring reassessment. Conduct necessary evaluations and recommend suspension, revision, or continuation based on ecological integrity and public health considerations.

- **Legal and Institutional Reform:** Convene a temporary commission to develop draft recommendations to establish integrated environmental governance mechanisms and align future policies with principles of ecological justice, sustainable agricultural and industrial development, and

efficiency and equity in resource allocation, while suggesting removal and revision of the regulations that are not in accordance with the current needs of the country. Priority areas should include formal recognition of water rights and resource management, in coordination with TWGS, public education and participation mechanisms, and the integration of sustainable development principles.

- **International Partnerships and Consultation:** Develop a roadmap for long-term engagement with critical international institutions and countries with leading environmental and sustainability practices, including the United States, Israel, Australia, and members of the European Union, to coordinate the mobilization of emergency funds and technical assistance from international agencies within a nationally led framework. Facilitate visits by international observers and experts to assess ecological challenges and support financial and technical assistance efforts.

- **Strengthen institutional capacity and public participation:** Develop rapid training and capacity-building programs for local authorities, technical staff, and civil society. Promote environmental education, raise public awareness, and create participatory platforms that empower communities to contribute to environmental recovery and governance.

Phase 4—Strategic Infrastructure, Intelligence and Accountability (Days 101 to 180)

- **Forest and Rangeland Protection:** Impose an immediate nationwide ban on commercial timber cutting in high-value forests, and ramp up ranger patrols. Encourage community-based monitoring of rangelands and support immediate practices that enhance soil health and vegetation recovery, while gradually adjusting grazing to align with the vegetation regrowth.

- **National Environmental Intelligence Platform:** Create an open-access monitoring system to collect, analyze, and share real-time environmental data from satellites, sensors, and local reports. This platform will enhance transparency, support evidence-based policymaking, and rebuild public and international trust in environmental governance.

- **Environmental Investment Strategy Plan:** Prepare a strategic plan identifying urgent ecological restoration needs, environmental infrastructure priorities, and funding opportunities to attract international donor support, technical assistance, and diaspora contributions.

- **Environmental Truth and Accountability Commission:** Create a formal investigatory body to start documenting ecological crimes and corruption under the former regime, focusing on wetland destruction, unlawful industrial licenses, and the IRGC's role in water diversion, deforestation, and environmental damage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Embed environmental recovery within the broader national stabilization agenda. The environmental crisis must be addressed as a matter of national security and sovereign responsibility, linked to public health, social cohesion, economic development, and regional security. Integration with other sectors, such as infrastructure, public health, and agriculture, will be essential.

- Establish a fast-track coordination mechanism for implementing emergency environmental actions. To avoid institutional fragmentation and bureaucratic delays during the transition, a clearly

mandated environmental coordination body should be empowered to lead and oversee the implementation of urgent environmental stabilization measures across ministries, provinces, and technical sectors.

- Ensure early budgetary and political capital is allocated to environmental recovery. Initial financial resources and political bandwidth should be allocated to environmental response, not only to enable implementation, but to signal the seriousness of intent to domestic and international audiences.

- Institutionalize data transparency and shared situational awareness. A central platform for environmental data and reporting must be operational to support coordinated action, improve decision-making, and build domestic and international trust in the Transitional Government's environmental stewardship.

- Deliver early and visible results to reinforce public trust. Target high-impact, rapidly achievable interventions that demonstrate visible impact, signal a clear break from past failures, and establish early credibility with the public. All emergency interventions should be guided by principles of environmental justice, ensuring that historically neglected communities receive equitable attention, resources, and representation in recovery planning.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- Emergency environmental governance is activated and operational.

- Critical ecosystems are placed under legal protection, with initial stabilization underway.

- Immediate pollution threats are addressed in select high-risk polluted areas.

- Continuity of environmental institutions is maintained, with reform planning initiated.

- Re-engagement with international institutions and donors is underway.

- Public legitimacy and trust are strengthened through visible action and inclusion.

- Strategic frameworks for long-term environmental transition have been initiated.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Metrics for Success:

- Percentage of identified high-risk ecological zones placed under emergency legal protection.

- Number of completed rapid environmental assessments and accessibility to the public.

- Scope and frequency of emergency environmental interventions, such as water provision, air quality measures, soil and land protection, and waste cleanup operations.

- Functional continuity of national and provincial environmental institutions (measured by staffing levels, operational capacity, and service delivery).

- Number of formal engagements initiated with international environmental agencies and donors.

- Public communication reach, media coverage, and the level of community participation in early civic environmental initiatives.

- Completion status of foundational documents: Environmental Intelligence Platform Roadmap, Investment Strategy Plan, and Legal Reform Draft Framework.

Review Process:

- The Transitional Environmental Emergency Task Force (TEETF) will provide monthly internal progress reports and quarterly public briefings to maintain transparency.

- An independent evaluation mechanism, composed of national experts and international observers selected by stakeholders, will validate results and ensure credibility in reporting.

- Progress data and outcomes will be made publicly accessible via open reporting platforms in line with global standards on environmental transparency and accountability.

ANTICIPATED POLITICAL CHALLENGES

- Institutional fragmentation and unclear authority during the transition: Overlapping mandates and a lack of clarity across transitional institutions may delay coordination and enforcement.

   Mitigation Strategy: Activate the Transitional Environmental Emergency Task Force (TEETF) as the central coordinating body, working through the Department of Environment, ministries, and provincial governance structures to streamline implementation.

- Sociopolitical sensitivities in historically marginalized, discriminated, and ecologically distressed regions: In provinces with histories of marginalization and severe environmental degradation, where past environmental injustice has been most acute, new recovery initiatives may be met with skepticism.

   Mitigation Strategy: Coordinate with local governance and community stakeholders to identify and implement early recovery projects in underserved, environmentally high-risk regions, along with transparent communication, participation of locally respected experts, and mechanisms for community feedback to demonstrate inclusion and build trust.

- Resistance from entrenched interests tied to environmental exploitation: Elements tied to the former regime, including military-industrial entities and politically connected contractors, may resist the enforcement of environmental regulations to protect illicit economic interests.

   Mitigation Strategy: Utilize the proposed legal and technical audit mechanisms to investigate and suspend activities that violate environmental regulations or pose clear conflicts of interest. This mechanism should be empowered with legal authority to halt non-compliant projects and initiate corrective action.

- Fiscal constraints and competing national recovery demands: The Transitional Government may face pressure to prioritize immediate infrastructure and economic needs, diverting attention and resources away from environmental recovery efforts.

Mitigation Strategy: The proposed Environmental Investment Strategy Plan should be developed in the first 180 days to attract early international and diaspora support. In parallel, integrate environmental recovery into broader national stabilization frameworks, such as economic, public health, industrial, and infrastructure recovery plans, to justify cross-sectoral budget allocations.

- Limited cooperation on transboundary environmental issues: Regional tensions may hinder early cooperation in managing shared water resources and ecosystems.

    Mitigation Strategy: Pursue technical cooperation through multilateral frameworks and existing UN environmental platforms as outlined in the International Partnerships roadmap.

- Security risks limiting field access: Unrest or sabotage may obstruct field operations in high-risk or remote areas.

    Mitigation Strategy: Coordinate with provincial security units to safeguard personnel and use remote monitoring tools via the National Environmental Intelligence Platform, where access is constrained.

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WATER: Resource Management and Supply Infrastructure

February 2026

Iran is facing a severe stage of water bankruptcy. This plan outlines a set of brief immediate measures to manage and stabilize the country's water sector amid regime collapse. The objective is to protect essential water services, prevent water-related territorial instability during the 180-day emergency phase of the transition period, and establish a sustainable development framework for future water resources management. It addresses urgent threats, promotes equitable water distribution, and recommends essential reforms under the Transitional Water Governance Sector (TWGS).

OBJECTIVES

- Ensure uninterrupted access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation for all citizens during the emergency phase of the transition period.

- Secure, protect, and rapidly stabilize critical water infrastructure across the country.

- Establish transparent, accountable, and participatory interim governance (TWGS) for the water sector.

- Lay the technical, legal, and financial foundations for long-term sustainable and equitable water resources management, aligned with international best practices, human-rights standards, and sustainable development goals (SDGs) defined by the United Nations.

- Foster public trust and civic engagement through education, clear communication, data transparency, and inclusion of local expertise and civil society.

Phase 0: Pre-Entry Coordination (Before Day 1)

- **Establish Transitional Water Governance Sector (TWGS):** Form an empowered body of experts and technocrats, with representation from key sectors and stakeholders such as academia, agriculture, urban water utilities, industry, and municipalities, to oversee and coordinate the water sector during the transitional period; the TWGS serves as an advisory board to the Transitional Government and will be supported by civil society, the Transitional Environmental Emergency Task Force (TEETF), and international partners. Similar to the TEETF, TWGS will be dismantled once institutional stability is restored or upon completion of the emergency phase.

- **Internal Coordination:** Establish robust communication networks with internal managers and administrators to ensure a smooth transition in the water sector.

- **International Coordination:** Identify key international agencies and contacts for rapid engagement, ensuring timely access to humanitarian and technical assistance when conditions are allowed.

- **Security Preparation:** Establish secure communication networks and logistical staging points on national scale.

Phase 1: Emergency Seizure and Lockdown (Days 1 to 10)

- **Organizational Structure:** Maintain the existing organizational structures of the entities fully or partially responsible for the water sector, such as the Department of Environment, the Supreme Water Council, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the water management sector and regional offices within the Ministry of Energy during the 180-day transition period, while preparing a roadmap for future, comprehensive institutional reform.

- **Institutional Control:** Promptly dismiss high-level water sector officials tied to corruption, and safeguard key water facilities from sabotage.

- **Maintain Key Personnel:** Retain mid-level management and technical personnel in water-related ministries and departments, unless evidence of corruption or conflicts of interest is confirmed.

- **Water-Energy Coordination**: In Phase 4 (Days 101 to 180) of the Energy chapter, the merger of the Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) and the Ministry of Energy (MoE) into a unified Ministry of Energy is proposed. This merger focuses on oil, gas, electricity, and nuclear sectors, and does not affect water governance structures, such as the Office of the Deputy for Water Affairs, the National Water and Wastewater Engineering Company, etc. Water responsibilities remain under the existing framework and will later be transferred to the newly appointed minister without disrupting allocation or distribution during the emergency phase.

- **Infrastructure Security:** In close coordination with security agencies, deploy law enforcement and security teams to safeguard key dams, pipelines, water transfer systems, and pumping stations in vulnerable regions (e.g., Khuzestan, the Central Plateau, Tehran, the Urmia Lake Basin, etc.).

- **Emergency Operations:** If water resources are limited, prioritize water supply for hospitals and safe drinking water for all urban and rural communities at the same level of urgency. Then allocate remaining water resources to support essential industrial and agricultural activities.

- **Groundwater Protection:** Strongly prohibit illegal groundwater well drilling, launch a nationwide assessment of aquifer conditions, and temporarily suspend new well drilling until a comprehensive, expert-led evaluation of groundwater resources is completed.

- **Flood and Drought Management:** During the 180-day transitional emergency phase, no institutional changes will be made to the agencies responsible for flood and drought management. Existing structures responsible for flood management such as the National Disaster Management Organization, the Meteorological Organization, etc. will remain in place to ensure stability and continuity in early warning, emergency response, and recovery operations.

- **Public Communication:** Launch nationwide communication efforts to inform the public about stabilization measures, promote civic cooperation, and strengthen trust.

Phase 2: Stabilization and Assessment (Days 11 to 40)

- **Reinstate Critical Services:** Prioritize restoring access to drinking water and sanitation facilities and conduct a rapid technical assessment of agricultural and other water use sectors to identify urgent needs and risks. Decisions on water reallocation for agriculture will be postponed until after the upcoming growing season and the Emergency Phase, to maintain stability, give farmers time to adjust, and enable the development of a national agricultural strategy.

- **Emergency Supply:** Deploy mobile water purification units and water tankers to areas where safe drinking water is not accessible, such as *Sistan and Baluchestan*.

- **Infrastructure Assessment:** Initiate preliminary assessments of critical water infrastructure to identify urgent needs and priority areas for immediate technical or financial support.

- **Import Key Agricultural Goods:** Align agricultural import policies with immediate water availability, reducing stress on critical water resources and supporting national food security.

- **EIA Requirement:** Perform a nationwide audit of major water infrastructure projects and water intensive industries to identify those lacking valid Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) or requiring reassessment.

- **Personnel Engagement:** Engage and collaborate with experienced engineers, specialists, and technical advisors to strengthen operational capacity.

- **Public Education:** A national effort will be launched to educate and mobilize society on water conservation and efficiency. By raising awareness of the country's severe water bankruptcy, the Transitional Government will promote responsible water use and support urgent measures to stabilize the water security outlook and prevent further deterioration.

Phase 3: Operational Continuity (Days 41 to 100)

- **Transparency Dashboard:** Provide weekly public updates on water supplies, reservoir levels, water use, and rehabilitation efforts by incorporating available public and formerly non-public water data through the Ministry of Energy and regional offices. This approach aims to foster public trust and transparency, and make the national water data repository accessible for public use.

- **Environmental Compliance Measures:** Review and if needed suspend water infrastructure projects and water intensive industries lacking valid Environmental Impact Assessments, pending formal review.

- **Project Review of Specific Agencies:** Suspend all major water infrastructure projects and water-intensive industries under the IRGC *Khatam-al Anbiya* (and affiliated) organization pending comprehensive expert audits, and begin re-examining large-scale water studies and consulting projects conducted by *Mahab Ghodss* and similar consulting firms to identify potential corruption, conflicts of interest, and other irregularities. It should be noted that under the Military and Security chapter of the booklet, it is proposed that the IRGC be dismantled.

- **Anti-Corruption Measures:** Initiate public disclosure of water allocations, suspend politically driven projects while safeguarding drinking water supplies, and begin systematic documentation of suspected corruption cases in the water sector for future legal action by independent judicial authorities.

- **Conflicts of Interest:** Through comprehensive audits, dismiss personnel with conflicts of interest due to profiting from water infrastructure projects and water-intensive industries or affiliations with military organizations.

- **International Consultation:** Arrange visits from international observers (e.g., UN, World Bank, EU) and water management experts from countries with advanced water sector expertise, such as the USA, Israel, and Australia to secure financial and technical support.

Phase 4: Strategic Planning and Institutional Transition (Days 101 to 180)

- **Governance Transition Roadmap:** Collaborate with key agencies and stakeholders to initiate drafting a national water governance roadmap that pilots a shift from water-intensive self-sufficiency policies toward a sustainable, diversified economy including agriculture and food production; introduces decentralized administrative management under central oversight; prioritizes sustainable approaches to maintain national water security; ensures stakeholder participation, transparency, and environmental accountability; and lays the groundwork for future legislation and organizational changes.

- **Institutional Reform Planning:** Draft proposed structural changes for water-related ministries and agencies to improve efficiency, transparency, and accountability, without implementing changes prematurely.

- **Suggestions for Future Constitutional Reform:** Suggest excluding the concept of "self-sufficiency" in food and agricultural products from the written future constitution to improve protection of surface and groundwater resources.

- **Legal Framework Drafting:** Develop recommendations for modern water legislation, including provisions on water rights, basin-level management, and public engagement, to support the development of modern environmental and water laws.

- **Economic Purposes:** Foster collaboration among foreign policy agencies, economic ministries, and tourism organizations to develop plans for transitioning from highly water-intensive jobs to low or non-water-intensive economic and employment opportunities.

- **Water Balance Compilation:** Conduct a preliminary basin-level water balance assessment to inform immediate allocation and long-term planning efforts for domestic and transboundary basins.

- **Groundwater Management Strategy:** Finalize the national assessment of aquifer conditions and develop a roadmap for sustainable groundwater use to guide future legislation and regulation.

- **Environmental Restoration Priorities:** Identify and document priority water resources for post-transition recovery, including *Lake Urmia*, and degraded watersheds and wetlands, supported by baseline data and restoration concepts.

- **Initiation of Agricultural Policy Planning:** In collaboration with relevant agencies, ministries, and organizations, initiate development of comprehensive policies on agricultural imports, exports, subsidies, and related areas to address national needs and the critical challenges of water resources and food security.

- **Agricultural Trade Transparency:** Cancel all import and export trade privileges for agri-food items held by individuals or entities affiliated with the Islamic Republic, and ensure that all agri-food trade activities are conducted transparently and disclosed to the public.

- **International Partnership Framework:** Develop a roadmap for long-term engagement with international partners and neighboring countries on transboundary water management, climate resilience, and infrastructure financing.

- **Regional Water Cooperation Scoping:** Initiate technical consultations and diplomatic groundwork for future cooperation with neighboring countries, laying the foundation for structured negotiations on shared water management.

- **National Data Platform Design:** Initiate design and piloting of a centralized, open-source water data system to support future evidence-based decision-making.

- **Procurement Audit:** Launch an initial review of procurement practices in the water sector to identify corruption risks, institutional weaknesses, and areas requiring future transparency safeguards.

- **Review of Domestic Water Tariffs and Subsidies:** Commission a technical analysis of current tariff systems and subsidy policies to highlight inefficiencies, fiscal risks, and equity concerns, informing the design of long-term affordability and sustainability reforms.

- **Investment Strategy Brief:** Develop a strategic investment brief that highlights critical infrastructure needs, financing options, and priority projects to engage the private sector, attract foreign and internal investments, secure international assistance, and mobilize diaspora support. Future investment planning should include but not limited to modern irrigation technologies, water and wastewater reuse, and the potential, targeted use of desalination for drinking water along the southern coastal areas, drawing on international best practices from countries such as Israel and South Africa.

CROSS-CUTTING MEASURES

- **Counter-Sabotage Operations:** In close collaboration with security and law enforcement agencies, deploy inspectors, police, security forces, and rapid response teams to detect and prevent acts of infrastructure sabotage.

- **Crisis Preparedness:** Conduct regular scenario-based exercises addressing drought, flooding, wildfires, dam failures, dust storms, and water infrastructure cyberattacks.

- **Economic Stabilization:** Pursue and secure international emergency funds, in coordination with financial transition authorities, to maintain critical services such as agencies responsible for drinking water; temporarily subsidize operations to avoid service disruption.

- **Inter-Sectoral Coordination:** Ensure collaboration between the Transitional Water Governance Sector and the Transitional Environmental Agency for aligned policies. Water allocation, infrastructure planning, and ecosystem restoration must be coordinated to avoid unintended negative impacts.

- **Water-Energy Operations**: Ensure close collaboration between the Water and Energy sectors during the 180-day transition to align water and power operations. This coordination will ensure electricity for water pumping, treatment, and supply, safeguarding service continuity and public stability.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

- **Public Outreach:** Implement proactive public communication through regular media interviews, emphasizing transparency and accountability.
- **Community Engagement:** Encourage public participation by establishing channels for reporting issues, promoting water conservation, and supporting localized distribution efforts.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

Iran's turbulent political scene can influence every step of this plan. Power brokers in the Transitional Government, including opposition coalitions, returning expatriates, etc., may all want a say over who runs provincial water sectors, dam operations, and emergency funds. Since water control brings both prestige and revenue, these appointments may be fiercely contested, and some factions could even exploit local service disruptions to embarrass their rivals. Long-standing tensions between the capital and outlying regions may add another layer of risk. Provinces such as *Khuzestan* have long argued that other provinces take their water while ignoring local needs. If early allocations appear unfair, street protests could potentially resurface within weeks, affecting the stability of the Transitional Government in the short term. External pressures will also complicate the transition. Several neighboring countries share water resources with Iran and may leverage cross-border flows to gain political concessions or deals. Meanwhile, lingering banking restrictions or sanctions could delay donor funds and international support.

A further, politically charged concern is the country's long-standing commitment to food and agricultural self-sufficiency. Decades of state messaging have equated domestic grain production with national pride, but the existing water bankruptcy makes that goal increasingly unrealistic. Farmers and provincial officials may resist any shift toward importing agricultural products or moving to less-thirsty crops, framing it as a betrayal of sovereignty. Infrastructure sabotage also looms as a real threat in the power vacuum. Disgruntled insiders, organized crime, or extremist factions could target dams, pumping stations, or control systems to gain leverage or discredit the transition authorities. A single deliberate breach or cyberattack could trigger cascading water shortages and public panic. In close coordination with the security and law enforcement sectors, the TWGS and agencies responsible for water infrastructure will therefore need rapid-response protection units, robust backup systems, and community-based monitoring to detect and neutralize sabotage attempts before they escalate. Finally, parts of the old system—contractors tied to the military, managers of big desalination, dam, or pipeline projects, and corrupt procurement networks—may try to come back. They may spread disinformation or stir local grievances to regain influence. If the TWGS fails to show transparent tendering and honest communication, public frustration could erode its legitimacy and open the door to these actors.

Select Mitigation Strategies:

- Depoliticize water governance by TWGS and local provincial water councils (that include stakeholders), guaranteeing the essential allocations for domestic/urban water use during the Emergency Phase.

- Initiate cross border water diplomacy on joint monitoring and data sharing with neighboring countries and seek third-party facilitation (UN agencies, World Bank, USACE, etc.) to shield negotiations from being used as political leverage.

- Introduce a shift of policies that result in reduced agricultural self-sufficiency not as a loss of sovereignty, but as a strategic water security measure that protects farmers and future generations.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

- Continuity of safe drinking water and sanitation services to the population throughout the 180-day transition.

- No major water-related public-health outbreaks or infrastructure failures attributable to mismanagement.

- Verified security and operational status of strategic dams, reservoirs, conveyance systems, and treatment plants.

- Documented audits of legacy projects—water infrastructure and water intensive industries/projects—and procurement practices, with priority corruption cases referred to the judiciary.

- A publicly accessible transparency dashboard delivering weekly updates on water supply, water use, and total water storage metrics and key governance decisions.

- Development of a draft National Water Governance Roadmap, a groundwater/surface water sustainability strategy, and a modern water-rights legal framework prepared for legislative adoption.

- Collaborate with international partners to establish memoranda of understanding and funding agreements for priority rehabilitation and capacity-building projects in the post-transition phase.

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HEALTHCARE: Overseeing the Medicine Supply Chain and Healthcare Services

February 2026

The healthcare emergency plan outlines a structured pathway for moving from a destabilized, collapsing system toward a phased return to stability. It is built as an evidence-based framework informed by the experiences of countries that have previously navigated national states of emergency. The program's timeline is organized according to the prioritization of essential healthcare resources and services.

OBJECTIVES

- Minimize disruption to Iran's existing healthcare provision and financing system.
- Introduce targeted supply-side and coverage reforms to immediately enhance affordability and access.

KEY PRIORITIES

- **Collect Insurance Premiums:** The government should continue to collect premiums for insurance plans such as SSI (Social Security Insurance), IHI (Iranian Health Insurance) and AFHI (Armed Forces Health Insurance) to the extent possible. This will lower the chance that the healthcare system will experience a funding shortfall (or reduce its severity in the event it occurs).
- **Maintain Current Subsidies:** To minimize disruptions in the delivery of healthcare services in the short term, the government will maintain the subsidies that it currently provides to the healthcare system (costing ~1.5% of Iran's current GDP). These include subsidies to providers, premium-reduction subsidies to individuals purchasing IHI, and government contributions to SSI and other eligible insurance plans.
- **Inject Emergency Funds If Necessary:** The government should be prepared to provide additional funding on an emergency basis to the healthcare system in case its ability to collect premiums in the short term is severely disrupted.

ASSUMPTIONS

- The country's banking and payments system remains sufficiently operational.

- The government will have the ability to borrow funds or release frozen assets in order to provide emergency support to the healthcare system in the event of a severe loss in the government's tax/premium collection capacity.

- The government maintains the ability to enforce location restrictions as they apply to physicians' practice.

ACTIONS

- **Halt Enforcement of IMC Price Controls:** The Iranian Medical Council (IMC) acts as an industry cartel that sets minimums for what private providers can charge. Halting the enforcement of those minimums can immediately make healthcare more affordable for millions of Iranians.

- **Eliminate Pharmaceutical Import Tariffs:** These tariffs are usually around 3–4% for drugs without a domestic equivalent and 15–20% for those with a domestic equivalent, but can reach up to 100% in certain cases. Their removal will immediately lower the prices for consumers and alleviate the persistent drug shortage problem that Iranians have experienced under the Islamic Republic.

- **Lift the After-Hours Practice Ban on New Medical Faculty:** The removal of this anti-competitive law will increase the supply of available physicians and enhance affordability and access.

- **More Flexible Practice Locations:** The government will allow physicians to practice freely in all areas for which they meet the current point requirements (i.e., areas with similar levels of economic development). This will allow the supply of physicians to adjust more swiftly to shifting needs while also preventing the urban-rural disparity in healthcare access from rising abruptly. Less restrictive location regulations will also be easier for the government to enforce and allow it to focus its limited enforcement capacity during the transition where it matters most (e.g., rural areas that suffer from severe underdevelopment).

- **Expand the Coverage of Chemotherapy in IHI:** IHI currently pays the full cost of chemotherapy sessions administered at public and university hospitals. However, while domestic chemotherapy drugs are covered, the patient is often responsible for 90–100% of the cost of any foreign-made chemotherapy drugs, which can be prohibitively expensive. Given the quality and availability concerns that exist regarding domestic equivalents, the expansion of IHI coverage to all chemotherapy drugs can greatly improve patient welfare.

ANTICIPATED POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Implementing the supply-side reforms outlined in the previous section will likely invite some resistance from special interest groups. However, the transition period also offers a unique opportunity to overcome such resistance and shift the status quo, considering that:

- The current pharmaceutical oligopoly in Iran is largely under the control of Islamic Republic-connected figures. As those figures lose their political influence in a post-regime Iran, the removal of protectionist regulations should become easier.

- IMC and similar interest groups will likely find it more difficult to organize and mount political pressure campaigns in the immediate aftermath of a regime change. They will also have a more difficult case to make to the government for the enforcement of their priorities when the Transitional Government has limited resources and more urgent tasks to deal with.

HEALTHCARE SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

This white paper lays out a sequenced, evidence-based roadmap for restoring essential health services in the first 180 days following a regime collapse in Iran. The plan is divided into four phases—each with clear objectives, priorities, actions, and risk-mitigation measures—culminating in the institutionalization of emergency structures into permanent health-sector governance. It is devised based on worst-case scenario preparedness and benefits from the scientific evidence of other countries' crisis management outcomes.

Emergency Phase Transition Plan (Day 0 to 180) — Overall Objective

Sequencing relief, stabilization, and institutionalization across a 180-day horizon protects life while signaling a credible pathway toward a sustainable national health service. Such staging mirrors the "emergency-to-early recovery-to-development" framework recommended by WHO and OCHA for complex crises [1].

Preparedness Phase (Day 0 → before Day 1)

Overview

A brief pre-Day-1 window is reserved for constituting two core bodies: the Oversight Committee (OC)—a non-political governance board—and the Disaster and Mass Casualty Program (DMCP), an operational trauma-surge cell. Both must align with the WHO Emergency Medical Team (EMT) minimum standards so that incoming foreign teams can plug into Iranian command structures [1]. Among other mass-casualty preparedness plans, publish a two-page, pictorial wound-care and infection-prevention guides in Persian and regional languages; triage the Ministry of Health's e-forms, stock modules, and referral registries so they work under low connectivity. Evidence from Syria and Libya shows that regions that formed emergency health command posts within 72 hours recorded markedly lower trauma mortality [2][3].

Importance

Transparent, centralized coordination cuts duplication and deters diversion of scarce supplies. The absence of such coordination created recurrent problems documented in the Syrian conflict, where treatment gaps and medicine shortages accounted for tens of thousands of indirect deaths [2]. Analyses of Libya's civil war likewise indicate that early establishment of field command posts reduced case-fatality ratios despite higher injury volumes [3].

Objectives

- The OC sets policy and accountability mechanisms.
- The DMCP drafts triage algorithms, evacuation routes, and surge-staff rosters.

- A nationwide map of ICU, dialysis, and operating-room capacity forms the baseline for a live trauma dashboard.

Key Priorities

- Appoint technically competent OC members, including Iranian diaspora clinicians, and provincial physician leaders from Iran.

- Compile a live inventory of trauma beds and cold-chain nodes to feed an open-data dashboard.

- Pre-stage field-triage modules, trauma kits, and satellite phones at regional airports.

Assumptions

- Core road corridors remain open or can be protected under security arrangements.

- WHO, ICRC, and Red Crescent partners will provide immediate in-kind trauma and IPC (infection prevention and control) support.

- Major public hospitals are structurally intact but need utility restoration.

Actions

Within 24 hours, an executive decree establishes the OC and DMCP with explicit emergency powers; the former Ministry of Health crisis room is reopened as a single coordination node; and fast-track contracts offer hazard pay indexed to inflation for EMS, ICU staff, and biomedical professionals.

Recommendations

Form an external advisory board of Iranian diaspora experts working closely with Iran's academic experts to guarantee alignment with best practice and bolster international credibility. Adopt the WHO EMT(Emergency Medical Teams) verification checklist as the audit tool for domestic surge teams [1].

Expected Outcomes

By Hour 72, the OC publishes its first situation report; the DMCP holds a national contact roster for trauma facilities; and EMS dispatch lines are live in every provincial capital.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Daily situation reports track ICU beds, blood products, essential medications, and EMS response times, while weekly red-team drills stress-test communications. All data feeds an open-access dashboard to foster public trust.

Political Risks and Mitigation

Competing factions may attempt to capture the OC. Live-streamed deliberations, UN observers, and community-health liaison officers who speak local dialects can blunt these efforts and expand legitimacy beyond the capital.

Phase 1 (Days 1-30) — Medication Flow, Hospital Operations and Infection Control

Overview

The first 30 days focus on reopening hospitals, restarting medicine flows, and deploying infection-prevention teams to communities; logistics outranks long-term reform during this "golden month."

Importance

Cross-country reviews show medicine stock-outs in the first two weeks of an emergency correlate with sharp spikes in avoidable mortality and antimicrobial resistance [4]. Rapid restoration of surgical capacity also deters clinician flight, as observed in post-2011 Syria [2].

Objectives

- Deliver WHO essential medicines to all 31 provinces, prioritising ICUs, cancer and dialysis units.
- Restore baseline services—clean water, power, obstetrics, and surgery—in at least 85% of public hospitals. Postponing elective surgeries to make operating rooms available for emergency cases. public service announcements that routine immunization and antenatal visits remain active.
- Activate infection-prevention teams in communities and camps to monitor disease outbreaks and clusters.

Key Priorities

- Use military and postal fleets for a central "push" distribution model until private wholesalers revive.
- Ensure power and water restoration to flagship referral hospitals as a confidence signal.
- Deploy mobile IPC units with chlorine generators and Personal Protective Equipment to high-density communities, camps, and shelters.

Actions

Conduct a 72-hour national warehouse inventory, publish gap lists, and issue blanket purchase orders financed by a pooled donor fund. Provide mixed civil-military escorts for convoys through insecure corridors.

Recommendations

Embed electronic stock-tracking into the OC dashboard; sign rapid-procurement MoUs with Persian Gulf and other international humanitarian agencies; and leverage Iran's postal service and private service providers for last-mile delivery of chronic-disease medicines.

Expected Outcomes

By Day 30, 85% of hospitals are restocked, EMS covers every provincial capital, and the prohibited black-market medicine prices fall, improving equity.

Monitoring and Evaluation / Political Risks and Mitigation

Daily dashboards track stock levels; third-party monitors such as MSF (Doctors Without Borders) publish shadow audits. Public heat-maps of deliveries discourage accusations of bias, while emergency customs decrees streamline inspection for WHO-prequalified cargo.

Phase 2 (Days 31-90) — Mental Health Surge, Insurance Continuity and Workforce Allocation

Overview

- With immediate mortality curves flattening, the system pivots to psychosocial care, financial protection, facilities audit, and equitable staffing. This phase deploys province-wide Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) teams, launches an Emergency Health-Voucher System (EHVS), and activates a GIS-enabled (Geographical Information System) human-resource registry. To ensure accessibility and sustainability, MHPSS services are further strengthened by integrating 24/7 peer support networks, AI-powered triage tools, and clinician-led supervision systems that dramatically expand the country's reach and capacity for mental, emotional, and social wellbeing. Implementing a 90-day rapid safety audits (non-structural first—oxygen lines, generators, water tanks) and map red-tag/amber-tag facilities; publish a capital plan for seismic retrofits.

- Setting up a national chronic-disease database (diabetes, dialysis, cancer and other chronic conditions needing essential services) with a three-month build.

- Starting a reliable simple to use Telemedicine for primary care + mental-health counseling.

- Publishing a 90-day Health Workforce Fair Compensation Package.

Importance

Long-term studies of Bosnian war survivors show that untreated trauma triples later disability claims, burdening fragile insurance schemes [5]. Early insurance continuity also reduces catastrophic out-of-pocket spending, as demonstrated by Rwanda's community-insurance scale-up [9]. However, in many post-crisis contexts, the scarcity of mental health professionals constrains service availability just as population-level psychological need spikes.

Scalable, AI-augmented peer support models address this bottleneck by offering around-the-clock care for low-acuity emotional needs, such as grief, family stress, trauma recovery, and reintegration challenges. Properly trained and clinically supervised peer responders—augmented by natural language processing tools for triage and suicide detection—can extend clinician reach, lower system burden, and provide culturally resonant care at scale.[11]

Objectives and Key Priorities

- Place at least one lead MHPSS team in every province to coordinate service delivery along with the local professionals.

- Operationalize the EHVS (Elderly Health Voucher Scheme) to subsidize essential care for six months.

- Use the digital registry to ensure 90 % of the population lives within 30 minutes of EMS or urgent care.

- Train and deploy peer support responders using a 100-day structured curriculum, modeled after the Supportive Academy framework.

- Integrate AI-powered triage and suicide risk detection tools into MHPSS workflows to support faster, safer escalation decisions.

- Embed emotional wellbeing protocols across frontline healthcare and humanitarian response teams.

Actions and Recommendations

Train three-person psychosocial teams (psychiatry specialist/resident, social worker, local nurse) to leverage cultural legitimacy; roll out biometric EHVS cards with mobile-money reimbursement; and publish hardship-bonus postings for underserved districts. Establish a nationwide peer-support infrastructure, operational 24/7 through chat and phone-based access points. Deploy AI-supported triage engines that classify the severity of distress and escalate high-risk users (e.g., suicidality, psychosis, trauma flashbacks) to clinicians in real-time. Build and launch a national suicide prevention hotline capable of routing calls/texts through AI-powered urgency filters to either trained peers or on-call clinicians. Embed PHQ-9 and GAD-7 (standardized questionnaires) assessments into digital and in-person support workflows to enable longitudinal mental health tracking. Coordinate with the Oversight Committee to monitor ethical use of AI, supervision coverage, and feedback loops.

Expected Outcomes / Monitoring and Evaluation / Political Risks and Mitigation

By Day 90, national MHPSS coverage is achieved, workforce inequity drops 30 %, and over 70 % of voucher claims pay within seven days. Oversight by the Red Crescent prevents provincial power plays, while mass-media public education campaigns destigmatize mental health care. 24/7 peer support channels are live in all provinces, and suicide hotline services are fully operational. Escalation rates and intervention success are tracked using validated tools and AI-derived emotional pattern monitoring.

Phase 3 (Days 91-120) — Urgent-Care Network and Electronic Health Infrastructure

Overview

Phase 3 institutionalizes 24 / 7 urgent-care centres (UCCs) and rolls out the National Electronic Health-Operations System (EHOS) to modernize data flow and enable predictive analytics. Citizen apps or SMS channels push outbreak alerts and locate nearby services.

Importance

Studies indicate a staffed UCC can cut non-emergency ED visits by 17-40%, easing tertiary-hospital overload [6][7]. Systematic reviews also show electronic health records halve laboratory redundancy and significantly reduce medication errors [8].

Objectives and Key Priorities

- Ensure 90% of the population lives within 20 minutes of an operational UCC.

- Achieve live data connectivity from 80 % of facilities.
- Stand-up mirrored, secure servers and distribute QR-coded health IDs.

Actions and Recommendations

Refurbish or erect modular UCCs with point-of-care diagnostics; deploy tele-health pods in sparsely populated areas; build EHOS on open-source DHIS2 (District Health Information Software 2) / OpenMRS (Open Medical Record System); and publish anonymized datasets to crowd-source outbreak detection.

Expected Outcomes / Monitoring and Evaluation / Political Risks and Mitigation

By Day 120, 80% of facilities report electronically, and citizens receive SMS alerts within 10 minutes of outbreak verification. Encrypted cloud backups guard against cyber attacks, while paper-digital hybrids cover low-connectivity districts.

Phase 4 (Days 121-180) — Reassessment and Reinforcement of OC, DMCP, Supply Chains and Digital Systems

Overview and Importance

The final phase converts emergency scaffolding into permanent institutions. Comparative evidence from Estonia and post-genocide Rwanda shows that post-crisis gains survive when embedded in clear legal mandates backed by stable financing, quadrupling five-year sustainability [10][9].

Objectives and Key Priorities

- Conduct independent audits of the DMCP, OC, and national supply chains.
- Table a Transitional Health-Governance Bill enshrining OC independence and setting accreditation standards.
- Expand EHOS to chronic-disease and maternal modules, and run a national DMCP chemical/biological drill.

Actions and Recommendations

Finalize long-term data-hosting agreements; build a national cyber-security operations centre for health data; and launch an online public consultation to shape post-transition health priorities.

Expected Outcomes / M&E(Monitoring and Evaluation) / Political Risks and Mitigation

By Day 180, the OC is legally recognized, digital platforms handle at least 80% of national health operations, and EMS is codified within civil-protection law. A public 180-Day Report will feed into a national academic and public health conference, while staggered funding asks tied to audited milestones minimize fatigue and data-privacy clauses shield against partisan capture.

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EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: Ensuring Continuity and De-Ideologization

February 2026

Reforming Iran's education system requires a phased, multi-year strategy aligned with the evolving institutional, legal, and social conditions of the post-Islamic Republic transition. This strategic document outlines the first stage of reform: Phase 1 (Months 0–6), which focuses on emergency de-ideologization and institutional stabilization.

PHASE 1: THE EMERGENCY PHASE

In the first six months following the collapse of the Islamic Republic, the immediate priority is to stabilize the education system while initiating urgent reforms that ensure continuity and signal a decisive break from the past. This phase must strike a balance between administrative pragmatism and clear political and symbolic action. The dual objective is to keep schools operating without disruption while actively dismantling the former regime's ideological foundations within the education system.

IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES

- Maintaining administrative and operational continuity to prevent chaos, ensure that schools remain open, and guarantee the uninterrupted continuation of teaching, including the timely payment of teachers' salaries.

- Providing essential support services, including free transportation in rural areas and the distribution of school meals in disadvantaged provinces, to promote equitable access, keep students from vulnerable communities in school, and reduce dropout rates.

- Ending gender segregation policies, initially in primary schools, making the wearing of the hijab optional for students and teachers at all educational levels, and abolishing rigid Islamic dress codes.

- In-service training for teachers and staff to help them navigate the new conditions and prepare them to teach in integrated, mixed-gender classrooms.

- Depoliticizing and de-ideologizing the teaching profession, introducing new recruitment standards based on professional qualifications rather than political or ideological affiliation.
- Removing Islamic Republic-related visual symbols, withdrawing selected textbooks and ideologically driven content, and eliminating specific indoctrination-focused extracurricular activities, under the guidance of task forces established explicitly for this purpose.

STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL INTERVENTIONS

To support these priorities, the following legal, administrative, and symbolic measures should be implemented swiftly:

- Legal revision: Repeal all existing laws and regulations that mandate religious indoctrination, gender segregation, or the inclusion of ideological content in curricula.

- Curriculum suspension and audit: Immediately suspend ideologically driven content. Establish an independent task force composed of educators, academics, historians, and psychologists to conduct a comprehensive review of educational materials.

- Review and reassessment of teacher and staff recruitment laws: Identify and temporarily suspend teachers, administrators, and officials who were complicit in the repression of educators, children, and adolescents within the education system or in the enforcement of ideological programs. Offer early retirement packages, accompanied by transparent legal safeguards, to facilitate organizational transition without disruption and with minimal social costs.

- Symbolic rupture: Rename institutions, revise public signage, and remove the Islamic Republic's symbols, slogans, and imagery from school environments to clearly signal political and institutional transition.

ANTICIPATED CHALLENGES

Several risks may complicate this transition:

- The bloated, ideologized bureaucracy, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of public-sector employees, may resist reform.

- Some families, teachers, and school administrators may oppose measures such as mixed-gender education or fear losing their status under the new policies.

- Low-income families may rely on the income generated by their children's labor, making it difficult to reintegrate those children into formal education.

- Individuals affiliated with the former regime may attempt to continue ideological education through private schools, using legal loopholes or regulatory gaps.

Mitigating these challenges will require early and transparent communication, broad community engagement, and targeted social support measures. This will be required particularly for low-income families and for employees whose professional status may be uncertain. This phase must lay the groundwork for deeper systemic reforms in Phases 2 and 3, while simultaneously rebuilding public trust and demonstrating the values of a new, inclusive educational order.

The transition from a gender-segregated education system to coeducational schools in Iran should also begin during this phase, at least at the primary level. However, this initiative brings both infrastructural and social challenges. After more than four decades of rigid gender-segregated schooling, purpose-built spaces for mixed-gender education are largely absent, except in some rural schools. In principle, and in line with the

intellectual framework of a national, secular transformation, schools should be required to fully dismantle gender segregation policies. Yet given current conditions, a phased approach is necessary.

Primary schools should begin implementing coeducational instruction, accompanied by modest physical adjustments, such as changes to restrooms, changing areas, and similar facilities. Flexible classroom arrangements, alongside optional separate spaces, can help accommodate a range of comfort levels and ease the transition during this period.

Workforce adjustment in the education sector will be critical. Many teachers who have worked exclusively in gender-segregated environments may find the shift to coeducational settings challenging. Retraining programs focused on gender sensitivity and inclusive pedagogy will therefore be essential. A more balanced redistribution of female and male teachers will also be necessary, along with incentives to facilitate transitions and reduce institutional friction. The incentives might include bonuses, career advancement, and early retirement packages.

Resistance from conservative groups and networks is also likely at this stage. Some parents may refrain from sending their daughters to mixed-gender schools due to moral or cultural concerns. Addressing this challenge will require a broader cultural and social strategy. Community engagement initiatives like public awareness campaigns and the use of religious and cultural narratives in support of coeducation should be launched to reassure families. Highlighting examples from modern Muslim-majority countries can help build public confidence. At the same time, robust safeguards against harassment, such as transparent reporting mechanisms, counseling services, and comprehensive staff training, must be embedded in all schools.

Students themselves will also require support. Having grown up in strictly gender-segregated environments governed by rigid rules, many may lack the social skills necessary for healthy mixed-gender interaction. Structured programs in social development, orientation sessions, and guided classroom engagement strategies can ease this transition. Encouraging older students to mentor younger ones can further help normalize new behavioral norms.

Beyond gender integration, addressing ideological resistance among educators is essential. Some teachers, particularly those trained under or affiliated with the former regime, may resist reform or fear dismissal. Immediate assessments should be conducted to determine who can adapt, who requires retraining, and who must be removed. Clear assurances should be provided to educators who merely complied with mandatory curricula, while those who actively promoted extreme ideology must be held accountable. Retraining, job security guarantees, and early retirement options should be integral to a humane and pragmatic transition.

Students will also require psychological and academic support. Some secondary-school students, deeply immersed in ideological narratives, may find the transition to secular education disorienting. Younger children may experience anxiety amid broader conflicts among adults. Schools should therefore provide structured spaces for discussion, counseling services, and a gradual curricular transition. These could happen through maintaining core subjects and essential instructional content while incrementally introducing new material in history, literature, and ethics.

To coordinate these reforms, an interim National Education Task Force should be established immediately. The Task Force should be composed of experts, educators, and civil society figures. This body should oversee personnel reforms, initiate rapid teacher training, and ensure that no school is forced to close due to staffing shortages or curricular gaps. During this sensitive period, the system must remain cohesive, functional, and reliable.

This phase is not only about removing ideology and indoctrination; it is about laying the foundations for a civic, inclusive, and student-centered education system. Once a broad consensus around these goals emerges, Iran can begin to develop a comprehensive blueprint for a new educational system that draws on successful global models while adapting them to the country's unique conditions.

Ultimately, overcoming the challenges of the emergency phase will be possible through precise, well-designed measures and sustained cooperation between domestic and diaspora actors. What is required is not only reform within education, but the formation of strong, expert-led teams across all sectors. The new system must bring together professionals from within the system and experienced specialists from abroad. The creation of such teams will help minimize disorder in the immediate post-Islamic Republic period. It will also safeguard the education system, financially, administratively, culturally, and politically, from the risk of shutdown or prolonged instability.

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